When people discuss the Greenland agreement, I get the impression that the debate often revolves more around Donald Trump’s statements than around what the governments actually signed. The distinction is important in this case. On 13 October, Trump once again referred to Greenland as “our” island and announced that oil, gas and mineral exploration activities would soon begin. Yet the agreement signed just a few weeks earlier does not transfer sovereignty over the island to the United States, nor does it give American companies any special right to exploit its resources. It therefore makes sense to start with the text itself, rather than with the statements surrounding it.
The first established fact is that the agreement was signed. On 22 September 2026, in New York, the US President, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Greenlandic Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen signed an agreement amending and supplementing the Agreement of 27 April 1951 concerning the defence of Greenland. This was neither a vague political understanding nor the purchase of a territory. It was a security agreement, negotiated after months of tensions between Washington, Copenhagen and Nuuk. Moreover, under the 1951 agreement and its subsequent amendments, the United States already enjoyed extensive rights to maintain a military presence on the island. The argument that Greenland could only be defended if it came under American sovereignty was therefore questionable even before the new agreement was signed.
The second fact is equally clear: the text reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark and recognises the Greenlandic people’s right to self-determination. These words have a precise legal meaning. There is no territorial cession, no annexation and no transfer of sovereignty over any part of the island to the United States. This needs to be stated clearly, particularly in light of the threats and proposals made in the preceding months. But it would be equally mistaken to stop there and conclude that nothing has changed.
In military terms, the agreement is far from insignificant. Washington will be able to expand and modernise its activities at Pituffik Space Base and establish new defence areas at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig, subject to technical arrangements yet to be agreed. The agreement also provides for procedures to identify additional defence areas, along with extensive access for US aircraft, military vehicles and vessels, including certain forms of submarine navigation in territorial waters. It also envisages closer cooperation on counterintelligence and the protection of installations. The Golden Dome missile defence project is mentioned in the preamble: this indicates a shared objective, but does not, in itself, amount to the approval of an already finalised operational plan. As for the new bases, the agreement authorises their establishment; it does not demonstrate that they have already been built or that every operational detail has been settled.
The provision that strikes me as particularly deserving of attention, especially from the perspective of economic security, concerns foreign investment. Article X provides for restrictions in particularly sensitive sectors — including critical infrastructure and resource extraction — on states and investors that are neither NATO members nor NATO partners nor members of the European Union. These restrictions apply where control over assets, significant influence or access to confidential information could endanger national security or public order. This is therefore not a blanket prohibition on investment from those countries. Implementation is entrusted to Greenland, in close cooperation with Denmark, while the Danish authorities must consult their American counterparts. Any exceptions provided for in the text require the agreement of the parties.
This is where things become interesting. A country does not need to purchase a territory to acquire lasting influence over the strategic decisions affecting it. In some cases, it is enough to have a say in who may establish military infrastructure there, who may acquire sensitive assets and which risks must be taken into account. I would not argue that the United States has secured a general right of veto over Greenland’s economy: that would be an excessive reading of Article X. It has, however, negotiated a significant role in the framework of safeguards that, once the agreement enters into force, will govern the most sensitive investments. And this is happening in a territory whose mineral resources have long attracted considerable strategic interest. The existence of mineral deposits, of course, does not mean that they can necessarily be exploited: inadequate infrastructure, environmental challenges and local regulations remain very real obstacles.
There is a third aspect, perhaps the most delicate from a legal standpoint. The agreement has no expiry date and may be amended only by mutual consent. It also provides that, should Greenland become independent, Denmark and Greenland will endeavour to ensure that the new state assumes the obligations established by the agreement and remains within NATO, applying for membership if necessary. A clarification is needed here: the agreement cannot, by itself, guarantee that a future independent Greenlandic state will belong to NATO. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires the unanimous agreement of the Allies for the admission of a new member. Nevertheless, the political and legal intention to preserve the existing security arrangements over time is clear, even in the event of a change in the island’s constitutional status.
This combination of principles and constraints raises a question that I find more significant than the argument over whether the agreement represents an American or a Danish “victory”. Self-determination is expressly recognised, yet Greenland’s future security choices, and some of its economic choices, are already being shaped by commitments intended to endure. Recognising sovereignty and the right to independence does not, therefore, mean leaving all the strategic options of a potentially independent state entirely open. This distinction deserves closer examination, without confusing influence with sovereignty or military cooperation with annexation.
Nor is everything definitively settled. The agreement has been signed, but its entry into force requires the completion of the necessary parliamentary procedures in Denmark and Greenland, followed by a diplomatic notification to the United States. On 12 October, the Greenlandic Parliament debated the agreement: a majority appeared supportive, while some opposition representatives questioned what tangible economic benefits the population would receive. It is a reasonable question, particularly because the commitment to give preference, wherever possible, to Greenlandic companies in contracts relating to military installations does not amount to a predetermined financial compensation package. As of 14 October, there was no confirmation that the agreement had entered into force.
If I were to summarise what happened, I would therefore avoid saying either that Trump has “obtained Greenland” or that the crisis has ended without consequences.
Sovereignty remains where it was; what has been agreed is an expansion of US military presence rights and a more restrictive framework governing certain strategic sectors.
The agreement brings the dispute back within a mutually agreed framework, but leaves essential questions unresolved: how much influence will the Greenlandic authorities have over operational decisions, how will investment screening measures be implemented, and what will all this mean if the Greenlandic people one day choose independence? These are the questions I would start with when assessing the agreement. The more emphatic political statements can wait.
Sources and fact-checking
- Full text of the agreement of 22 September 2026, White House (particularly the preamble and Articles IV, V, VI, IX, X, XI and XII).
- Danish Government press release, 22 September 2026.
- House of Commons Library, The new US–Denmark–Greenland agreement, 29 September 2026.
- European Parliamentary Research Service, The new US–Denmark–Greenland agreement, 12 October 2026, PE 791.543.
- Reuters, debate in the Greenlandic Parliament, 12 October 2026.
- Associated Press, Trump’s statements on Greenland’s resources, 14 October 2026.
- North Atlantic Treaty, Article 10, official NATO text.