On May 12, 2025, China’s State Council Information Office released a major white paper titled “China’s National Security in the New Era”. It presents a comprehensive shift in Beijing’s strategic thinking—distinguishing this as their first dedicated national security declaration since 1949 .
The paper analyzes China’s holistic national security strategy—spanning political, economic, technological, and social spheres—and its global ambitions through the Global Security Initiative (GSI).
Abstract of the white paper in English
This white paper signals a decisive turn toward an expansive, security-first doctrine:
- Security considerations now permeate all domains—development, technology, culture, and governance.
- The CCP’s central role is explicit, and institutional mechanisms are being reinforced to match this priority.
- Internationally, China frames itself as a responsible global security actor via GSI and law-based multilateralism.
- Domestically, new laws and stricter controls cement a securitized society and economy.
http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2025-05/12/content_117870467.html
The Global Security Initiative (GSI) is a diplomatic and security policy framework proposed by Chinese leader Xi Jinping on April 21, 2022, at the Boao Forum for Asia
This paper explores how China seeks to reshape the international order by promoting multipolarity, enhancing regional stability, and countering geopolitical isolation. The study examines GSI’s guiding principles and its practical impact on multilateralism and international institutions, highlighting a key shift in China’s foreign policy toward a distinctive global vision.
A comprehensive analysis of China’s ‘National Security in the New Era’ white paper (May 2025).
A summary of the white paper’s content and structure.
Release and structure: On 12 May 2025, China’s State Council Information Office released a white paper titled ‘China’s National Security in the New Era’. Besides a preface and conclusion, the document is organised into six thematic sections. These sections cover:
(1) China’s role in bringing certainty and stability to a turbulent world
(2) The guiding role of the ‘holistic national security’ approach in the new era
(3) National security providing solid support for steady Chinese modernisation
(4) Integrating security and development
(5) Implementing the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and promoting global security
(6) Reforming China’s national security system and capacity to modernise it An annex lists key national security-related laws enacted in the new era, underscoring the legal framework supporting these efforts.
Main themes: The central theme of the white paper is China’s “holistic” or “overall” approach to national security in the new era under Xi Jinping. It asserts that world affairs are at a historical crossroads of change and instability, yet China has provided ‘reliable stability’ by maintaining its own security and collaborating with neighbouring countries to promote regional peace. It highlights new and ‘comprehensive’ security challenges, ranging from geopolitical conflicts and great-power competition to non-traditional threats such as climate disasters, pandemics and technological risks, and portrays China as a source of stability amidst this ‘interwoven turbulence’. The document emphasises that, under the leadership of the Communist Party, China’s national security strategy has achieved historic successes in safeguarding sovereignty, development and social stability. This has enabled economic prosperity and modernisation.
Notable developments: The white paper codifies Xi Jinping’s holistic national security concept (???????) as the guiding ideology for security work, marking the first time such a strategy has been formally articulated as state doctrine. It stresses that ‘national security is no longer a narrow focus on military defence against external threats’; instead, China now considers security in sixteen interconnected domains ranging from political, territorial, military and economic security to cultural, cyber, ecological, resource, biosecurity and even space, polar and deep-sea security. This white paper introduces several new emphases: protecting political security (i.e. the socialist system and Communist Party leadership) is declared the ‘lifeline’ of national security in the new era, taking precedence across all sectors. Economic security and development are given equal weight – the paper repeatedly insists that ‘high-quality development’ requires ‘high-level security’, and vice versa. It touts achievements in public security and social stability, such as low violent crime rates, few industrial accidents and improved disaster response, as evidence that comprehensive security policies deliver tangible benefits to the people. The white paper also introduces China’s recent legal innovations in national security and notes that a ‘comprehensive and transparent legal framework’ has been established. It highlights laws such as the National Security Law (2015) and new statutes on counter-espionage, data security, biosecurity, counter-terrorism, foreign sanctions countermeasures and the Foreign Relations Law as part of a robust approach to the rule of law in relation to security. On the international stage, the document elaborates on China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), a proposal for reforming global security governance, presenting it as China’s contribution of ‘Chinese wisdom’ to world peace and stability.
In summary, ‘China’s National Security in the New Era’ presents an expansive view of security that blends domestic and international dimensions. It portrays China as a confident yet risk-aware great power that has bolstered its own regime security and development against myriad challenges and now seeks to share its security vision globally for the sake of common peace and development. The white paper systematically moves from describing the volatile global context and explaining China’s security philosophy to detailing how national security underpins China’s modernisation and outlining China’s role in global security governance and ongoing reforms to its security apparatus.
