What makes this white paper worth reading carefully is not the doctrine itself — Beijing has been articulating “holistic national security” for a decade. It is the decision to codify it in a single document, at this particular moment, with this degree of specificity. The timing, coming amid intensifying great-power competition, turns what might have been a routine policy statement into a strategic signal.
On May 12, 2025, China’s State Council Information Office released a major white paper titled “China’s National Security in the New Era”. It presents a comprehensive shift in Beijing’s strategic thinking—distinguishing this as their first dedicated national security declaration since 1949 .
The paper analyzes China’s holistic national security strategy—spanning political, economic, technological, and social spheres—and its global ambitions through the Global Security Initiative (GSI).
The Global Security Initiative (GSI) is a diplomatic and security policy framework proposed by Chinese leader Xi Jinping on April 21, 2022, at the Boao Forum for Asia
A comprehensive analysis of China’s ‘National Security in the New Era’ white paper (May 2025).
A summary of the white paper’s content and structure.
Main themes: The central theme of the white paper is China’s “holistic” or “overall” approach to national security in the new era under Xi Jinping. It asserts that world affairs are at a historical crossroads of change and instability, yet China has provided ‘reliable stability’ by maintaining its own security and collaborating with neighbouring countries to promote regional peace. It highlights new and ‘comprehensive’ security challenges, ranging from geopolitical conflicts and great-power competition to non-traditional threats such as climate disasters, pandemics and technological risks, and portrays China as a source of stability amidst this ‘interwoven turbulence’. The document emphasises that, under the leadership of the Communist Party, China’s national security strategy has achieved historic successes in safeguarding sovereignty, development and social stability. This has enabled economic prosperity and modernisation.
Notable developments: The white paper codifies Xi Jinping’s holistic national security concept (???????) as the guiding ideology for security work, marking the first time such a strategy has been formally articulated as state doctrine. It stresses that ‘national security is no longer a narrow focus on military defence against external threats’; instead, China now considers security in sixteen interconnected domains ranging from political, territorial, military and economic security to cultural, cyber, ecological, resource, biosecurity and even space, polar and deep-sea security. This white paper introduces several new emphases: protecting political security (i.e. the socialist system and Communist Party leadership) is declared the ‘lifeline’ of national security in the new era, taking precedence across all sectors. Economic security and development are given equal weight – the paper repeatedly insists that ‘high-quality development’ requires ‘high-level security’, and vice versa. It touts achievements in public security and social stability, such as low violent crime rates, few industrial accidents and improved disaster response, as evidence that comprehensive security policies deliver tangible benefits to the people. The white paper also introduces China’s recent legal innovations in national security and notes that a ‘comprehensive and transparent legal framework’ has been established. It highlights laws such as the National Security Law (2015) and new statutes on counter-espionage, data security, biosecurity, counter-terrorism, foreign sanctions countermeasures and the Foreign Relations Law as part of a robust approach to the rule of law in relation to security. On the international stage, the document elaborates on China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), a proposal for reforming global security governance, presenting it as China’s contribution of ‘Chinese wisdom’ to world peace and stability.
In summary, ‘China’s National Security in the New Era’ presents an expansive view of security that blends domestic and international dimensions. It portrays China as a confident yet risk-aware great power that has bolstered its own regime security and development against myriad challenges and now seeks to share its security vision globally for the sake of common peace and development. The white paper systematically moves from describing the volatile global context and explaining China’s security philosophy to detailing how national security underpins China’s modernisation and outlining China’s role in global security governance and ongoing reforms to its security apparatus.
Theoretical Foundations: Ideology and doctrine behind the white paper
Xi Jinping’s holistic national security concept
At the heart of the white paper lies ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’, in which national security is emphasised as a key component of the ideology. The document frames China’s approach to security as being based on both Marxist-Leninist doctrine and China’s own strategic culture. It opens with historical references, such as the proverb ‘Be secure but never forget danger’ (?????) and an invocation of 5,000 years of continuous Chinese civilisation, to suggest that this comprehensive focus on security is a natural continuation of China’s traditions. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has formulated the ‘Overall National Security Concept’ (zongti guojia anquan guan), which the White Paper refers to as a ‘major strategic thought’ and ‘the first guiding ideology for national security work since the founding of the PRC’. This concept was first introduced by Xi in April 2014 at the inaugural meeting of China’s National Security Commission, and has since been elevated to official doctrine.
