1. Structural difference: the JCPOA and the Islamabad Memorandum are not the same type of agreement
The 2015 JCPOA was a technical, nuclear-focused, multilateral agreement. On one side stood Iran; on the other, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. Its object was essentially the limitation, verification, and transparency of Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for the suspension or removal of specific nuclear-related sanctions. It was later endorsed by Security Council Resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which established the framework for the gradual termination of previous UN sanctions and for the procurement channel.
The June 2026 Islamabad Memorandum, as it emerges from the text provided, is a much broader arrangement: cessation of hostilities, Lebanon, naval blockade, the Strait of Hormuz, withdrawal of United States forces, sanctions, oil, frozen assets, economic reconstruction, the nuclear file, and a future binding Security Council resolution. It is not, strictly speaking, a “JCPOA 2.0”. It is a politico-military de-escalation agreement with a nuclear component, not a nuclear agreement with ancillary geopolitical effects.
This distinction is decisive. The JCPOA was narrower but more verifiable.
The Islamabad MoU is more ambitious but much more exposed to vagueness, interpretive disputes, and implementation problems.
2. Summary comparison table
| Profile | JCPOA 2015 | Islamabad Memorandum 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Nature | Multilateral politico-diplomatic understanding on the nuclear file | Preliminary bilateral US-Iran MoU with regional, military, economic, and nuclear components |
| Central parties | Iran, P5+1/E3+3, EU | United States and Iran; the text indirectly involves “allies”, Lebanon, Oman, Gulf coastal States, and regional partners |
| Main object | Limiting Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief | Ending a war, reopening Hormuz, easing sanctions, launching a final agreement, and managing the nuclear programme |
| Nuclear verification | Highly detailed, entrusted to the IAEA | Provided for, but still generic in the text: in situ down-blending and IAEA supervision to be defined |
| Sequence of benefits and obligations | Iran adopts nuclear measures; sanctions relief follows according to a timetable | Some economic and naval benefits begin immediately or almost immediately; many nuclear obligations are deferred to the final agreement |
| Sanctions | Mainly nuclear-related relief; many non-nuclear US sanctions could remain in place | Very broad commitment to end “all types” of sanctions, including primary, secondary, and UN sanctions |
| Regional question | Almost excluded: missiles, proxies, Hezbollah, Yemen, and Lebanon were not integrated | Central: ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon; non-interference; territorial integrity |
| UN legalization | Resolution 2231 incorporated a framework of endorsement and implementation | Paragraph 14 provides for a future binding Security Council resolution |
| Main strength | Technical precision and verifiability | Broad de-escalation and potential regional/energy stabilization |
| Main weakness | Sunset clauses, exclusion of missiles/proxies, vulnerability to US withdrawal | Vagueness, front-loading of concessions, immediate nuclear weakness, problems with allies and US domestic law |
3. Advantages of the JCPOA
The first advantage of the JCPOA was its technical verifiability. The system was not based only on political declarations by Iran, but on quantifiable limits: enrichment levels, uranium stockpiles, number and type of centrifuges, conversion of Fordow, modifications to the Arak reactor, IAEA inspections, and monitoring of the supply chain. The JCPOA created a system of restrictions and verification measures covering specific nuclear commitments, while IAEA reports after Implementation Day documented verification and monitoring of Iranian compliance.
A second advantage was that the JCPOA increased the breakout time, namely the estimated time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear device if it decided to violate the agreement. Although the JCPOA did not eliminate Iranian know-how, it reduced stockpiles, operational centrifuges, and permitted enrichment, thereby creating a useful time margin for detection, diplomatic pressure, or international reaction.
A third advantage was the JCPOA’s multilateral structure. The involvement of the EU, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and the Security Council reduced the risk that the crisis would be managed exclusively as a bilateral US-Iran matter. Resolution 2231 gave the agreement an international framework and a mechanism for the gradual removal of UN sanctions.
A fourth advantage was that the JCPOA was limited but realistic. It did not claim to resolve, in a single text, the missile programme, Hezbollah, Syria, the Gulf, Sunni-Shiite rivalries, Israel’s security, or the regional order. This narrowness was criticized, but it was also a negotiating strength: it isolated the nuclear file, which was the most urgent file from the perspective of non-proliferation.
