https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023JC0020&qid=1687525961309
https://techtracker.aspi.org.au/
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker is a website that provides a new dataset to track 44 critical and emerging technologies that are foundational for economies, societies, national security, energy production, health, and climate security. It focuses on individual institutions and technologies that are critical and emerging, rather than total research output, and allows decision-makers to make more informed policy and investment decisions. It offers unique insights into strategy, intent, and potential future capabilities, and valuable insights into the spread and concentrations of global expertise across a range of critical areas. The website contains an enormous amount of original data and analysis, which can be used by policymakers, businesses, researchers, and media to support strategic planning, enable more targeted investment, or facilitate the establishment of new global partnerships. The Critical Technology Tracker can help monitor global technology advancements by highlighting China’s global lead in 37 out of the 44 critical and emerging technology domains tracked, spanning defense, space, robotics, energy, the environment, biotechnology, artificial intelligence (AI), advanced materials, and quantum technology. By providing data and analysis in these areas, ASPI aims to help democracies rapidly pursue a strategic critical technology step-up and pay greater attention to the Indo-Pacific to ensure ongoing access to trusted and secure critical technology supply chains.
https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2023-03/ASPIs%20Critical%20Technology%20Tracker_0.pdf?VersionId=ndm5v4DRMfpLvu.x69Bi_VUdMVLp07jw
G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security_20052023
The G7 leaders emphasize the importance of cooperating on enhancing security and resiliency in critical infrastructure, particularly in the digital domain. They support projects that strengthen the resilience of the ICT ecosystem, including mobile, satellite and core networks, submarine cables, components and cloud infrastructure. The document also expresses concern about regulations that unjustifiably require companies to localize data or those that allow governments to access data without appropriate safeguards and protections.
In terms of technical standards, the G7 leaders recognize the importance of such standards in the global economy and reaffirm their commitment to collectively support the development of open, voluntary and consensus-based standards that will shape the next generation of technology. These should be based on inclusive multi-stakeholder approaches in line with their common democratic values and principles. They also identify and address issues related to international standards setting through information sharing and engagement in the established standards setting processes. They will deepen their cooperation through information sharing including with wider public and private stakeholders in international standards setting activities, and support effective standards setting.
The G7 leaders issued a statement on the crisis in Ukraine on May 19, 2023, reaffirming their commitment to stand against Russia’s “illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked war of aggression” against Ukraine, which it claims is in violation of international law. The statement notes that the 15 months of aggression has cost lives and inflicted great suffering on the people of Ukraine. The G7 committed to providing financial, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine until the issue is resolved. Further sanctions and other measures are being imposed to increase costs and Russia’s dependence on energy is being reduced by alternative supply sources. While maintaining pressure on Russia, the G7 is committed to supporting Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction. The private sector has a significant role to play in Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, while the country is encouraged to combat corruption and advance institution-building reforms. Finally, the G7 is committed to ensuring that Russia pays for the long-term reconstruction of Ukraine.
Yesterday, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, delivered a speech on the relationship between the EU and China. She suggested that the EU should use its current trade tools more frequently, such as export controls, and establish a clear boundary on whether exports are beneficial to its security interests when dual-use purposes cannot be ruled out or when human rights are involved.
Von der Leyen also highlighted that China has intensified its economic and trade coercion policies, citing examples of retaliatory actions against Lithuania for opening a Taiwan office in Vilnius and imposing sanctions on MPEs, officials, and academic institutions for expressing their opinions on China’s actions.
“I believe it is neither viable – nor in Europe’s interest – to decouple from China. Our relations are not black or white – and our response cannot be either. This is why we need to focus on de-risk – not de-couple.”
“We can expect to see a greater focus on security – whether military, tech or economic. All companies in China, for example, are already obliged by law to assist state intelligence-gathering operations and to keep it secret. We can also expect even stricter economic control measures as part of a strengthening of the Chinese Communist Party’s steering of the economy through its institutions and leaders. And we can expect to see a clear path and push to make China less dependent on the world and the world more dependent on China. Or as President Xi put it bluntly a few years ago: ‘China must tighten international production chains’ dependence on China to form a powerful countermeasure and deterrent capability’.”
