The Russian approach to deterrence, referred to as “deterrence à la Russe,” differs significantly from the Western conceptualization in several fundamental aspects, including its etymology, underlying logic, scope, typology, and the cultural factors that influence it.
Here are the main differences:
• Etymology and logic
The English term “deterrence” is derived from “terror” (fear) and implies the infliction of apprehension through the threat of using force. Fear, rather than the actual use of force, is the key logic in classical Western deterrence theory.
The Russian term “sderzhivanie” (the usual translation for “deterrence”) does not derive from fear. Instead, it refers to a concrete effort to hold back, restrain, or contain something or someone in motion or on the verge of erupting, such as emotions, tears, horses, or military aggression. Its connotation implies a preemptive and proactive action, a concrete engagement of the competitor rather than a mere rhetorical threat. The figurative meaning of “sderzhivanie” in the Russian mind is the idea of a proactive and preemptive move, a concentration of physical or emotional energy directed towards a specific object to create the desired effect.
The Russian term “ustrashenie” (intimidation), derived from “strakh” (fear), is closer to the English “terror”. However, it is rarely used to describe Russian actions due to its negative connotation, which implies an offensive and aggressive act. It is more often used to describe Western coercive policies or deterrence by punishment. Russia sees itself operating from a position of “counter-coercion” (kontrsderzhivanie).
Furthermore, unlike the English lexicon, “sderzhivanie” is applied more broadly in the Russian strategic lexicon, including more general-level strategies like geopolitical “containment”.
• Broader rationale and scope
In the Western conception, deterrence primarily aims to prevent an actor from undertaking an unwanted action (maintaining the status quo). The term “deterrence” implies a more reactive modus operandi, while “compellence” has a more proactive connotation.
“Deterrence à la Russe” has a much broader meaning: it refers to the use of threats, sometimes accompanied by limited use of force, to maintain the status quo, change it (compellence), shape the strategic environment, prevent escalation, or de-escalate during actual armed conflict. Russian discourse uses the term “deterrence” to refer to both aspects.
The term “prinuzhdenie” (compellence, meaning to compel someone to do or stop doing something) is used less frequently in Russian discourse, often to describe Western actions or in specific contexts like peace-enforcement operations.
“Deterrence à la Russe” describes activities and signals both in peacetime and during military conflict, spanning all phases of war (threatening, initial, main, and final periods). This makes it closer to the Western conceptualization of “coercion” in its prewar and intrawar forms.
• Varying typologies
Western literature distinguishes between deterrence by denial (preventing the adversary from achieving its objectives) and deterrence by punishment (threatening retaliation after an action).
In the nuclear and conventional realms, Russian thinking tends to downplay this Western dichotomy, considering it irrelevant or unhelpful, as the two strategies often merge by default and by design. The distinction between these two forms has never been as prominent in the Russian lexicon as in the Western one.
The Russian taxonomy focuses on the distinction between “intimidation” or “fear-inducement” (ustrashenie) (declaratory signaling and demonstrations of resolve) and “forceful deterrence” (silovoe sderzhivanie) (limited use of force on and beyond the battlefield).
A notable exception is in the informational domain, where Russian experts have adopted the denial and punishment terminology, following Western debates on cyber warfare. This adoption might be due to a learning competition between the two approaches in this domain.
• Cross-domain approach
Both Russian and Western approaches aim to be “cross-domain.” However, “deterrence à la Russe” was conceived from the outset as a cross-domain construct. For example, in the 1990s, influence from the nuclear domain was leveraged into the conventional sphere to compensate for Russia’s strategic-operational inferiority.
While Western experts had to integrate this feature later, for Russians, it was a natural expansion of an existing practice.
The Russian approach tends to merge all instruments of influence into a single organic system, whereas the U.S. approach, at least initially, was more compartmentalized. Russians also have fewer normative and psychological restrictions in integrating domains, seeking a synergistic effect where new domains complement existing ones without devaluing them (e.g., nuclear capabilities).
• Tailored approach
“Deterrence à la Russe” demonstrates a sophisticated ability to calibrate “deterrent damage” according to the adversary’s strategic culture and psychology. This includes the pursuit of a proper conceptual classification for “deterring damage” (sderzhivaiuschii uscherb), differentiating between “unacceptable” (nepriemlimyi), “assigned” (zadannyi), and “dosed” (dozirovannyi) damage.
This sensitivity stems from a Russian holistic-dialectical cognitive style that views the deterrence equation as a function of the interaction between oneself and one’s competitor, rather than mere static balances.
• Cultural and Ideational factors
Holistic-Dialectical Cognitive Style: Russian strategy is characterized by a holistic or systemic and dialectical approach to reality, seeing issues as interconnected within a broad framework and recognizing contradictions. This explains the broad meaning, scope, and cross-domain nature of “deterrence à la Russe,” as well as the tendency to merge forceful and non-forceful modes of operation into a single coercive scheme.
Primacy of moral and psychological factors: Russian military culture places greater emphasis on moral and psychological-cognitive factors than on material or technological ones. This naturally predisposes to understanding the psychological aspects of coercion, makes perception the center of gravity of a military campaign, and facilitates the integration of various forms of influence (nuclear, conventional, and non-military).
Reflexive control, military cunningness, active measures: Traditional Russian concepts such as reflexive control (manipulating the adversary’s perception), military cunningness (deception, maskirovka), and active measures (clandestine influence operations to actively shape reality) have strongly influenced Russian deterrence theory. These concepts, though differing from deterrence in their clandestine or manipulative signaling aspects, provide a philosophical and practical framework for coercion.
Aktivnost’ and persistent engagement: aktivnost’ (combat dynamism), a principle of Russian military art, refers to uninterrupted influence on the adversary to seize the initiative and shape their conduct. The related concept of “persistent engagement of the adversary” or “systematic combat activities” is also central to Russian intelligence, describing the execution of separate operational missions with limited forces over a long period to influence the adversary and create favorable conditions.
Cumulative coercion: Russian informational deterrence is based on “cumulative coercion,” a constant, low-intensity engagement to generate a “deterrent potential” that can be exploited later. This approach blurs the line between coercion and combat.
• Conceptual maturity and historical legacies
Russian deterrence theory is approximately five decades younger than its Western counterpart. However, Russian defense intellectuals have bridged the knowledge gap and developed a unique and sophisticated theory of coercion, demonstrating flexibility in merging different domains and sophistication in calibrating damage.
The Russian approach has also been influenced by historical legacies such as Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov’s vision of the military-technical revolution (which provided a framework for conventional deterrence and the relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear operations), the “reasonable sufficiency” (razumnaia dostatochnost’) concept from the Perestroika era (informing damage calibration and cross-domain logic), and the Soviet methodology for calculating the “correlation of forces and means” (COFM) (shaping the analytical predisposition for deterrence planning).
In summary, “deterrence à la Russe” is distinguished by its more proactive, holistic, and inherently cross-domain integrated nature, allowing it to blur the lines between peace and war, coercion and combat, in ways that the Western approach has traditionally conceptualized more distinctly.
For more information see Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, The Russian Way of Deterrence, Strategic Culture, Coercion, and War, 2023