Summary of “A Primer on Russian Cognitive Warfare” – Institute for the Study of War (ISW), June 30, 2025
Russia’s cognitive warfare represents a foundational pillar of its strategy for both war and governance. More than mere disinformation, it is a long-term, multilayered effort to reshape how adversaries think, reason, and decide—with the aim of achieving strategic objectives without relying solely on military force.
This is not an incidental component of Russia’s strategy—it is the strategy.
The Russian concept of cognitive warfare
Cognitive warfare, as described in the report, is not just about propaganda or “fake news.” Rather, it is about implanting false or distorted premises into the minds of opponents so that they arrive—seemingly on their own—at conclusions that serve Russia’s interests. It is, in essence, a strategic attack on perception, logic, and volition.
This approach is distinctly Russian, rooted in Soviet doctrines like reflexive control, developed by theorists like Vladimir Lefebvre in the 1960s. The idea is not to impose decisions, but to manipulate the very reasoning process of adversaries by feeding them a curated version of reality.
Why cognitive warfare?
Russia turns to cognitive warfare out of both necessity and opportunity. It is not a weak state per se—it maintains a significant military force, nuclear arsenal, and global presence—but it is weak relative to its expansive strategic ambitions:
- Restoring control over Ukraine, Belarus, and other former Soviet states
- Securing a “sphere of influence” free from Western presence
- Undermining NATO and U.S. global leadership
- Preserving Putin’s regime by cultivating the idea that alternatives are worse or destabilizing
Given that its conventional power cannot fully achieve these goals, the Kremlin seeks to close the gap between ambition and capability by manipulating how others perceive its power and inevitability.
Cognitive warfare as a tool of governance and occupation
Internally, the Kremlin uses cognitive warfare to sustain domestic control. Since Putin’s rise in 2000—symbolized by the immediate raid on the NTV station—Russia has moved steadily toward total informational control. By 2025, dissenting voices are criminalized; even citing Ukrainian poetry is punished with prison sentences.
Externally, Russia replicates these methods in occupied territories. In Kherson (2022), the first action was seizing the TV tower to broadcast Russian media. In 2023, 20 Russian federal channels were forcibly connected to networks in Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts. The 2024 “presidential elections” staged in occupied Ukraine were also part of a broader cognitive campaign to normalize occupation.
Three levels of cognitive warfare
Russia’s efforts operate simultaneously at tactical, operational, and strategic levels:
- Tactical: Short-lived, low-level actions—like Romanian influencers backing a pro-Kremlin candidate, or false claims about Ukrainian officials using drugs.
- Operational: Medium-term campaigns targeting states or regions. Examples include the campaign against the Baltic states involving threats, citizenship offers, and narratives about “repression” of Russian speakers.
- Strategic: The most dangerous. These aim to shape deep-seated premises—e.g., “Russia’s victory in Ukraine is inevitable,” “Ukraine is a failed state,” or “NATO enlargement is provocative.” These premises serve as the foundation upon which Western debates and decisions are then built.
Multi-generational and cross-theater strategy
Cognitive warfare is long-game warfare. Some campaigns have been decades in the making:
- In Ukraine, separatist narratives began as early as 2004.
- Against the Baltics, the Kremlin has sowed doubts about their independence since the 1990s, going as far as to claim they voluntarily joined the USSR.
- In Finland, the Kremlin has accused Helsinki of historical crimes and exaggerated ties to Russia to undermine NATO membership.
Moreover, Soviet-style tropes resurface repeatedly, such as the false claim of U.S. bio-labs in former Soviet countries. This narrative—used in the 1980s to blame the U.S. for HIV—has been revived and exported globally (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Latin America, Africa), creating the impression of a hostile and deceitful West.
Beyond information: physical means reinforce cognitive objectives
The Kremlin’s information campaigns are often amplified through physical actions:
- Military drills, nuclear posturing, cyberattacks, and even false flag operations are used not primarily for kinetic outcomes but to shape perceptions and induce paralysis in adversaries.
- In 2023, Russia threatened nuclear retaliation as Ukraine prepared a counteroffensive. The aim was not escalation, but deterrence—making Western leaders fear the cost of arming Ukraine.
- Russia also tried to simulate a naval blockade of Ukrainian grain ports through targeted strikes and withdrawal from the UN Grain Deal, hoping to paint Ukraine as the cause of global food insecurity.
Non-traditional vectors: the Church, Corporations, and Diplomats
Cognitive warfare does not rely on media alone. It is institutionally embedded in various arms of the Russian state:
- The Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate): instrumental in occupied Ukraine and abroad, promoting pro-war liturgies and narratives.
- Rosatom: used not only for nuclear cooperation but also for messaging campaigns in Africa to enhance Russia’s image.
- Rossotrudnichestvo: an agency for “cultural diplomacy” that organizes pro-Russian rallies and youth programs abroad.
- Kremlin-linked oligarchs and influencers: act as “cognitive warfighters,” targeting foreign audiences with tailored narratives—e.g., Kirill Dmitriev (RDIF CEO), or Konstantin Malofeev (Tsargrad).
What has cognitive warfare achieved? And where has it failed?
Successes:
- Slowed Western delivery of tanks and advanced weapons to Ukraine in 2022–2023.
- Framed Ukrainian resistance as destabilizing, manipulating neutral or skeptical countries.
- Maintained internal regime stability despite immense battlefield losses (over 1 million Russian casualties by mid-2025).
Failures and vulnerabilities:
- Sweden’s decision to join NATO in 2023 came despite threats of retaliation.
- Russian overreliance on cognitive tools has created blind spots, e.g., overestimating how quickly Ukraine would fall.
- The illusion of control has at times led the Kremlin to believe its own propaganda—undermining military planning and intelligence.
- Domestic dissent is growing among nationalist milbloggers and veterans, despite censorship.
Strategic recommendations
The ISW strongly argues that responding symmetrically to Russia’s cognitive warfare is a mistake. Debunking individual falsehoods is insufficient. Instead, Western democracies should:
- Reject the premises Russia tries to impose (e.g., that NATO provoked the war, or that Russian victory is inevitable).
- Act decisively in the real world, where physical outcomes undermine Russian narratives—e.g., Ukrainian victories dispelling nuclear bluffing.
- Exploit Russia’s vulnerabilities, especially the fragility of its legitimacy, military limitations, and dependence on fabricated narratives.
- Build long-term situational awareness, recognizing that cognitive warfare is predictable, and that its themes recur in cycles.