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_2063
The European Parliament and the Council have come to an agreement regarding the anti-coercion instrument. This instrument is meant to prevent third countries from using economic coercion to harm the EU or its member states through trade or investment measures. The Council will play an important role in determining what is considered economic coercion, while the European Commission will have the power to make decisions on how the EU responds to such measures. The instrument includes measures like trade restrictions, but the EU will try to resolve any issues through dialogue before resorting to countermeasures.
The Russian Federation ceases to be a Party to the European Convention on Human Rights
The Russian Federation ceases to be a Party to the European Convention on Human Rights
“That is why in the coming year the Commission will present measures to update our legislative framework for fighting corruption.
We will raise standards on offences such as illicit enrichment, trafficking in influence and abuse of power, beyond the more classic offences such as bribery.
And we will also propose to include corruption in our human rights sanction regime, our new tool to protect our values abroad.
Corruption erodes trust in our institutions. So we must fight back with the full force of the law.”
Commission adopts proposal for “maintenance and alignment” package
The European Commission has today adopted a joint (High Representative-Commission) proposal for a new package of measures to maintain and strengthen the effectiveness of the EU’s six wide-ranging and unprecedented packages of sanctions against Russia.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2022:193:TOC
Adopted the sixth package of restrictive measures against Russia.
A complete import ban on all Russian seaborne crude oil and petroleum products.
This covers 90% of our current oil imports from Russia. The ban is subject to certain transition periods to allow the sector and global markets to adapt, and a temporary exemption for pipeline crude oil to ensure that Russian oil is phased out in an orderly fashion. This will allow the EU and its partners to secure alternative supplies and minimises the impact on global oil prices.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2022:153:TOC
Today, the European Commission is proposing to add the violation of EU restrictive measures to the list of EU crimes. The Commission is also proposing new reinforced rules on asset recovery and confiscation, which will also contribute to the implementation of EU restrictive measures. While the Russian aggression on Ukraine is ongoing, it is paramount that EU restrictive measures are fully implemented and the violation of those measures must not be allowed to pay off. Today’s proposals aim to ensure that the assets of individuals and entities that violate the restrictive measures can be effectively confiscated in the future. The proposals come in the context of the ‘Freeze and Seize’ Task Force, set up by the Commission in March.
Ukraine__The_Commission_proposes_rules_on_freezing_and_confiscating_assets
TRATTATO TRA LA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA E LA REPUBBLICA XXXXXXXX SULL’ACCESSO AI PORTI
La Repubblica Italiana e la Repubblica XXXXXXXX, di seguito denominate le “Parti contraenti”,
Animati dal desiderio di rafforzare le relazioni amichevoli e di cooperazione tra i due paesi;
Considerando l’importanza del libero accesso ai porti per lo sviluppo del commercio e delle attività marittime;
Convenuti sui seguenti termini:
Articolo 1 – Libero accesso ai porti
Le Parti contraenti si impegnano a consentire alle navi battenti bandiera dell’altra Parte l’accesso ai porti del proprio paese, senza formalità amministrative particolari o restrizioni ingiustificate.
Articolo 2 – Parità di trattamento
Le navi battenti bandiera di una Parte contraente godranno, nell’accesso ai porti dell’altra Parte, del trattamento non meno favorevole di quello riservato alle navi battenti bandiera di qualsiasi altro paese.
Articolo 3 – Sicurezza e salute pubblica
Nel rispetto delle leggi e dei regolamenti applicabili, le Parti contraenti si impegnano a garantire la sicurezza delle navi e delle persone a bordo, nonché la tutela della salute pubblica.
Articolo 4 – Cooperazione
Le Parti contraenti si impegnano a cooperare tra di loro per agevolare l’accesso ai porti e per risolvere eventuali problemi che possano insorgere nell’applicazione del presente Trattato.
Articolo 5 – Entrata in vigore e durata
Il presente Trattato entrerà in vigore trenta giorni dopo la data di deposito degli strumenti di ratifica e avrà una durata illimitata. Esso potrà essere denunciato da una delle Parti contraenti mediante notifica scritta all’altra Parte, con preavviso di sei mesi.