A fifth advantage was that, for Iran, the JCPOA offered selective economic reintegration without formal capitulation. For the United States and the Europeans, it offered substantial control over the nuclear programme without war. It was therefore a classic compromise: Iran retained a limited civilian nuclear capability; the West obtained transparency and restrictions.
4. Disadvantages of the JCPOA
The main political defect of the JCPOA was its temporal asymmetry. Iran received economic and symbolic benefits relatively early, while some nuclear restrictions were subject to expiry dates, the so-called sunset clauses. For critics, this meant that the agreement postponed the problem rather than solving it.
A second disadvantage was that the JCPOA did not substantially regulate ballistic missiles, drones, Iranian-aligned armed groups, or regional policy. This omission made the agreement vulnerable to criticism from the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia: Iran could obtain sanctions relief while continuing regional activities perceived as destabilizing.
A third disadvantage was that the JCPOA had a fragile legal basis under United States domestic law. It was not approved as a treaty by the US Senate; it was treated as a political commitment. This made the 2018 withdrawal easier. As a political commitment rather than a legally binding treaty, a party could withdraw without necessarily violating international law, although the political consequences were substantial.
A fourth disadvantage was that the sanctions mechanism was complex and uncertain for European and Asian economic operators. Even before the US withdrawal, many banks and companies remained reluctant to return to Iran because of the risk of secondary sanctions, OFAC enforcement, banking compliance, and political instability.
A fifth disadvantage was that the JCPOA depended on confidence in a sharp distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear sanctions. The United States could maintain or introduce measures on terrorism, human rights, missiles, or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. To Tehran, this appeared as a possible circumvention of the spirit of the agreement; to Washington, it was a necessary reserve of pressure.
The United States withdrawal of 8 May 2018 confirmed the agreement’s political vulnerability. President Trump announced the end of US participation and the reimposition of sanctions, arguing that the JCPOA did not adequately protect US national security, did not address Iran’s regional conduct, and left open a future path toward more advanced nuclear capabilities.
5. Advantages of the 2026 Islamabad Memorandum
The first advantage of the MoU, if actually implemented, is the immediate cessation of hostilities. Paragraph 1 is much more ambitious than the JCPOA: it is not limited to the nuclear file, but declares the permanent end of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon, and includes a commitment not to initiate wars or military operations against each other. In jus ad bellum terms, the text attempts to transform a truce into an obligation of non-use of force and non-aggression.
A second advantage is that the MoU addresses the issue of maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz. This is a point that the JCPOA did not cover. After months of crisis, mines, blockades, or threats to navigation, a commitment to reopen commercial traffic and allow safe passage may have immediate effects on energy markets, maritime insurance, supply chains, and macroeconomic stability. Public sources indicate that the reopening of the Strait and commercial traffic are among the central points of the understanding.
A third advantage is that the MoU offers Iran a much stronger economic package than the JCPOA: termination of sanctions, waivers for petroleum exports, access to frozen assets, licenses for financial transactions, and at least USD 300 billion for reconstruction and economic development. For Tehran, this makes the agreement politically saleable: it is not only nuclear containment, but economic survival and reintegration.
A fourth advantage is that the MoU, unlike the JCPOA, contains a principle of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Paragraph 2 uses the classic language of the UN Charter: sovereignty, territorial integrity, and abstention from interference in internal affairs. For Iran, this is probably central: at least formally, it reduces the threat of regime change or preventive military campaigns.
A fifth advantage is that the MoU provides for an executive monitoring mechanism and a future binding Security Council resolution. If paragraph 14 were actually implemented through a mandatory resolution, the future agreement could be legally more robust than the JCPOA as a mere political commitment, at least at the UN level.
A sixth advantage is that paragraph 8 attempts to address the most urgent nuclear problem of 2026: the stockpile of enriched uranium, including high-level enriched material. Iran had accumulated a significant quantity of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent, a level far more problematic than the JCPOA parameters. In situ down-blending under IAEA supervision would, if verifiable, be an immediate risk-reduction measure.
