In late June 2025, a striking announcement marked a turning point in Germany’s intelligence landscape: the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the country’s foreign intelligence agency, is set to undergo a major institutional overhaul. At the heart of this transformation lies a symbolic yet strategic leadership change. Bruno Kahl, who has led the BND since 2016, will step down and be reassigned as ambassador to the Vatican. His successor, Martin Jäger, currently serving as Germany’s ambassador to Ukraine, is not a career intelligence officer but a seasoned diplomat. This choice signals a recalibration of the BND’s identity and function, suggesting a stronger alignment between Germany’s diplomatic and intelligence strategies.
An article, published in Bild, frames this shift as the beginning of a new chapter for the BND. Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Chancellery Minister Thorsten Frei (both CDU) present the reform not merely as administrative reshuffling, but as part of a broader response to Germany’s “growing responsibility in the world”. According to Frei, the BND must be equipped to deliver a decisive knowledge advantage in a world marked by “multiple crises, hybrid threats, and global power shifts.” Intelligence, in this framing, is no longer a passive activity but a critical enabler of sovereign decision-making.
Criticism of the BND’s recent performance provides the political rationale for reform. One of the most severe voices comes from Peter R. Neumann, professor of security studies at King’s College London. He points to a systemic dysfunction within the agency, arguing that successive German chancellors have failed to make strategic use of the BND. This neglect, he claims, has led to institutional complacency. The most glaring example was the BND’s failure to anticipate Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022—an event that caught its leadership off guard, with then-director Kahl reportedly needing evacuation from Kyiv.
Neumann’s criticism goes further: the BND, he says, must reclaim its core mission as an intelligence agency, not a civic education bureau. His words underscore the need to sharpen the agency’s focus on foreign intelligence gathering—particularly on secret information that is not accessible through diplomatic or open-source channels. Only in doing so, he argues, can the BND justify its extraordinary powers and significant budget.
The reform proposals outlined in the article also include expanding the BND’s technical capabilities. Professor Carlo Masala of the Bundeswehr University in Munich highlights several key areas for modernization: real-time use of facial recognition technologies (currently restricted under German law), direct access to financial data (now available only via customs authorities), and systematic IP address logging. These are not minor tweaks—they represent a significant broadening of the BND’s surveillance and investigative toolkit.
Yet perhaps the most controversial aspect of the article is the call for the BND to engage in covert operations abroad. Neumann openly suggests that Germany should respond to Russian hybrid tactics with its own, implying that the BND should play a proactive role in influencing foreign publics and advancing Germany’s foreign policy objectives in non-transparent ways. This idea—rarely voiced so bluntly in the German public sphere—suggests a reimagining of intelligence work as a strategic instrument of statecraft, not just a defensive shield.
What emerges from the article is a vision of a leaner, more assertive, and more politically integrated BND—a service no longer defined by bureaucratic inertia, but by agility, initiative, and strategic relevance. However, this vision raises critical questions. The article notably lacks any discussion of democratic oversight, judicial review, or ethical boundaries. It assumes that more power and more autonomy will necessarily lead to more effectiveness, without acknowledging the risks of mission creep, legal overreach, or erosion of civil liberties.