Theoretical Foundations: Ideology and doctrine behind the white paper
Xi Jinping’s holistic national security concept
At the heart of the white paper lies ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’, in which national security is emphasised as a key component of the ideology. The document frames China’s approach to security as being based on both Marxist-Leninist doctrine and China’s own strategic culture. It opens with historical references, such as the proverb ‘Be secure but never forget danger’ (?????) and an invocation of 5,000 years of continuous Chinese civilisation, to suggest that this comprehensive focus on security is a natural continuation of China’s traditions. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has formulated the ‘Overall National Security Concept’ (zongti guojia anquan guan), which the White Paper refers to as a ‘major strategic thought’ and ‘the first guiding ideology for national security work since the founding of the PRC’. This concept was first introduced by Xi in April 2014 at the inaugural meeting of China’s National Security Commission, and has since been elevated to official doctrine.
The white paper defines holistic national security as extraordinarily broad in scope. It posits that ‘national security’ must encompass virtually all aspects of national life: ‘political security as fundamental, people’s security as the purpose, economic security as the foundation, and military, cultural and societal security as guarantees, with the promotion of international security as an important support’. It also calls for coordination between internal and external security, homeland security and citizen security, traditional and non-traditional security, and China’s own security and common global security. In practice, this means that areas such as politics, ideology, the economy, finance, cyber security, technology, ecology, public health, food security, energy security, and even space and polar regions are all considered elements of national security. ‘Nothing is outside the scope of the Party’s definition of security’, as one analysis observed.
A key doctrinal mantra repeated throughout the text is that development and security are inextricably linked. President Xi is quoted as saying, ‘Development is the foundation of security, and security is the precondition for development’. The white paper stresses that China has made ‘coordinating development and security’ a fundamental principle of governance in the new era. This reflects the belief that economic prosperity and social stability reinforce each other; sustained development provides the necessary resources for security, and a secure environment (both domestically and internationally) is essential for development. The document therefore calls for risk-informed decision-making in economic and social policy so that China’s modernisation is not derailed by security threats. For instance, it highlights initiatives such as establishing a national security risk early-warning system, building strategic stockpiles of critical materials, ensuring food and energy self-sufficiency, and safeguarding supply chains. All these measures tie into Xi’s notion of a ‘secure development path’ for achieving the goal of a modern socialist country by 2049.
Importantly, the holistic security doctrine prioritises political security, namely the security of China’s socialist system and Communist Party rule. The white paper explicitly states that ‘upholding the Party’s position as the governing authority and the socialist system’ is the essence of political security. It refers to political stability as the ‘lifeline’ of national security. This reflects the Marxist-Leninist view that the survival of the regime is synonymous with national survival. As commentators have noted, ‘national security is inseparable from Party security’ within this framework. All other aspects of security – economic, military, cultural, etc. – are subordinate to preserving the CPC’s leadership and socialist ideology. The white paper emphasises the importance of resisting Westernisation and hostile ideologies, as well as maintaining strict ideological control over education, the media and cyberspace, in order to prevent political unrest. By codifying ideological security as a facet of national security, the document provides doctrinal justification for the CPC’s tight grip on public discourse and its crackdowns on dissent. These are not presented as mere political censorship, but as necessary measures to neutralise security risks to China’s stability.
Despite the sweeping scope of ‘holistic security’, Chinese officials insist it is not about ‘securitising everything’. Rather, they frame it as improving coordination and prevention. The white paper states that the objective is to ‘enhance the systemic, holistic and coordinated nature of national security work, and effectively wage a comprehensive national security campaign’ . In other words, the intention is to break down silos so that economic, military, technological and other policies are all aligned with a unified security strategy. This reflects Xi Jinping’s call for the modernisation of the national security system and capacity, which includes better risk monitoring, emergency response and the integration of security considerations across all governance fields.
China’s Distinctive National Security Governance Model
The white paper portrays China’s national security governance as a model with ‘Chinese characteristics’, which is distinct from Western approaches. A major point of pride is the creation of a centralised leadership structure for security: in 2014, Xi established the Central National Security Commission (?????????), which operates directly under his leadership. The document states that this has established a ‘centralised, unified, authoritative and efficient national security leadership system and work mechanism’. Under this system, the Communist Party exercises absolute leadership over all national security work. The white paper even devotes a subsection to ‘strengthening the Party’s absolute leadership in national security’, reinforcing the idea that security governance must always align with CPC directives. This top-down, party-centric approach contrasts with that of many democracies, where security agencies have more institutional autonomy and political pluralism is tolerated. In China’s model, party supremacy and regime security are axiomatic — for instance, the text emphasises that safeguarding the ruling party and the socialist system is a non-negotiable core interest.