6. Disadvantages and risks of the Islamabad Memorandum
The first major problem is nuclear vagueness. The JCPOA was meticulous; the MoU, in the text provided, is programmatic. It states that Iran will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons, that the accumulated enriched material will be addressed through a mutually agreed mechanism, and that the basic method will be in situ down-blending under IAEA supervision. However, at least in the text provided, it does not yet specify:
- what quantity of material will be diluted;
- to what level of enrichment;
- according to which technical timetable;
- with what form of IAEA access;
- with what measures regarding centrifuge containment;
- what regime will apply to Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan, or other sites;
- whether Iran will be allowed to continue enrichment;
- what consequences will follow in the event of non-cooperation.
This is the most delicate point. The JCPOA reduced nuclear risk through already detailed technical obligations. The MoU defers many of the answers to the final agreement.
A second problem is that the MoU appears to anticipate economic benefits before full neutralization of the nuclear risk. Paragraphs 10 and 11 provide for waivers for petroleum exports and the availability of frozen assets already in the phase following signature or implementation of the MoU. For opponents, this is equivalent to giving Tehran liquidity before a verified nuclear rollback has occurred. Public criticism of the MoU focuses precisely on the risk that Iran receives economic oxygen while retaining nuclear, missile, or proxy capabilities.
A third problem is that paragraph 7 promises the end of all types of sanctions, including UN sanctions, IAEA-related measures, and unilateral US primary and secondary sanctions. This is legally and politically very difficult. The United States can remove or suspend many executive measures, but some sanctions are based on congressional legislation; others depend on UN decisions; and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors are not simply “American sanctions”. The text uses a maximalist formula that may create unrealistic Iranian expectations.
A fourth problem is that the MoU involves actors not fully controllable by the parties. Paragraph 1 refers to “allies in the current war” and includes Lebanon. But Hezbollah, Israel, Shiite militias, Arab regional partners, and possibly other actors are not necessarily direct parties to the MoU. A US-Iran commitment to stop operations “on all fronts” risks being contested if a third actor continues hostilities or interprets the text differently. The Lebanese component and the role of Hezbollah and Israel are among the most fragile interpretive nodes.
A fifth problem is that the Strait of Hormuz raises an autonomous legal question. The law of the sea protects transit through straits used for international navigation, but neither Iran nor the United States is party to UNCLOS; the customary status of the transit passage regime is disputed, while Article 44 UNCLOS provides that strait States must not hamper transit passage and that there shall be no suspension. By referring to Iran-Oman dialogue and future administration or maritime services, the MoU could stabilize passage. It could also, however, legitimize, or at least normalize, Iranian claims of management, fees, or control that many States would regard as incompatible with freedom of navigation.
A sixth problem is that paragraph 9 freezes the nuclear status quo pending the final agreement. If the status quo is already very advanced, freezing it may be insufficient. Iran had accumulated uranium enriched to 60 per cent, and inspection activities had been compromised following attacks and the withdrawal of inspectors for security reasons. In other words, a freeze is useful only if the starting point is acceptable and fully monitorable. In 2026, this is much more problematic than it was in 2015.
A seventh problem is that the MoU creates a possible strategic moral hazard. If Iran obtains USD 300 billion, oil waivers, frozen assets, and the end of the naval blockade in exchange for commitments that remain generic, other States may interpret the sequence as evidence that escalation, closure of chokepoints, and nuclear accumulation produce concessions. This is a political rather than strictly legal issue, but it matters greatly for the governance of non-proliferation.
An eighth problem is that the MoU may be vulnerable from the perspective of United States constitutional law. A commitment to remove “all types” of sanctions, authorize petroleum transactions, mobilize regional partners for USD 300 billion, and withdraw forces may require congressional cooperation, appropriations, legislative amendments, or repeated use of waiver authorities. Without a congressional basis, the risk of reversibility remains high, as it was with the JCPOA.
7. From the perspective of non-proliferation: the JCPOA is stronger than the MoU, at least for now
From the strictly nuclear perspective, the JCPOA was superior for three reasons.
