In recent months China has tightened its export regime for rare earth elements and related technologies, describing these steps as essential to its national security. The change is not a minor adjustment but a structural move that turns China’s dominance in critical minerals into an explicit instrument of geopolitical strategy.
(See MOFCOM Spokesperson’s Remarks on China’s Recent Economic and Trade Policies and Measures)
Ministry of Commerce Notice 2025 No. 61: Announcement of the Decision to Implement Controls on Exports of Rare Earth-Related Items (CSET / Georgetown)
Exporters—Chinese or foreign—must now obtain a licence to sell abroad not only the minerals themselves but also machinery used to mine, refine, or process them. The rules reach beyond China’s borders: they apply to companies outside the country if their products or production processes contain or use Chinese rare earth materials or technology above a minimal threshold.
The new controls cover twelve of the seventeen rare earth elements, adding holmium, erbium, thulium, europium, and yttrium to the list of minerals already restricted. The regulations also target magnet-manufacturing equipment, smelting and separation technologies, and recycling systems. Exporters are required to disclose the final user and the intended use of the products; applications connected to defence, artificial intelligence, or advanced semiconductors will face severe scrutiny and, in many cases, rejection. The measures take effect in phases between November and December 2025.
China justifies these decisions by referring to the dual-use nature of rare earths—materials that can serve both civilian and military industries—and by invoking the international norm of controlling sensitive technologies. Official statements emphasise the need to safeguard the country’s security interests, prevent technological leakage, and ensure control over resources that are strategic to national development.
Behind the legal justifications lies a deeper strategic logic. By moving from passive resource ownership to active resource diplomacy, Beijing seeks to consolidate its position in the global supply chain for high-tech and defence industries. Extraterritorial provisions discourage foreign firms from embedding Chinese inputs too deeply into their production networks. The timing of the announcement, just before renewed trade talks with Washington, also suggests an intent to strengthen China’s bargaining position.
For foreign manufacturers, especially in electronics, defence, and clean-energy sectors, the new regime complicates supply chains. Products that include even small amounts of Chinese rare earths, or that rely on Chinese-origin technology, may now require individual export licences. Many countries are accelerating plans to develop alternative mining and refining capacities, but replacing China’s integrated ecosystem of extraction, processing, and magnet fabrication will take years.
China, too, faces risks. By deploying export controls so broadly, it may encourage faster diversification among trading partners and a permanent shift away from Chinese suppliers. Some analysts argue that the political effect of these measures may be strongest only once: after the initial shock, other economies will adapt, reducing the long-term leverage that Beijing can exercise.
The new export controls therefore represent both a show of strength and a sign of strategic anxiety. They mark China’s determination to defend its technological and economic security while revealing the fragility that accompanies global interdependence in critical materials.