Another hallmark of China’s security governance is the integration of law-based governance (yifa zhiguo) into national security. The white paper repeatedly stresses that China’s security efforts operate ‘on the track of the rule of law’. It highlights that, since 2014, China has been developing a comprehensive legal system for national security. This began with the 2015 National Security Law as an overarching statute, under which a series of specialised laws and regulations have been enacted. An annex to the white paper indeed lists dozens of new or updated laws in areas such as counter-espionage, cybersecurity, data security, biosecurity, counterterrorism, foreign NGO management, export control and anti-foreign sanctions. The government argues that this legal framework brings transparency and predictability to security governance, ensuring that security measures are ‘codified’ rather than arbitrary. For example, a China Daily editorial on the white paper states that ‘China has established a comprehensive and transparent legal framework for its domestic security environment’, suggesting that, even as it tightens security, China does so through laws and regulations that businesses and citizens can follow.
Holistic national security governance also incorporates economic and social management into the security paradigm. The white paper cites the creation of mechanisms to secure supply chains, review foreign investments for security risks, and stockpile critical resources. It describes a ‘national security risk monitoring and early warning system’, a ‘strategic materials reserve system’, and a ‘framework for major emergency response’ as pillars of the governance model. Additionally, China’s model involves mobilising society, with the text noting strengthened national security education and grassroots vigilance to ‘prevent and defuse risks at the early stage’. This reflects initiatives such as China’s annual National Security Education Day and the expansion of local community surveillance networks, all of which are part of a “people’s war” for security. The white paper proudly claims that these efforts have resulted in the formation of a ‘multi-level, all-field risk monitoring and emergency response structure’, providing a robust foundation for addressing future challenges.
Ideologically, Chinese authorities characterise their security governance as proactive and comprehensive, contrasting it with what they perceive as piecemeal or reactionary approaches elsewhere. They cite China’s success in quelling internal unrest (such as separatism or terrorism in Xinjiang and Tibet), maintaining low levels of violent crime and quickly containing public health threats. They attribute these successes to the ‘whole-of-nation’ security architecture. The white paper also links security governance to traditional Chinese philosophy, claiming that Chinese civilisation prizes harmony and stability. It even quotes ancient texts such as the Lost Book of Zhou: ‘Internal affairs are harmonious when governed with virtue; external affairs should be handled with strength, and force used only if just’, implying a moral underpinning to China’s security strategy. By grounding modern policy in cultural rhetoric, the document seeks to legitimise the Chinese model as being uniquely suited to China’s history, and as a contribution of Chinese wisdom to global security theory.
In summary, the theoretical foundation of ‘National Security in the New Era’ is the doctrine of Xi Jinping that security must be holistic, people-centric and party-led. The white paper crystallises this doctrine: national security is defined broadly to cover all spheres of national life, is explicitly tied to preserving CPC leadership and enabling national rejuvenation, and is implemented through an integrated governance model combining strong centralised (Party) control, extensive legal mechanisms, socio-economic measures and active international engagement. This comprehensive approach, often summarised by Chinese officials as the ‘national security path with Chinese characteristics’, is presented as the reason for China’s domestic stability and an organising principle for its growing role on the world stage.
International implications: Law, Global Security Governance, and Reactions
Sovereignty, non-interference and international legal norms
China’s new national security white paper has significant implications for how Beijing interprets and emphasises international legal norms such as sovereignty, non-interference and multilateralism. The document leaves no doubt that China views the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity as sacrosanct. It explicitly reiterates China’s position that core interests, including ‘state sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity’, are ‘non-negotiable’ red lines. In particular, the white paper stresses that Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet and China’s maritime rights are of the utmost importance and are internal matters. It warns that China ‘will never allow any person or force to split off any part of Chinese territory at any time, in any form’, clearly referring to Taiwan and other separatist concerns. The document invokes UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which recognised the PRC as holding China’s UN seat, as affirming the One-China principle. It also asserts that Taiwan has ‘no right to participate in international organisations that only sovereign states can join’. It vows to ‘firmly oppose “Taiwan independence” separatism and external interference’, reserving the option of ‘all necessary measures’ (code for the potential use of force) to prevent Taiwan’s secession. This uncompromising language reinforces China’s long-standing legal stance that issues such as Taiwan or Hong Kong are purely domestic matters, and that foreign commentary or involvement constitutes illegitimate interference.
The white paper also reiterates the principle of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs — a principle that China considers fundamental to international law (as set out in the UN Charter’s respect for sovereignty). It criticises ‘certain countries’ (implied to be the United States and its allies) for ‘rudely interfering in China’s internal politics’ by causing trouble in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet. Beijing portrays such foreign criticism or sanctions related to human rights as destabilising provocations. Echoing this, the white paper voices support for other countries resisting external interference, noting that China supports Latin American and Caribbean nations in opposing outside interference and upholding their peace and stability, among other examples. This aligns with China’s broader diplomatic message that sovereignty must be universally upheld – a stance that resonates with many developing countries wary of Western interventionism.