The white paper defines holistic national security as extraordinarily broad in scope. It posits that ‘national security’ must encompass virtually all aspects of national life: ‘political security as fundamental, people’s security as the purpose, economic security as the foundation, and military, cultural and societal security as guarantees, with the promotion of international security as an important support’. It also calls for coordination between internal and external security, homeland security and citizen security, traditional and non-traditional security, and China’s own security and common global security. In practice, this means that areas such as politics, ideology, the economy, finance, cyber security, technology, ecology, public health, food security, energy security, and even space and polar regions are all considered elements of national security. ‘Nothing is outside the scope of the Party’s definition of security’, as one analysis observed.
A key doctrinal mantra repeated throughout the text is that development and security are inextricably linked. President Xi is quoted as saying, ‘Development is the foundation of security, and security is the precondition for development’. The white paper stresses that China has made ‘coordinating development and security’ a fundamental principle of governance in the new era. This reflects the belief that economic prosperity and social stability reinforce each other; sustained development provides the necessary resources for security, and a secure environment (both domestically and internationally) is essential for development. The document therefore calls for risk-informed decision-making in economic and social policy so that China’s modernisation is not derailed by security threats. For instance, it highlights initiatives such as establishing a national security risk early-warning system, building strategic stockpiles of critical materials, ensuring food and energy self-sufficiency, and safeguarding supply chains. All these measures tie into Xi’s notion of a ‘secure development path’ for achieving the goal of a modern socialist country by 2049.
Importantly, the holistic security doctrine prioritises political security, namely the security of China’s socialist system and Communist Party rule. The white paper explicitly states that ‘upholding the Party’s position as the governing authority and the socialist system’ is the essence of political security. It refers to political stability as the ‘lifeline’ of national security. This reflects the Marxist-Leninist view that the survival of the regime is synonymous with national survival. As commentators have noted, ‘national security is inseparable from Party security’ within this framework. All other aspects of security – economic, military, cultural, etc. – are subordinate to preserving the CPC’s leadership and socialist ideology. The white paper emphasises the importance of resisting Westernisation and hostile ideologies, as well as maintaining strict ideological control over education, the media and cyberspace, in order to prevent political unrest. By codifying ideological security as a facet of national security, the document provides doctrinal justification for the CPC’s tight grip on public discourse and its crackdowns on dissent. These are not presented as mere political censorship, but as necessary measures to neutralise security risks to China’s stability.
Despite the sweeping scope of ‘holistic security’, Chinese officials insist it is not about ‘securitising everything’. Rather, they frame it as improving coordination and prevention. The white paper states that the objective is to ‘enhance the systemic, holistic and coordinated nature of national security work, and effectively wage a comprehensive national security campaign’ . In other words, the intention is to break down silos so that economic, military, technological and other policies are all aligned with a unified security strategy. This reflects Xi Jinping’s call for the modernisation of the national security system and capacity, which includes better risk monitoring, emergency response and the integration of security considerations across all governance fields.
This is where the document becomes more interesting for those who follow international law and security governance.
International implications: Law, Global Security Governance, and Reactions
Sovereignty, non-interference and international legal norms
China’s new national security white paper has significant implications for how Beijing interprets and emphasises international legal norms such as sovereignty, non-interference and multilateralism. The document leaves no doubt that China views the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity as sacrosanct. It explicitly reiterates China’s position that core interests, including ‘state sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity’, are ‘non-negotiable’ red lines. In particular, the white paper stresses that Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet and China’s maritime rights are of the utmost importance and are internal matters. It warns that China ‘will never allow any person or force to split off any part of Chinese territory at any time, in any form’, clearly referring to Taiwan and other separatist concerns. The document invokes UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which recognised the PRC as holding China’s UN seat, as affirming the One-China principle. It also asserts that Taiwan has ‘no right to participate in international organisations that only sovereign states can join’. It vows to ‘firmly oppose “Taiwan independence” separatism and external interference’, reserving the option of ‘all necessary measures’ (code for the potential use of force) to prevent Taiwan’s secession. This uncompromising language reinforces China’s long-standing legal stance that issues such as Taiwan or Hong Kong are purely domestic matters, and that foreign commentary or involvement constitutes illegitimate interference.
The white paper also reiterates the principle of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs — a principle that China considers fundamental to international law (as set out in the UN Charter’s respect for sovereignty). It criticises ‘certain countries’ (implied to be the United States and its allies) for ‘rudely interfering in China’s internal politics’ by causing trouble in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet. Beijing portrays such foreign criticism or sanctions related to human rights as destabilising provocations. Echoing this, the white paper voices support for other countries resisting external interference, noting that China supports Latin American and Caribbean nations in opposing outside interference and upholding their peace and stability, among other examples. This aligns with China’s broader diplomatic message that sovereignty must be universally upheld – a stance that resonates with many developing countries wary of Western interventionism.
