Beyond “Us Against Them”: Making Difficult Reforms Possible – Law in a Changing World

Reflections on political polarisation, long-term policymaking and democratic accountability in Italy

In my article of 15 October 2026, “Quando chi la pensa diversamente diventa un nemico” (“When Those Who Disagree Become Enemies”), I reflected on how political disagreement can turn into hostility towards people themselves. Affective polarisation does more than flatten the nuances of public debate: it makes even a willingness to acknowledge a point made by an opponent appear suspect. The shift from criticism of ideas, however forceful, to the delegitimisation of those who express them has consequences beyond political language. When debate becomes a permanent contest to discredit opponents, it becomes harder to tackle challenges that cannot be resolved within a single parliamentary term.

Consider public debt, productivity, demographic decline, education and energy security. These issues are not interchangeable, nor do they admit universally agreed solutions. Yet they all have long-term implications, as reflected in the European Commission’s 2026 recommendations concerning Italy. Many policies intended to address them impose immediate costs while generating benefits only years later. Today’s government bears the political consequences; another government, possibly led by its opponents, may reap the rewards. This creates an incentive to postpone, soften or divide difficult reforms into smaller measures. It is a structural incentive, not necessarily evidence of personal irresponsibility.

Two problems need to be kept distinct. One is the difficulty of forming a parliamentary majority able to govern. The other is the difficulty of sustaining a policy over ten or fifteen years. Even a large majority can struggle with the second problem. Conversely, a narrower governing coalition may be able to secure lasting results through issue-specific agreements and institutions designed to maintain continuity. The answer does not necessarily lie in ever-larger governing majorities.

Technocratic governments: an instrument, not a permanent solution

Italian political experience offers one familiar response: in particular circumstances, the government may be entrusted to figures operating outside ordinary party competition. The Monti government (2011–2013) and the Draghi government (2021–2022), although markedly different in their composition and political setting, illustrate the possibility. There is no separate constitutional category of “technocratic government”. Under Articles 92 and 94 of the Italian Constitution, the President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister, and the government must obtain the confidence of both parliamentary chambers.

Such an arrangement can mobilise expertise and assemble political forces around a limited programme, especially in an emergency. Yet its strengths also expose its limitations. Experts can explain options, constraints and expected effects, but cannot resolve as a technical matter who should bear the costs, which interests deserve priority, or what distributive justice requires. These remain political choices. Parliamentary support can also disappear when electoral competition intensifies. A technocratic government can therefore relieve a temporary deadlock without removing the incentives that created it. It may even enable parties to support difficult choices initially and subsequently distance themselves from the responsibility for them.

Cooperation between opponents without abolishing opposition

A different approach separates competition for office from cooperation on particular long-term challenges. A national unity government is not required for parties to agree on multi-year objectives concerning skills, infrastructure, administrative digitisation or the sustainability of public systems. Government and opposition would retain their distinct roles; on selected issues, however, they could negotiate shared criteria, timetables, transitional protections and review arrangements.

Sweden’s pension reform provides a relevant example. In the 1990s, the reform emerged from an agreement involving five political parties. A cross-party body subsequently monitored implementation and possible adjustments. The Swedish government describes the reform process as one built on cooperation and compromise, while the Pensionsgruppencontinues to provide a forum for inter-party consultation. This does not establish the superiority of consensual systems as a general rule. It shows that, in certain policy fields, responsibility for a structural reform can extend beyond the lifetime of a single government. Such arrangements also have risks: they may become rigid, exclude dissenting voices or delay necessary corrections.

Giving the future a voice in Parliament

A further option is to strengthen Parliament’s capacity to consider the long term. Finland established a permanent Committee for the Future in 1993. It maintains dialogue with the government on future societal and technological developments. It does not replace party politics or eliminate disagreement, but creates an institutional setting in which issues extending beyond a single electoral term can be examined continuously.

An Italian counterpart could be conceived as a standing, pluralist parliamentary forum connected to the relevant committees, supported by research and required to publish scenarios, assumptions and disagreements. Independent scrutiny would also matter. Italy’s Parliamentary Budget Office already provides assessments of public finances and long-term sustainability. Shared evidence may reduce disputes over basic facts, although it cannot settle disagreements about values and priorities.

Involving citizens in difficult choices

A third set of instruments extends beyond relations between political parties. Ireland’s citizens’ assemblies bring together people selected to reflect the diversity of society, give them time to examine complex questions and produce recommendations for government and Parliament. Those recommendations are not binding: responsibility for decisions remains with representative institutions. The model and its limits are described on the Irish Citizens’ Assembly website. The OECD regards representative deliberation as particularly useful for dilemmas involving competing values, trade-offs and long time horizons.

In Italy, such processes could help make the costs and consequences of public decisions more intelligible. They do not replace elections, nor are they suited to every issue; urgent decisions and national-security matters present particular limitations. They can nevertheless offer a setting in which citizens are invited to weigh evidence and alternatives rather than simply choose a side.

The central issue: sharing political responsibility

None of these mechanisms works unless the political dimension is confronted directly. Sound technical analysis is not enough. Difficult reforms require choices about distributing burdens, protecting vulnerable groups, designing transitions and reviewing results. Measures that initially appear unacceptable may become more open to public scrutiny when implementation is gradual, transitional protections are credible and periodic review is built in. Cross-party agreement can begin with procedures rather than final solutions: a common evidence base, measurable objectives, transparent cost estimates, timetables and evaluation. Not every party needs to endorse the same policy or join the same government.

There is also an essential qualification. The “general interest” is not a technically predetermined answer waiting to be discovered. What counts as fair, sustainable or urgent is itself a legitimate subject of democratic contestation. Demanding that the opposition abandon disagreement in the name of the common good would risk replacing responsibility with conformity. Nor can an ordinary political agreement make legislation legally immune from revision by future parliaments.

One possible institutional design would combine public, issue-specific agreements on a small number of long-term priorities; parliamentary scrutiny assisted by independent evidence; consultation with affected stakeholders and, where appropriate, deliberative citizens’ assemblies; and legislation with staged implementation, measurable indicators, compensation and regular review. Political parties would retain the right to disagree about distribution and remedies. Continuity would remain a political commitment requiring renewal, not a guarantee insulated from elections.

The hardest question, however, remains. If political attention and support are increasingly gained by portraying opponents as enemies, what incentive do parties have to negotiate compromises that can be denounced as concessions? Procedures can make cooperation possible and visible; they cannot create the willingness to cooperate on their own. The challenge is therefore not simply to suspend politics periodically and turn to experts. It is to understand how competitive democratic politics can again take public responsibility for difficult, long-term choices.

Technocratic governments: an instrument, not a permanent solution

Cooperation between opponents without abolishing opposition

Giving the future a voice in Parliament

Involving citizens in difficult choices

The central issue: sharing political responsibility

Selected sources