In advocating these norms, the document rejects what it terms ‘hegemonism’, ‘unilateral sanctions’, and ‘bloc politics’. It accuses ‘a few big countries’ of undermining global stability by withdrawing from treaties, imposing tariffs for political ends and reviving Cold War mindsets. While not naming the U.S., it is clearly targeted. The white paper decries the ‘abuse of export controls, unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction’ as practices that ‘severely infringe other countries’ legitimate rights’ and violate WTO principles. In response, China proclaims that it will vigorously counter such measures, having put in place ‘anti-sanctions, anti-interference and anti-long-arm jurisdiction’ mechanisms, and will use its legal ‘toolbox’ to retaliate against actions that harm China’s development interests. Notably, the document insists that any countermeasures China takes are ‘legitimate self-defence, fully in line with international law and common international practice’. This framing seeks to position China as acting within the bounds of international law, arguing that by imposing sanctions or extraterritorial application of domestic laws, Western powers violate international norms. Consequently, China’s responsive sanctions or legal blocks (e.g. the 2021 Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and the new Foreign Relations Law) are presented as upholding the principles of sovereignty and international law.
Alongside sovereignty, the white paper places significant rhetorical emphasis on ‘genuine multilateralism’ and the international rule of law. It states that China ‘advocates strengthening global governance through consultation and cooperation, upholds true multilateralism, and calls for strict observance of international law’. Specifically, it calls for adherence to the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter — code for respect for sovereignty and equality of states — and for the interests of developing countries to be better represented in global decision-making. Reflecting the white paper, the China Daily editorial emphasises that all countries should ‘follow the principles of the United Nations Charter and respect the reasonable security concerns of other countries’. In line with this, the White Paper and Chinese officials condemn ‘exclusive’ military alliances and zero-sum approaches, arguing that these undermine the UN-centric international order. Instead, China presents itself as a defender of the post-WWII order, but one that wants to ‘make the global governance system more just and reasonable’ to reflect the interests of the global majority (often a cue for amplifying the voice of the Global South).
However, critics note a degree of performative contrast in China’s stance. While Beijing’s rhetoric strongly supports sovereignty and non-interference — for instance, calling for respect for ‘the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries’ in the context of the Ukraine crisis — China’s own behaviour can appear to contradict these principles, as evidenced by its support for Russia despite the invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the implications of the white paper are that China will increasingly use international legal terminology to legitimise its policies and challenge Western narratives. We can expect China to invoke the principles of sovereignty and the UN Charter frequently in international forums to shield itself and its allies from criticism while accusing the West of hypocrisy. In effect, Beijing is signalling a more assertive legal diplomacy, using the language of international law to push back against what it sees as US-led norms that conflict with its interests and to promote an alternative vision of order in which state sovereignty (especially that of incumbent regimes) takes precedence over interventionist values.
Global Security Governance and the Global Security Initiative (GSI)
The white paper positions China not just as a participant in global security governance, but as an emerging shaper of it. A full section is devoted to ‘practising the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and promoting common security’. The GSI was first proposed by Xi Jinping in April 2022, and this document elaborates on it as China’s contribution to resolving international security issues. At its core, the GSI espouses ‘common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security’ as guiding principles. The white paper spells out these principles in detail: common security means respecting and ensuring the security of every country; comprehensive security means addressing both traditional and non-traditional security issues in a coordinated way; cooperative security means resolving differences through dialogue and partnership, rather than forming military blocs; and sustainable security means focusing on development in order to remove the root causes of conflict. The GSI explicitly includes ‘respect for each country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’ and ‘abiding by the purposes of the U.N. Charter’ as fundamental tenets.
In effect, the GSI is presented as a vision for a fairer global security order. The white paper asserts that the GSI ‘provides a new solution for eliminating the root causes of international conflicts, addressing global security challenges and improving global security governance’. It is presented as an alternative to what China perceives as Western security paradigms. The China Daily editorial bluntly states: ‘The GSI is, in essence, China’s holistic approach to international security.’ . In other words, just as China applies ‘holistic security’ at home, it advocates a similar, all-encompassing, cooperative approach globally. This includes rejecting Cold War–era practices: ‘rejecting zero-sum games, absolute security and political alliances for confrontation’, as the editorial notes. There is clear criticism of US-led alliances such as NATO and AUKUS – the GSI calls for security mechanisms that are not ‘exclusive blocs’ but instead emphasise ‘common security for all countries’. The GSI also implicitly challenges policies such as the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, which Beijing perceives as being aimed at containing China. By promoting ‘dialogue and cooperation’ over military deterrence, and by opposing ‘bloc confrontations’, China is advocating a shift in how global security issues are managed.