Fatto a Roma, in due esemplari, in lingua italiana e araba, entrambi i testi facenti ugualmente fede, il giorno 17 aprile XXXX.
Per la Repubblica Italiana: ________
Per la Repubblica XXXXXXX: ________
COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2022:578
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022:576
COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2022:582
COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022:581
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022:580
EU agrees fifth package of sanctions against Russia
Ukraine__EU_agrees_fifth_package_of_restrictive_measures_against_Russia
The package comprises:
– a prohibition to purchase, import or transfer coal and other solid fossil fuels into the EU if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia, as from August 2022. Imports of coal into the EU are currently worth EUR 8 billion per year.
– a prohibition to provide access to EU ports to vessels registered under the flag of Russia. Derogations are granted for agricultural and food products, humanitarian aid, and energy.
– a ban on any Russian and Belarusian road transport undertaking preventing them from transporting goods by road within the EU, including in transit. Derogations are nonetheless granted for a number of products, such as pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural and food products, including wheat, and for road transport for humanitarian purposes.
– further export bans, targeting jet fuel and other goods such as quantum computers and advanced semiconductors, high-end electronics, software, sensitive machinery and transportation equipment, and new import bans on products such as: wood, cement, fertilisers, seafood and liquor. The agreed export and import bans only account for EUR 10 billion and EUR 5.5 billion respectively.
– a series of targeted economic measures intended to strengthen existing measures and close loopholes, such as: a general EU ban on participation of Russian companies in public procurement in member states, the exclusion of all financial support to Russian public bodies. an extended prohibition on deposits to crypto-wallets, and on the sale of banknotes and transferrable securities denominated in any official currencies of the EU member states to Russia and Belarus, or to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia and Belarus,.
Furthermore, the Council decided to sanction companies whose products or technology have played a role in the invasion, key oligarchs and businesspeople, high-ranking Kremlin officials, proponents of disinformation and information manipulation, systematically spreading the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war aggression in Ukraine, as well as family members of already sanctioned individuals, in order to make sure that EU sanctions are not circumvented.
Moreover a full transaction ban is imposed on four key Russian banks representing 23% of market share in the Russian banking sector. After being de-SWIFTed these banks will now be subject to an asset freeze, thereby being completely cut off from EU markets.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_2281
Press_statement_by_President_von_der_Leyen
This fifth package has six pillars.
First, we will impose an import ban on coal from Russia, worth EUR 4 billion per year. This will cut another important revenue source for Russia.
Second: a full transaction ban on four key Russian banks, among them VTB, the second largest Russian bank. These four banks, which we now totally cut off from the markets, represent 23% of market share in the Russian banking sector. This will further weaken Russia’s financial system.
Third: a ban on Russian vessels and Russian-operated vessels from accessing EU ports. Certain exemptions will cover essentials, such as agricultural and food products, humanitarian aid as well as energy. Additionally, we will propose a ban on Russian and Belarusian road transport operators. This ban will drastically limit the options for the Russian industry to obtain key goods.
Fourth: further targeted export bans, worth EUR 10 billion, in areas in which Russia is vulnerable. This includes, for example, quantum computers and advanced semiconductors, but also sensitive machinery and transportation equipment. With this, we will continue to degrade Russia’s technological base and industrial capacity.
Fifth: specific new import bans, worth EUR 5.5 billion, to cut the money stream of Russia and its oligarchs, on products from wood to cement, from seafood to liquor. In doing this, we also close loopholes between Russia and Belarus.
Sixth: We take a number of very targeted measures, such as a general EU ban on participation of Russian companies in public procurement in Member States, or an exclusion of all financial support, be it European or national, to Russian public bodies. Because European tax money should not go to Russia in whatever shape or form.
On 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation began a military operation in Ukraine. By acts of March 1, 2022 1, the Council of the European Union introduced a series of measures to suspend the broadcasting activities of certain media, including RT France, in or towards the Union. According to the Council, the Russian Federation has carried out propaganda actions targeting members of civil society in the Union and its neighbors, seriously distorting and manipulating the facts, having used, for this purpose, as channels media under the control of the Russian leadership.RT France has filed an action for annulment of the Council’s acts before the European Union Tribunal. It has also filed an application for interim measures to obtain a stay of execution of the latter.
