The EU regulation on countering foreign economic coercion (Reg. 2023/2675) sets up an instrument that, at first glance, appears robust: it allows the Union to identify coercive acts by third countries, initiate consultations, and—if necessary—adopt response measures.
The stated goal is to “deter economic coercion” (see Recital 7, 8 and Article 1(2)).
“Recital (7) Whilst always acting within the framework of international law, it is essential that the Union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its Member States. […]. “
Recital (8) “This Regulation aims to ensure an effective, efficient and swift Union response to economic coercion. It especially aims to deter the economic coercion of the Union or a Member State and to enable the Union, as a last resort, to counteract economic coercion through Union response measures. […]”.
Note: As written, the phrase “to deter the economic coercion of the Union or a Member State” creates an awkward ambiguity—because it makes it sound as though the Union or Member States are the ones perpetrating coercion.
Art. 1, par. 2 “Article 1 (Subject matter and scope)
1. This Regulation applies in cases of economic coercion by a third country. It lays down rules and procedures to ensure the effective protection of the interests of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by a third country.
2. This Regulation establishes a framework for the Union to respond to economic coercion with the objective of deterring economic coercion or obtaining the cessation of economic coercion, whilst enabling the Union, as a last resort, to counteract economic coercion through Union response measures.”
The new EU regulation on countering foreign economic coercion (Reg. 2023/2675) sets up an instrument that, at first glance, appears robust: it allows the Union to identify coercive acts by third countries, initiate consultations, and—if necessary—adopt response measures. The stated goal is to “deter economic coercion” (see Recitals 7-8 and Article 1(2)).
Yet there’s something oddly self-defeating in how the deterrent function is framed. Deterrence, if it is to work at all, depends on two essential premises: first, that the potential coercer knows the instrument exists; and second, and more importantly, that it believes we are prepared to use it.
A deterrent is not a moral warning—it is a strategic threat.
The concept of deterrence hinges on two foundational elements:
- The adversary’s assessment of our capabilities
- The adversary’s assessment of our willingness to employ those capabilities
This formulation aligns with classical deterrence theory, particularly developed in the context of international relations and military strategy. The effectiveness of deterrence does not depend solely on the material resources available to a state—military strength, technological superiority, alliances—but on the adversary’s perception of those resources and, above all, the credibility of the threat to use them when vital interests are at stake.
In this sense, deterrence is as much about power as it is about credibility. If an adversary does not believe that a threat will actually be carried out, the deterrent effect evaporates. A key aspect, then, is strategic communication, designed to convince adversaries of the readiness and determination to act.
Applied to international law, these principles resonate with debates on collective security and the lawful use of force, but they are equally relevant in the economic and diplomatic domains. Deterrence is not exclusively military—it can, and increasingly does, operate through legal, diplomatic, and financial instruments. But it still requires a coherent posture: not merely writing that we aim to deter, but projecting the political will to act when red lines are crossed.