A notable aspect is how the white paper links the GSI to the concept of a ‘Community with a Shared Future for Mankind’ — a broader Chinese vision for a more integrated and equitable global order. It argues that, in such a community, countries would mutually respect each other’s sovereignty and development interests, and disputes would be settled peacefully. In practice, China portrays itself as a provider of security public goods under the GSI. For instance, it highlights Chinese initiatives such as U.N. peacekeeping contributions, anti-pandemic cooperation, anti-terror operations and conflict mediation (notably China’s role in facilitating a détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023) as examples of its dedication to global security. Furthermore, the white paper emphasises China’s role as a champion of the Global South, noting that the GSI reflects the “common desire of the vast majority of countries for cooperation and win-win outcomes, and the pursuit of lasting peace”. China explicitly presents itself as defending the interests of developing countries against hegemonic pressures, claiming to be a voice for fairness in global security governance. This is evident in its opposition to ‘hegemonism’ and support for development as part of security, criticising how sanctions and protectionism by major powers jeopardise global economic security.
In terms of practical impact, the white paper’s emphasis on GSI suggests that China intends to play a more prominent role in shaping the agenda at the United Nations and other multilateral forums on peace and security. We can expect Beijing to propose more initiatives that align with GSI principles (e.g. conflict mediation proposals, proposals on the links between development and security, and cyber governance proposals), and to rally support from other nations for reforms to the global security architecture. For example, China has called for the U.N. Security Council to be reformed to give a stronger voice to Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it often coordinates its positions with Russia and groups such as BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in order to counter U.S.-EU stances. The white paper explicitly states that China ‘advocates true multilateralism and a global security governance system that is more just and equitable, better reflecting the will and interests of the majority of countries’.
Foreign policy analysts interpret the GSI, as set out in this white paper, as an alternative model of world order that China is championing. Rather than U.S.-led alliances and interventionist doctrines, it emphasises Westphalian sovereignty, regime security and development-led peace. However, some experts are sceptical, noting that ‘GSI’s vision of sovereign equality and win-win cooperation’ in practice privileges authoritarian regimes and could legitimise their crackdowns as internal matters. The GSI’s rejection of ‘bloc politics’ aligns with China and Russia’s efforts to discredit US alliance networks, and its call to respect ‘reasonable security concerns of all countries’ is often used to justify the actions of great powers (such as Russia’s objections to NATO expansion). Indeed, China’s close strategic alignment with Russia, as evidenced by joint statements opposing ‘unilateralism’ and supporting each other’s core interests, suggests that the GSI is partly intended to undermine the US-led order in favour of a multipolar system that is more favourable to authoritarian great powers.
In summary, the white paper’s international chapters signal a confident China seeking to reshape global security governance. It offers the GSI framework, which, if adopted, would move the world away from US-centred security alliances and towards a model where power is diffused and constrained by principles of sovereignty and mutual non-aggression. Whether this would promote global stability or simply mask China’s ambition is a matter of debate. What is clear is that Beijing is systematically codifying its global security narrative, portraying China as a stabiliser and peace builder that injects ‘certainty’ into an unstable world, in contrast to Western powers, which are depicted as sources of turmoil through military interventions and sanctions. This narrative, now enshrined in an official white paper, will likely guide China’s diplomacy and its engagement with international law moving forward.
National Security Law Frameworks: China’s Approach in Comparative Perspective
The white paper illuminates how China’s concept of national security has been translated into a comprehensive legal and institutional framework that differs markedly from the approaches of many other countries. Over the past decade, China has rapidly constructed what it calls a ‘????????’ (national security legal system). This includes the 2015 National Security Law, which defines national security extremely broadly (covering politics, the military, culture, finance, cyberspace, and so on), as well as a host of specialised laws and regulations. The annex to the white paper lists key enactments such as the Counter-Espionage Law (amended in 2023), the Anti-Terrorism Law, the Cybersecurity Law, the Data Security Law, the Biosecurity Law, the Nuclear Security Law, the Hong Kong National Security Law (2020) and the International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law. Notably, China passed a law to counter foreign sanctions in 2021 and a comprehensive Foreign Relations Law in 2023; these extend China’s legal reach externally in order to push back against foreign measures. The white paper portrays this legal blitz as filling gaps and providing a rule-of-law shield for China’s interests. It proudly claims that an ‘initial national security strategy system and policy framework’ is now in place, supported by laws and a National Security Strategy outline (an apparently internal document for 2021–2025).
Comparatively, China’s national security legislation is far more comprehensive than that of most Western countries. For example, the United States does not have an all-encompassing National Security Law; instead, it relies on a variety of specific statutes (for defence, intelligence, homeland security, etc.) and periodic strategy documents. In contrast, China’s 2015 law and subsequent regulations effectively ‘securitise’ many aspects of governance, from culture and education to technology and religion, by labelling them as matters of state security. This reflects the holistic concept that threats are multifaceted (economic, ideological, cybernetic, biological, etc.) and thus require a unified legal response. One analysis describes China’s doctrine as a ‘fortress at home’ mentality, whereby the regime legally fortifies its control over all domains in the name of security. For example, China’s counter-espionage law, amended shortly after the release of the white paper, greatly broadened the definition of espionage and the scope of state surveillance, raising concerns among foreign businesses about potential liability. Similarly, the Data Security and Cybersecurity laws impose strict data control and local storage requirements, which the authorities justify as a means of preventing foreign cyber threats and intelligence risks.