By his order of today, the President of the Court of First Instance rejects RT France’s request for interim relief.
European Commission and United States Joint Statement on Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework
The European Commission and the United States announce that they have agreed in principle on a new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework, which will foster trans-Atlantic data flows and address the concerns raised by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Schrems II decision of July 2020.
Trans-Atlantic_Data_Privacy_Framework.pdf
European_Commission_and_United_States_Joint_Statement
Alessandro Colombo, Professor of International Relations at the University of Milan and Head of ISPI’s Transatlantic Relations Programme.
has just published a very interesting article on the website of Fondazione Feltrinelli.
https://fondazionefeltrinelli.it/la-crisi-del-nuovo-ordine-mondiale/
On 25 February 2022, the Council of Europe decided to adopt Article 8 measures and suspended Russia, with immediate effect, from its rights of representation in the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly.
On 10 March, the Russian Federation declared its intention to leave the Council of Europe, though at that time it did not submit a formal declaration of withdrawal to the Council Secretary-General, as required by Article 7 of the Council Statute.
On 15 March, the formal notification reached the Council Secretary-General together with a declaration of Russia’s intention to denounce the European Convention on Human Rights.
On 16 March the Committee of Ministers decided that Russia would no longer be a member of the Council of Europe as of 16 March.
On 17 March, the Committee of Ministers decided to suspend certain rights of Belarus, which is not a member of CoE, (the right of Belarus to participate as an observer to the Committee of Ministers, and the right of representation of Belarus in GRECO (the Group of States against Corruption), because of the ‘active participation of Belarus in the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine’.
Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_1828
The European Commission’s ‘Freeze and Seize’ Task Force, set up to ensure EU-level coordination to implement sanctions against listed Russian and Belarussian oligarchs, has now stepped up its action at international level. It will work alongside the newly established ‘Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO)’ Task Force, under which the EU operates together with the G7 countries Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as Australia.
The ‘Freeze and Seize’ Task Force was set up by the European Commission to ensure the efficient implementation of the EU sanctions against listed Russian and Belarussian oligarch across the EU.
The ‘Freeze and Seize’ Task Force is composed of the Commission, national contact points from each Member State, Eurojust and Europol as well as other EU agencies and bodies as necessary. It will coordinate actions by EU Member States, Eurojust, Europol and other agencies to seize and, where national law allows provides for it, confiscate assets of Russian and Belarussian oligarchs. While the Commission provides strategic coordination, Eurojust and Europol are best placed to ensure operational coordination. The first meeting of the ‘Freeze and Seize’ Task Force took place on 11 March and was chaired by Commissioner Reynders.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_22_1776
Question_and_Answers__fourth_package_of_restrictive_measures_against_Russia
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1761
The agreed measures are the following:
– A full prohibition of any transactions with certain Russian State-owned enterprises across different sectors – the Kremlin’s military-industrial complex.
– An EU import ban on those steel products currently under EU safeguard measures, amounting to approximately € 3.3 billion in lost export revenue for Russia. Increased import quotas will be distributed to other third countries to compensate.
A far-reaching ban on new investment across the Russian energy sector, with limited exceptions for civil nuclear energy and the transport of certain energy products back to the EU.
An EU export ban on luxury goods (e.g. luxury cars, jewellery, etc.) to directly hit Russian elites.
Moreover, the list of sanctioned persons and entities has been further extended to include more oligarchs and business elites linked to the Kremlin, as well as companies active in military and defence areas, which are logistically and materially supporting the invasion. There are also new listings of actors active in disinformation.
A ban on the rating of Russia and Russian companies by EU credit rating agencies and the provision of rating services to Russian clients, which would result in them losing even further access to the EU’s financial markets.
Ukraine__EU_agrees_fourth_package_of_restrictive_measures_against_Russia
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_1724
“First, we will deny Russia the status of most-favoured-nation in our markets. This will revoke important benefits that Russia enjoys as a WTO member. Russian companies will no longer receive privileged treatment in our economies. We will also work to suspend Russia’s membership rights in leading multilateral financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. We will ensure that Russia cannot obtain financing, loans, or any other benefits from these institutions. Because Russia cannot grossly violate international law and, at the same time, expect to benefit from the privileges of being part of the international economic order.