In advocating these norms, the document rejects what it terms ‘hegemonism’, ‘unilateral sanctions’, and ‘bloc politics’. It accuses ‘a few big countries’ of undermining global stability by withdrawing from treaties, imposing tariffs for political ends and reviving Cold War mindsets. While not naming the U.S., it is clearly targeted. The white paper decries the ‘abuse of export controls, unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction’ as practices that ‘severely infringe other countries’ legitimate rights’ and violate WTO principles. In response, China proclaims that it will vigorously counter such measures, having put in place ‘anti-sanctions, anti-interference and anti-long-arm jurisdiction’ mechanisms, and will use its legal ‘toolbox’ to retaliate against actions that harm China’s development interests. Notably, the document insists that any countermeasures China takes are ‘legitimate self-defence, fully in line with international law and common international practice’. This framing seeks to position China as acting within the bounds of international law, arguing that by imposing sanctions or extraterritorial application of domestic laws, Western powers violate international norms. Consequently, China’s responsive sanctions or legal blocks (e.g. the 2021 Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and the new Foreign Relations Law) are presented as upholding the principles of sovereignty and international law.
Alongside sovereignty, the white paper places significant rhetorical emphasis on ‘genuine multilateralism’ and the international rule of law. It states that China ‘advocates strengthening global governance through consultation and cooperation, upholds true multilateralism, and calls for strict observance of international law’. Specifically, it calls for adherence to the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter — code for respect for sovereignty and equality of states — and for the interests of developing countries to be better represented in global decision-making. Reflecting the white paper, the China Daily editorial emphasises that all countries should ‘follow the principles of the United Nations Charter and respect the reasonable security concerns of other countries’. In line with this, the White Paper and Chinese officials condemn ‘exclusive’ military alliances and zero-sum approaches, arguing that these undermine the UN-centric international order. Instead, China presents itself as a defender of the post-WWII order, but one that wants to ‘make the global governance system more just and reasonable’ to reflect the interests of the global majority (often a cue for amplifying the voice of the Global South).
However, critics note a degree of performative contrast in China’s stance. While Beijing’s rhetoric strongly supports sovereignty and non-interference — for instance, calling for respect for ‘the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries’ in the context of the Ukraine crisis — China’s own behaviour can appear to contradict these principles, as evidenced by its support for Russia despite the invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the implications of the white paper are that China will increasingly use international legal terminology to legitimise its policies and challenge Western narratives. We can expect China to invoke the principles of sovereignty and the UN Charter frequently in international forums to shield itself and its allies from criticism while accusing the West of hypocrisy. In effect, Beijing is signalling a more assertive legal diplomacy, using the language of international law to push back against what it sees as US-led norms that conflict with its interests and to promote an alternative vision of order in which state sovereignty (especially that of incumbent regimes) takes precedence over interventionist values.
Global Security Governance and the Global Security Initiative (GSI)
The white paper positions China not just as a participant in global security governance, but as an emerging shaper of it. A full section is devoted to ‘practising the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and promoting common security’. The GSI was first proposed by Xi Jinping in April 2022, and this document elaborates on it as China’s contribution to resolving international security issues. At its core, the GSI espouses ‘common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security’ as guiding principles. The white paper spells out these principles in detail: common security means respecting and ensuring the security of every country; comprehensive security means addressing both traditional and non-traditional security issues in a coordinated way; cooperative security means resolving differences through dialogue and partnership, rather than forming military blocs; and sustainable security means focusing on development in order to remove the root causes of conflict. The GSI explicitly includes ‘respect for each country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’ and ‘abiding by the purposes of the U.N. Charter’ as fundamental tenets.
In effect, the GSI is presented as a vision for a fairer global security order. The white paper asserts that the GSI ‘provides a new solution for eliminating the root causes of international conflicts, addressing global security challenges and improving global security governance’. It is presented as an alternative to what China perceives as Western security paradigms. The China Daily editorial bluntly states: ‘The GSI is, in essence, China’s holistic approach to international security.’ . In other words, just as China applies ‘holistic security’ at home, it advocates a similar, all-encompassing, cooperative approach globally. This includes rejecting Cold War–era practices: ‘rejecting zero-sum games, absolute security and political alliances for confrontation’, as the editorial notes. There is clear criticism of US-led alliances such as NATO and AUKUS – the GSI calls for security mechanisms that are not ‘exclusive blocs’ but instead emphasise ‘common security for all countries’. The GSI also implicitly challenges policies such as the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, which Beijing perceives as being aimed at containing China. By promoting ‘dialogue and cooperation’ over military deterrence, and by opposing ‘bloc confrontations’, China is advocating a shift in how global security issues are managed.