A stark difference can be seen in how political dissent and regime change are treated. In liberal democracies, changing the government via elections or criticising leaders is normal and is protected to varying degrees by law; these actions are not viewed through a ‘national security’ lens unless they are tied to illegal activity. In China’s framework, however, opposing the Communist Party or spreading ideas that challenge its rule can be construed as endangering political security (and thus national security). The white paper explicitly frames ‘infiltration by Western liberal ideas’ or calls for political reform as security threats to be combatted by law. This has led to the introduction of laws such as the Hong Kong National Security Law, which criminalises subversion, secession, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces. This law has been used to quash virtually all organised opposition in Hong Kong. No Western national security law has such a broad reach into political expression. Indeed, many countries distinguish between internal and external security and protect free speech, even if it is critical of the government. China’s approach blurs these lines – domestic ‘stability maintenance’ (??) is elevated to a matter of national security, giving security agencies considerable leeway. The white paper even cites social governance and crime fighting as contributing to human security, boasting that China’s low violent crime rate makes it ‘one of the safest countries’, thus ‘truly respecting and protecting human rights’. This claim highlights a fundamental difference in perspective. Beijing asserts that public order and material well-being are primary human rights, whereas critics argue that China’s national security measures trample on civil and political rights in the name of collective security.
Another point of contrast is China’s use of law as a strategic tool, sometimes termed “lawfare”. The white paper’s narrative that China is using legal means to safeguard its interests also signals to the international community that China will assert legal justifications for contentious actions. For instance, Beijing has enacted a Maritime Traffic Safety Law and a Coast Guard Law, which empower its agencies in disputed waters. This legally formalises China’s claims in the South China Sea, even when these claims conflict with the ruling of the UNCLOS tribunal (which China has rejected). While Western nations also use domestic law to bolster their positions (e.g. US sanctions laws or domestic laws on freedom of navigation), China’s critics say its recent laws are ‘weaponising regulation’ to advance geopolitical aims. The Stratnews analysis cited anti-sanctions and export control laws as providing China with a legal ‘veneer’ with which to retaliate against or coerce foreign companies in line with state goals. From the Chinese viewpoint, however, these laws are defensive, designed to compel respect for China’s sovereignty and to ‘lock out’ threats (e.g. by disallowing foreign NGOs or businesses from engaging in activities that China deems subversive).
Another difference is that China’s national security laws often have extraterritorial implications, which many countries find troubling. The Hong Kong NSL, for example, claims jurisdiction even over offences committed by non-residents outside China. The Counter-Espionage Law could potentially apply to any entity interacting with Chinese data or personnel abroad. While Western security laws sometimes have extraterritorial implications (e.g. the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and sanctions regimes), China’s laws explicitly target activities globally that affect China’s interests. This reflects a more expansive assertion of jurisdiction in the name of security. This has raised complex questions, with foreign academics, journalists and businesses fearing that normal interactions, such as receiving information from a Chinese source, could be construed as espionage under Chinese law. However, the white paper reassures us that ‘these measures are aimed only at acts harming China’s legitimate interests and do not impede normal business, research, academic exchange or people-to-people contacts’. This is an attempt to allay international concerns by distinguishing between security threats and ‘normal’ interactions. Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the terminology used in Chinese legislation and the political nature of its enforcement leaves many unconvinced by its ‘transparency’.
In the global context, China’s model is inspiring some convergence and some pushback. Other authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states may emulate aspects of China’s security legislation, such as broad anti-subversion laws or internet controls, as a means of shoring up their regimes. Democracies, on the other hand, are increasingly scrutinising Chinese operations, such as police outposts abroad, influence campaigns and tech espionage, as threats to their own national security. The broad Chinese definition of security can clash with liberal norms when Beijing, for instance, demands that other countries curb the speech or activities of diaspora groups that China considers ‘separatist’ or ‘terrorist’. This has occurred with Uyghur, Tibetan and Hong Kong activist communities abroad: China labels these groups as security threats and pressures host nations to act, a move which democracies often resist as a violation of free expression and political asylum principles. Thus, there is tension in international law. China’s expansive security claims sometimes conflict with human rights law and the sovereignty of other states (consider the extraterritorial reach of the Hong Kong NSL, for example, which prompted formal protests from the US, EU and others for overstepping the mark).