Second, we will continue pressuring Russian elites close to Putin as well as their families and enablers. This is why G7 Finance-, Justice- and Home Affairs Ministers will meet next week to coordinate the task force we set up targeting Putin’s cronies.
Third, we are making sure that the Russian state and its elites cannot use crypto assets to circumvent the sanctions. We will stop the group close to Putin and the architects of his war from using these assets to grow and transfer their wealth.
Fourth, we will ban the export of any EU luxury goods from our countries to Russia, as a direct blow to the Russian elite. Those who sustain Putin’s war machine should no longer be able to enjoy their lavish lifestyle while bombs fall on innocent people in Ukraine.
Fifth, very importantly, we will prohibit the import of key goods in the iron and steel sector from the Russian Federation. This will hit a central sector of Russia’s system, deprive it of billions of export revenues and ensure that our citizens are not subsidising Putin’s war.
Finally, we will propose a big ban on new European investments across Russia’s energy sector. Because we should not be feeding the energy dependency which we want to leave behind us. This ban will cover all investments, technology transfers, financial services, etcetera, for energy exploration and production – and thus have a big impact on Putin.”
The European Commission welcomes today’s agreement of Member States to adopt further targeted sanctions in view of the situation in Ukraine and in response to Belarus’s involvement in the aggression. In particular, the new measures impose restrictive measures on 160 individuals and amend Regulation (EC) 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and Regulation (EU) 833/2014 concerning Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. These amendments create a closer alignment of EU sanctions regarding Russia and Belarus and will help to ensure even more effectively that Russian sanctions cannot be circumvented, including through Belarus.
For Belarus, the measures introduce SWIFT prohibitions similar to those in the Russia regime, clarify that crypto assets fall under the scope of “transferable securities” and further expand the existing financial restrictions by mirroring the measures already in place regarding Russia sanctions.
In particular, the agreed measures will:
Restrict the provision of SWIFT services to Belagroprombank, Bank Dabrabyt, and the Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus, as well as their Belarusian subsidiaries.
Prohibit transactions with the Central Bank of Belarus related to the management of reserves or assets, and the provision of public financing for trade with and investment in Belarus.
Prohibit the listing and provision of services in relation to shares of Belarus state-owned entities on EU trading venues as of 12 April 2022.
Significantly limit the financial inflows from Belarus to the EU, by prohibiting the acceptance of deposits exceeding €100.000 from Belarusian nationals or residents, the holding of accounts of Belarusian clients by the EU central securities depositories, as well as the selling of euro-denominated securities to Belarusian clients.
Prohibit the provision of euro denominated banknotes to Belarus.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1649
https://eusanctions.integrityline.com/frontpage
The EU Sanctions Whistleblower Tool protects your identity and allows you to contact us anonymously to report violations of EU sanctions.
The Council today introduced further restrictive measures in view of the Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine.
The Council decided in particular to prohibit:
the provision of specialised financial messaging services, which are used to exchange financial data (SWIFT), to Bank Otkritie, Novikombank, Promsvyazbank, Rossiya Bank, Sovcombank, VNESHECONOMBANK (VEB), and VTB BANK’. This prohibition will enter into force on the tenth day after the publication in the Official Journal of the EU, and will also apply to any legal person, entity or body established in Russia whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50% by the above-mentioned banks.
to invest, participate or otherwise contribute to future projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund.
sell, supply, transfer or export euro denominated banknotes to Russia or to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia, including the government and the Central Bank of Russia, or for use in Russia.
Today’s decisions complements the package of measures announced by the High Representative after the video conference of EU Foreign Affairs Ministers of 27 February. Such package also includes the provision of equipment and supplies to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility, a ban on the overflight of EU airspace and on access to EU airports by Russian carriers of all kinds, a ban on the transactions with the Russian Central Bank, and the prohibition for state-owned media Russia Today and Sputnik’ to broadcast in the EU.
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/353 of 2 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU)
No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening
the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/354 of 2 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine
Steve Peers SIDIBlog
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