National Security Law Frameworks: China’s Approach in Comparative Perspective
The white paper illuminates how China’s concept of national security has been translated into a comprehensive legal and institutional framework that differs markedly from the approaches of many other countries. Over the past decade, China has rapidly constructed what it calls a ‘????????’ (national security legal system). This includes the 2015 National Security Law, which defines national security extremely broadly (covering politics, the military, culture, finance, cyberspace, and so on), as well as a host of specialised laws and regulations. The annex to the white paper lists key enactments such as the Counter-Espionage Law (amended in 2023), the Anti-Terrorism Law, the Cybersecurity Law, the Data Security Law, the Biosecurity Law, the Nuclear Security Law, the Hong Kong National Security Law (2020) and the International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law. Notably, China passed a law to counter foreign sanctions in 2021 and a comprehensive Foreign Relations Law in 2023; these extend China’s legal reach externally in order to push back against foreign measures. The white paper portrays this legal blitz as filling gaps and providing a rule-of-law shield for China’s interests. It proudly claims that an ‘initial national security strategy system and policy framework’ is now in place, supported by laws and a National Security Strategy outline (an apparently internal document for 2021–2025).
Comparatively, China’s national security legislation is far more comprehensive than that of most Western countries. For example, the United States does not have an all-encompassing National Security Law; instead, it relies on a variety of specific statutes (for defence, intelligence, homeland security, etc.) and periodic strategy documents. In contrast, China’s 2015 law and subsequent regulations effectively ‘securitise’ many aspects of governance, from culture and education to technology and religion, by labelling them as matters of state security. This reflects the holistic concept that threats are multifaceted (economic, ideological, cybernetic, biological, etc.) and thus require a unified legal response. One analysis describes China’s doctrine as a ‘fortress at home’ mentality, whereby the regime legally fortifies its control over all domains in the name of security. For example, China’s counter-espionage law, amended shortly after the release of the white paper, greatly broadened the definition of espionage and the scope of state surveillance, raising concerns among foreign businesses about potential liability. Similarly, the Data Security and Cybersecurity laws impose strict data control and local storage requirements, which the authorities justify as a means of preventing foreign cyber threats and intelligence risks.
International Reactions and Commentary
The immediate official reactions to the ‘National Security in the New Era’ white paper have been relatively muted (which is unsurprising given that it is a policy paper rather than an abrupt policy change). However, where the content touches on sensitive issues, some responses have emerged:
• Taiwan: Given the white paper’s firm restatement of reunification as a security imperative, Taiwanese authorities were quick to dismiss its significance. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council reportedly stated that Beijing’s report contained ‘nothing new’ and was essentially a rehash of long-held positions, thus warranting no policy change from Taipei. The Taiwanese government maintains that the People’s Republic has no jurisdiction over Taiwan and has criticised the white paper for its aggressive tone. Unofficially, there is concern in Taiwan that, by framing the island’s status as a non-negotiable security red line, Beijing is lowering its threshold for the use of force. While not new, the document’s wording that China “will never promise to renounce the use of force” on Taiwan reinforced fears that China’s patience could eventually wane. However, some analysts (e.g. in the Institut Montaigne piece) have noted that the white paper’s language still emphasises ‘utmost sincerity for peaceful reunification’ and does not suggest an imminent shift to military coercion. The inclusion of phrases about ‘sincerity’ and United Front tactics may signal Beijing’s intent to influence Taiwan’s political scene rather than resorting to force in the near term.
• United States and Allies: While no U.S. government statement has specifically addressed the white paper, its themes have not gone unnoticed in strategic circles. The emphasis on US “containment and suppression” as a threat, and the call to counter “hegemonic” behaviour, fits into China’s broader narrative that US policies are destabilising. U.S. analysts have interpreted the white paper as confirmation that China’s external stance is hardening. For example, the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) observed that the document ‘further codified’ China’s comprehensive approach and ambition to ‘reshape global governance in line with PRC interests’, noting how it portrays the US and liberal influences as hostile forces to be resisted. There is recognition in Washington that China’s concept of ‘national security’ now explicitly extends to undermining US influence abroad, from pushing back against US alliances in Asia to securing supply chains against US sanctions. This will likely strengthen the resolve in U.S. policy circles to intensify alliances (QUAD, AUKUS, etc.) as a counterweight, even though China decries these as contrary to ‘true multilateralism’. In short, the white paper reinforces the assumption of the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy that China is a strategic competitor seeking to mould a new international order in its favour. We may therefore see the U.S. doubling down on its own Indo-Pacific security initiatives, citing China’s self-professed goals as justification.