Overall, the white paper signals that China views its legal security framework as a comparative advantage — part of what it touts as a more effective governance model than Western liberalism. It claims that by tightening its legal defences and closing loopholes, China has achieved security and development, pointing to its management of economic growth alongside strict security measures. . The challenge for other countries is how to respond to this model. Some, like the United States, view it as a threat. U.S. officials often argue that China’s concept of national security is excessive and serves as a cover for human rights abuses. They are concerned that, if widely adopted, it would undermine the international rule of law in favour of an authoritarian ‘might makes right’ approach. Others in the developing world may sympathise with aspects of China’s stance, particularly its emphasis on sovereignty and development, even if they are wary of Chinese power. As such, the white paper not only describes China’s domestic legal position, but also serves as an ideological export, inviting comparisons and debate about the meaning of ‘national security’ in the 21^(st) century.
International Reactions and Commentary
The immediate official reactions to the ‘National Security in the New Era’ white paper have been relatively muted (which is unsurprising given that it is a policy paper rather than an abrupt policy change). However, where the content touches on sensitive issues, some responses have emerged:
• Taiwan: Given the white paper’s firm restatement of reunification as a security imperative, Taiwanese authorities were quick to dismiss its significance. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council reportedly stated that Beijing’s report contained ‘nothing new’ and was essentially a rehash of long-held positions, thus warranting no policy change from Taipei. The Taiwanese government maintains that the People’s Republic has no jurisdiction over Taiwan and has criticised the white paper for its aggressive tone. Unofficially, there is concern in Taiwan that, by framing the island’s status as a non-negotiable security red line, Beijing is lowering its threshold for the use of force. While not new, the document’s wording that China “will never promise to renounce the use of force” on Taiwan reinforced fears that China’s patience could eventually wane. However, some analysts (e.g. in the Institut Montaigne piece) have noted that the white paper’s language still emphasises ‘utmost sincerity for peaceful reunification’ and does not suggest an imminent shift to military coercion. The inclusion of phrases about ‘sincerity’ and United Front tactics may signal Beijing’s intent to influence Taiwan’s political scene rather than resorting to force in the near term.
• United States and Allies: While no U.S. government statement has specifically addressed the white paper, its themes have not gone unnoticed in strategic circles. The emphasis on US “containment and suppression” as a threat, and the call to counter “hegemonic” behaviour, fits into China’s broader narrative that US policies are destabilising. U.S. analysts have interpreted the white paper as confirmation that China’s external stance is hardening. For example, the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) observed that the document ‘further codified’ China’s comprehensive approach and ambition to ‘reshape global governance in line with PRC interests’, noting how it portrays the US and liberal influences as hostile forces to be resisted. There is recognition in Washington that China’s concept of ‘national security’ now explicitly extends to undermining US influence abroad, from pushing back against US alliances in Asia to securing supply chains against US sanctions. This will likely strengthen the resolve in U.S. policy circles to intensify alliances (QUAD, AUKUS, etc.) as a counterweight, even though China decries these as contrary to ‘true multilateralism’. In short, the white paper reinforces the assumption of the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy that China is a strategic competitor seeking to mould a new international order in its favour. We may therefore see the U.S. doubling down on its own Indo-Pacific security initiatives, citing China’s self-professed goals as justification.
• Other major powers: For the EU and many Western countries, the white paper largely confirms existing concerns regarding China’s trajectory. European commentators have pointed out the document’s heavy ideological tone, noting that China’s advocacy of ‘multilateralism’ is accompanied by the assertion that Western-defined rules (especially those relating to human rights or trade fairness) should be challenged. Some European analyses (e.g. Institut Montaigne) have highlighted the rhetoric of moral superiority used by China – casting itself as a peace-loving civilisation – while also questioning the credibility of this narrative in light of China’s stance on issues such as Ukraine. While the white paper’s opposition to ‘absolute security’ and military blocs resonates with European public discourse, policymakers are wary that this is intended to weaken NATO and transatlantic unity. There has been increased transatlantic dialogue on reducing vulnerabilities, such as dependency on Chinese supply chains or technology, which the white paper anticipates by lauding China’s push for supply chain self-reliance and technology independence. Key Indo-Pacific players Japan and Australia likely view the white paper as validation of their recent defensive moves, such as Japan’s military buildup and Australia’s AUKUS partnership. The document’s warnings against ‘external interference in regional disputes’ and its emphasis on protecting maritime rights hint at more assertive Chinese maritime behaviour, which Japan, Australia and Southeast Asian claimants may find concerning. Indeed, the white paper seems to justify China’s military and paramilitary activities in the East and South China Seas by framing them as defensive and sovereignty-driven, leaving little room for compromise on those maritime disputes.