First, it contained numerical and technical limits that had already been negotiated. The MoU promises a future mechanism.
Second, it entrusted the IAEA with a more structured verification regime. In the MoU, the IAEA is mentioned, but its concrete authority depends on what will be written into the final agreement.
Third, the JCPOA reduced capabilities and stockpiles preventively. The MoU appears to intervene after the situation has deteriorated. The fact that the text refers to in situ down-blending indicates that the problem is no longer only to prevent accumulation, but to manage material already accumulated.
Therefore, if only the nuclear dimension is assessed, the JCPOA was a more precise, more verifiable agreement and more consistent with the classic logic of non-proliferation. The MoU can become better only if the final agreement includes obligations at least equivalent or superior to those of the JCPOA: full IAEA access, complete inventory, verified dilution, limits on advanced centrifuges, a ban or strict limit on enrichment, a procurement channel, complete declarations, and an automatic mechanism for the restoration of sanctions.
8. From the regional-strategic perspective: the MoU is more ambitious than the JCPOA
The JCPOA did not resolve the problem of regional security. The MoU addresses it directly: war, Lebanon, the Strait of Hormuz, withdrawal of forces, non-interference, reconstruction, and the end of the naval blockade.
This is its principal advantage. If it works, the MoU can produce benefits that the JCPOA could not produce:
- immediate reduction of the risk of US-Iran war;
- reopening of Hormuz;
- reduction of global energy risk;
- reduction of pressure on commercial routes;
- a direct US-Iran diplomatic channel;
- future UN involvement;
- possible conditional economic normalization.
But this breadth is also its principal defect. The more issues are inserted into the same agreement, the more veto points arise. The JCPOA could fail over the nuclear file or sanctions; the MoU can fail over the nuclear file, Lebanon, Hormuz, frozen assets, oil, military withdrawal, regional partners, the US Congress, the Security Council, Israel, Oman, Gulf States, and the IAEA.
9. From the legal perspective: paragraph 14 is crucial
Paragraph 14 provides that the final agreement must be approved through a binding Security Council resolution. This is probably the most important legal clause.
If the Security Council were to adopt a clearly binding resolution under Chapter VII, or at least using mandatory language, the final agreement could obtain a stronger legal status than a simple bilateral MoU. It could:
- bind UN Member States;
- coordinate the termination of UN sanctions;
- create a verification mechanism;
- establish consequences for violations;
- reduce unilateral reversibility.
However, a UN resolution would not automatically solve everything. It cannot, by itself, require the US Congress to repeal domestic sanctions legislation, except by creating a political and legal conflict between international obligations and domestic law. It cannot guarantee that Israel or Hezbollah will fully accept the US-Iran interpretation. It cannot make a nuclear agreement technically verifiable if Iran does not grant physical, documentary, and continuous access to the IAEA.
10. The sequencing problem: who gives what, and when?
The most sensitive difference is sequencing.
Under the JCPOA, the sequence was: Iran implements nuclear measures; the IAEA verifies; nuclear-related sanctions are suspended or removed according to a timetable.
Under the MoU, the sequence appears more mixed and riskier: cessation of hostilities and de-blockade begin immediately; Iran allows maritime passage; the United States issues petroleum waivers and makes frozen assets available; the substantive nuclear question is discussed and defined in the final agreement.
This sequence can be defended on pragmatic grounds: without immediate benefits, Iran would not accept a truce or reopen Hormuz. But it can be criticized from an enforcement perspective: if benefits arrive before nuclear verification, Western leverage diminishes.
The sustainability of the MoU therefore depends on a very precise conditionality clause. Paragraph 13 attempts to do this: negotiations on the final agreement begin subject to the initiation and continued implementation of paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 10, and 11. But this clause is not sufficient unless accompanied by an automatic mechanism suspending benefits in the event of violation.
11. Comparative assessment of advantages
The JCPOA is preferable if the main criterion is verifiable nuclear non-proliferation. It was more technical, more precise, more multilateral, and more consistent with the IAEA’s mandate.
The Islamabad MoU is preferable if the main criterion is the immediate cessation of conflict and regional stabilization. It is broader, more political, and closer to an embryonic regional security arrangement.