• Other major powers: For the EU and many Western countries, the white paper largely confirms existing concerns regarding China’s trajectory. European commentators have pointed out the document’s heavy ideological tone, noting that China’s advocacy of ‘multilateralism’ is accompanied by the assertion that Western-defined rules (especially those relating to human rights or trade fairness) should be challenged. Some European analyses (e.g. Institut Montaigne) have highlighted the rhetoric of moral superiority used by China – casting itself as a peace-loving civilisation – while also questioning the credibility of this narrative in light of China’s stance on issues such as Ukraine. While the white paper’s opposition to ‘absolute security’ and military blocs resonates with European public discourse, policymakers are wary that this is intended to weaken NATO and transatlantic unity. There has been increased transatlantic dialogue on reducing vulnerabilities, such as dependency on Chinese supply chains or technology, which the white paper anticipates by lauding China’s push for supply chain self-reliance and technology independence. Key Indo-Pacific players Japan and Australia likely view the white paper as validation of their recent defensive moves, such as Japan’s military buildup and Australia’s AUKUS partnership. The document’s warnings against ‘external interference in regional disputes’ and its emphasis on protecting maritime rights hint at more assertive Chinese maritime behaviour, which Japan, Australia and Southeast Asian claimants may find concerning. Indeed, the white paper seems to justify China’s military and paramilitary activities in the East and South China Seas by framing them as defensive and sovereignty-driven, leaving little room for compromise on those maritime disputes.
In conclusion, ‘China’s National Security in the New Era’ is a landmark document that articulates how China’s leadership views the world and its own security as inseparable and all-encompassing. Its immediate effect is to codify China’s stances, providing foreign audiences with a clearer (if occasionally disconcerting) picture of China’s intentions. In the long term, the white paper’s impact will be determined by how China implements these ideas. Will it double down on unilateral actions justified by its security concepts, or will it secure more partners for initiatives such as the GSI? The international community’s responses, ranging from wary military preparedness to cautious engagement, indicate that China’s security doctrine is now very much on the global agenda. As one analysis put it, the world will be watching closely to see whether this ‘holistic security’ truly delivers stability as Beijing claims or merely serves as a fig leaf for extending the CCP’s power at home and abroad. One thing is clear: national security is now the all-encompassing lens through which the Chinese government views both domestic governance and its role in the world. This white paper invites other nations to acknowledge and adapt to that reality.
Sources:
1. State Council Information Office of the PRC, ‘??????????’ (China’s National Security in the New Era), full text (Chinese).
2. Xinhua News Agency (English summary), ‘White Paper on “China’s National Security in the New Era”‘, 12 May 2025.
3. CGTN News, ‘China releases white paper on national security in the new era’, 12 May 2025.
4. China Daily (editorial), ‘A holistic approach to enhancing global security’, 12 May 2025.
5. Mathieu Duchâtel (Institut Montaigne), ‘Reading China’s White Paper on National Security in the New Era’, 13 May 2025.
6. Institut Montaigne (ibid.), analysis of key themes and statistics.
7. StratNews Global – Ramananda Sengupta, ‘China’s New Security Doctrine: Fortress at Home, Power Abroad”, 12 June 2025.
8. The Diplomat, Shannon Tiezzi, ‘China’s 2025 National Security White Paper: ‘Holistic Security’ Amid Rising Global Tensions”, May 2025.
9. Institute for the Study of War (ISW): ‘China–Taiwan Weekly Update’, 17 May 2025.
10. Xinhua (Chinese): White Paper Preface excerpt on the comprehensive national security concept.
11. Xinhua (Chinese), White Paper, Chapter V excerpt – on the Global Security Initiative and international security vision.
12. Chinese Government Official Portal (gov.cn): White Paper Summary (Chinese) – Key Points on Holistic Security and Development.
13. Gov.cn/CCTV (Chinese): White Paper text – sections on Taiwan, legal measures, etc. 14.
14. Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council (via media reports): Statement responding to Beijing’s White Paper, May 2025. (As reported by TaiwanPlus News).