• International Organizations: There was no direct comment from bodies such as the U.N., which typically do not respond to national policy documents. However, the discourse on international law and the U.N. Charter in the white paper aligns with messages that Chinese diplomats are likely to advance at the U.N. and in other forums. For example, China’s emphasis on sovereignty and criticism of sanctions reflects arguments it has previously presented in U.N. debates (e.g. opposing U.N. investigative mechanisms on Xinjiang or Myanmar on the grounds of non-interference). China has proposed the Global Security Initiative in forums such as the Conference on Disarmament and the U.N. General Assembly. While these bodies have not formally endorsed it, elements of the initiative, such as dialogue-based conflict resolution and development cooperation, reflect long-standing U.N. themes. Some representatives of developing countries privately welcome China’s calls for greater fairness in global governance, even if they are cautious about alignment. Conversely, NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept labelled China’s policies as a challenge to allied interests and values, and this white paper will likely be cited in NATO analyses as evidence of China’s intent to contest Western influence globally.
• Scholarly and Expert Community: Global think tanks and China experts have produced a flurry of commentary. Many have noted the unprecedented nature of this white paper: while China has regularly issued defence white papers, this is the first comprehensive national security white paper, possibly indicating greater transparency or confidence in this area. Experts such as Mathieu Duchâtel suggest that it may be the public-facing counterpart to an internal five-year national security strategy. Analysts generally agree that the document is ‘sweeping and sobering’, confirming that under Xi, China has blurred the distinction between domestic and foreign security, as well as between traditional security and socio-economic issues. Some praise China’s long-term view, for example its focus on climate change and supply chain resilience as security issues, which is considered forward-thinking. However, others are critical. One foreign policy commentator described the paper as ‘a manifesto of control, projection and confrontation dressed in the language of cooperation and stability’. In other words, while the white paper talks of peace and win-win situations, sceptics see an assertive agenda to secure the Chinese regime and expand its global reach, potentially at the expense of liberal norms and neighbouring countries’ security. The dichotomy between China’s proclaimed strategic confidence and its underlying strategic anxieties (e.g. fear of encirclement and internal unrest) is a common theme in expert analyses. This suggests that the white paper serves a dual purpose: externally, it projects confidence and sets the terms of the discourse; and internally, it justifies tighter control and vigilance amid domestic challenges (e.g. an economic slowdown, as alluded to in the paper’s acknowledgement of internal issues).
In conclusion, ‘China’s National Security in the New Era’ is a landmark document that articulates how China’s leadership views the world and its own security as inseparable and all-encompassing. Its immediate effect is to codify China’s stances, providing foreign audiences with a clearer (if occasionally disconcerting) picture of China’s intentions. In the long term, the white paper’s impact will be determined by how China implements these ideas. Will it double down on unilateral actions justified by its security concepts, or will it secure more partners for initiatives such as the GSI? The international community’s responses, ranging from wary military preparedness to cautious engagement, indicate that China’s security doctrine is now very much on the global agenda. As one analysis put it, the world will be watching closely to see whether this ‘holistic security’ truly delivers stability as Beijing claims or merely serves as a fig leaf for extending the CCP’s power at home and abroad. One thing is clear: national security is now the all-encompassing lens through which the Chinese government views both domestic governance and its role in the world. This white paper invites other nations to acknowledge and adapt to that reality.
Sources:
1. State Council Information Office of the PRC, ‘??????????’ (China’s National Security in the New Era), full text (Chinese).
2. Xinhua News Agency (English summary), ‘White Paper on “China’s National Security in the New Era”‘, 12 May 2025.
3. CGTN News, ‘China releases white paper on national security in the new era’, 12 May 2025.
4. China Daily (editorial), ‘A holistic approach to enhancing global security’, 12 May 2025.
5. Mathieu Duchâtel (Institut Montaigne), ‘Reading China’s White Paper on National Security in the New Era’, 13 May 2025.
6. Institut Montaigne (ibid.), analysis of key themes and statistics.
7. StratNews Global – Ramananda Sengupta, ‘China’s New Security Doctrine: Fortress at Home, Power Abroad”, 12 June 2025.
8. The Diplomat, Shannon Tiezzi, ‘China’s 2025 National Security White Paper: ‘Holistic Security’ Amid Rising Global Tensions”, May 2025.
9. Institute for the Study of War (ISW): ‘China–Taiwan Weekly Update’, 17 May 2025.
10. Xinhua (Chinese): White Paper Preface excerpt on the comprehensive national security concept.
11. Xinhua (Chinese), White Paper, Chapter V excerpt – on the Global Security Initiative and international security vision.
12. Chinese Government Official Portal (gov.cn): White Paper Summary (Chinese) – Key Points on Holistic Security and Development.
13. Gov.cn/CCTV (Chinese): White Paper text – sections on Taiwan, legal measures, etc. 14.
14. Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council (via media reports): Statement responding to Beijing’s White Paper, May 2025. (As reported by TaiwanPlus News).