Hate speech, free speech, and the European Court of Human Rights: the challenge of consistency and the low-threshold hatred paradigm

Natalie Alkiviadou’s presentation highlights how freedom of expression, a cornerstone of democracy, is currently facing political “weaponization” and an inconsistent approach from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Although the Court established in 1976 that free speech includes ideas that “shock, offend, or disturb,” Alkiviadou argues that this principle has significantly deteriorated. A major issue is the lack of a universal definition for “hate speech,” leading the Court to adopt a paternalistic and inconsistent stance that often creates a hierarchy of protected groups and punishable speech.

This shift is evident in what she calls the “low threshold hatred paradigm,” where criminal sanctions are imposed for offensive remarks even without any incitement to violence. Cases involving politicians like Féret, youth groups like Vejdeland, or private citizens like Lilliendahl demonstrate how the Court now penalizes expressions targeting religious, racial, or gender groups simply because they are deemed prejudicial or insulting, effectively ignoring its own precedents on provocative speech. This inconsistency also extends to historical memory; for example, the Court strictly applies Article 17 (abuse of rights) to Holocaust denial but uses a more permissive contextual analysis for the denial of the Armenian genocide. A similar double standard is seen in the prohibition of Nazi symbols contrasted with a more lenient view toward Communist imagery.

Furthermore, the introduction of third-party liability means that online platforms and even individuals can be held criminally responsible for hateful comments posted by others if they are not removed quickly enough. Alkiviadou warns that these restrictive measures may be counterproductive; rather than protecting minorities, silencing offensive opinions can turn those speakers into “martyrs” and provide them with a larger platform. Ultimately, she suggests that a healthy democracy should not rely on the Court’s paternalism to decide who is “vulnerable,” but should instead maintain a robust structure of free speech that allows all citizens to engage and flourish.

See also Natalie Alkiviadou, Hate Speech and the European Court of Human Rights (Routledge, 2025), in which the author argues that the European Court of Human Rights should revisit its approach to hate speech cases and reaffirm a robust protection of freedom of expression in line with Handyside v. United Kingdom, noting that Article 10 protects not only well-received opinions but also those that are offensive, shocking or disturbing.


Leave a Reply