The JCPOA limited a specific risk. The MoU attempts to extinguish a wider strategic fire.
The JCPOA was less ambitious but more governable. The MoU is more ambitious but more fragile.
12. Comparative assessment of risks
The principal risk of the JCPOA was that Iran would obtain legitimacy and economic benefits while retaining, in the long term, technological capabilities and regional influence. The US criticism in 2018 focused precisely on this: sunset clauses, missiles, proxies, regional conduct, and the perceived insufficiency of the agreement to protect US national security.
The principal risk of the MoU is more serious in the immediate term: Iran could obtain very broad economic and strategic benefits without a sufficiently verified nuclear reduction. Moreover, if Hormuz, Lebanon, and sanctions are negotiated ambiguously, each party will be able to sustain a different reading of the text.
In particular:
- for the United States, the risk is appearing to have converted military pressure and sanctions into premature concessions;
- for Iran, the risk is that US promises are politically reversible or not implementable without Congress;
- for Europe, the risk is marginalization in relation to a major US-Iran arrangement that produces extraterritorial effects on sanctions, energy, and regional security;
- for Israel and the Gulf States, the risk is that US-Iran de-escalation leaves intact or strengthens Iranian strategic depth;
- for the non-proliferation regime, the risk is that the precedent weakens the idea that violations and nuclear accumulation produce isolation, not rewards.
13. What the final agreement should contain in order to be better than the JCPOA
To overcome the limits of the JCPOA without inheriting the weaknesses of the MoU, the final agreement should contain at least the following elements.
First, a complete and verified inventory of all nuclear material, including uranium enriched to 60 per cent and 20 per cent, UF6, uranium metal, advanced centrifuges, components, and storage sites.
Second, down-blending with numerical parameters: quantity, final enrichment level, timetable, location, sealing procedures, sampling, and continuous IAEA surveillance.
Third, robust IAEA access, including the Additional Protocol or a functional equivalent, rapid access to suspicious sites, cameras, seals, historical data, and the supply chain.
Fourth, limits on advanced centrifuges and research and development. Without this, reducing the stockpile is not enough: Iran could rapidly reconstitute capability.
Fifth, a snapback or automatic reimposition mechanism for sanctions in the event of material breach, avoiding the need for renewed political consensus within the Security Council for every violation.
Sixth, conditional sequencing: oil waivers, frozen assets, and reconstruction funds should be phased according to IAEA verification and maritime/regional compliance.
Seventh, clarification on Hormuz: no fee incompatible with freedom of navigation; no recognition of an Iranian right to suspend transit; coordination with Oman and the IMO; guarantees for neutral vessels.
Eighth, a verifiable regional clause: if the text includes Lebanon and proxies, it must define who is bound, which activities are prohibited, how the cessation of hostilities is monitored, and what happens in the event of violations by non-State actors.
Ninth, a US domestic legal basis: without some degree of congressional involvement or legislative stabilization, the new agreement risks suffering the same fate as the JCPOA.
14. Concluding assessment
The JCPOA was technically solid but politically incomplete. It worked well as an instrument of nuclear control, but it did not resolve the strategic conflict between Iran, the United States, Israel, and regional partners. Its defect was not so much immediate technical weakness, but the failure to integrate the missile, regional, and security files, combined with the fragility of its political basis in the United States.
The Islamabad Memorandum is the opposite: politically vast, technically still weak. It has the merit of addressing war, Hormuz, sanctions, reconstruction, and the nuclear file within the same framework. But for that very reason it risks being less controllable. Its success depends almost entirely on the final agreement: if, within 60 days, detailed nuclear obligations, rigorous conditional sequencing, IAEA guarantees, and a genuinely binding UN resolution are fixed, the MoU could become more important than the JCPOA. If, however, it remains vague, with anticipated economic benefits and deferred verification, it will be strategically riskier than the JCPOA and legally more unstable.
The clearest formulation is this: the JCPOA was a good nuclear agreement but a poor regional agreement; the Islamabad Memorandum could be a good regional de-escalation agreement, but for now it is an insufficient nuclear agreement.
