Who Decides What Counts as a Threat? The Language of Security Has a History

National security strategies from different countries can sound remarkably alike. Hybrid threats, foreign interference, economic coercion: certain expressions have become so familiar that I sometimes find myself reading past them. Yet there is a history behind that familiarity. How do particular problems enter the vocabulary of national security, and what should we make of their repeated appearance in official documents?

Andrew W. Neal and Roy B. Gardner take up these questions in Securitization through inscription: National security documents and the making of a global threat lexicon (1987–2025), published in Contemporary Security Policy in November 2026. Their study covers 660 national security and defence documents from 118 countries and territories, issued between 1987 and 2025. From these texts, they identify 421 threat categories. Of 4,041 distinct country–category pairings, 88.5 per cent involve a category that had already appeared in another country’s documents. This tells us something about the vocabulary available to officials drafting these texts. It does not establish that governments copied one another, still less that the first country to mention a term in the dataset invented the idea.

The early appearances are far from evenly distributed. Nineteen countries and territories account for 80.4 per centof them, while the United States accounts for 25.8 per cent on its own. That US lead is heavily concentrated in the formative years of this documentary field. Its share falls from 51.9 per cent in 1987–1997 to 2.2 per cent in 2005–2025, as more governments begin to publish comparable strategies. Some of the categories recorded early on remain in circulation, or return after long periods of relative silence. Neal and Gardner use the term prior inscription power to capture the possible advantage enjoyed by those who helped establish the vocabulary before much of the field had taken shape.

A conversation with a few friends left me thinking harder about that word, power. One of them put the objection neatly: perhaps being first to name a threat is not a distinct source of power at all. Perhaps it is simply one of the things powerful states are in a position to do. The United States had substantial geopolitical reach, institutional resources and an established practice of publishing broad national security strategies long before many others entered the field. Its prominence in the documentary record may reflect those advantages rather than an additional capacity generated by the language itself. The authors recognise related methodological problems: the timing of entry, the volume of publication and the type of document all affect the opportunity to register a first appearance.

I find the objection persuasive as a limit on what we can infer. A vocabulary may be shaped by an existing hierarchy of power without itself exercising much independent influence. It is also possible for the relationship to work in both directions. Once an expression becomes standard, it may help sustain a particular account of what deserves attention, making familiar categories easier to invoke than unfamiliar ones. But enduring usage is not, on its own, evidence of an autonomous political effect. To establish one, we would need to know how terms travelled through drafting processes, alliance practices and bureaucratic networks, and whether their adoption made a difference to actual choices. The study traces an unusually large documentary record. It cannot settle that further causal question, nor does it claim to measure the implementation of policy.

My friends also raised a more prosaic point about the documents themselves. Public strategies are often negotiated statements, full of language that survives because it is conventional, sufficiently vague or unlikely to reopen an argument. Officials may use familiar phrases simply because everyone recognises them, or because there is little time to draft something better. The resulting text can look authoritative without showing much of the bargaining behind it. I would therefore hesitate to say that a public strategy is necessarily where a state defines and ranks its national interests. Often, it communicates a settlement reached elsewhere. Political and administrative elites present an agreed account to a wider community whose cooperation, resources and consent may be needed to sustain their decisions.

And signalling does not begin or end with the published strategy. Budgets, procurement, legislation, deployments, diplomatic commitments and private exchanges may disclose more about a government’s priorities than a polished document ever could. States with greater resources have more such channels available to them. A strategy is one part of a much larger picture. Treating it as a direct window onto how decisions are made would give it far more evidential weight than it can bear.

Still, I would not dismiss these texts as mere decoration. Even a formulaic strategy has to speak in terms its intended audiences understand. That is worth studying in its own right. The familiar vocabulary of security has not appeared from nowhere, and there is a difference between tracing how that vocabulary became conventional and claiming that its earliest users acquired control over other governments’ decisions. The first is what the study can help us understand; the second remains to be demonstrated.

There is a further distinction here that matters to me as an international and EU lawyer. National security and national interest are not interchangeable. A document called a national security strategy may address technological leadership, economic competitiveness, access to resources and geopolitical influence alongside military defence and protection from hostile activity. Some of these concerns plainly have security dimensions. Others acquire that description through political choice. Framing an interest as a security imperative may make a policy easier to defend, but it does not itself satisfy the legal conditions for an exception, restriction or coercive measure under the applicable rules of national, EU or international law.

Securitization theory has long asked why political actors describe a particular issue as one of security. Neal and Gardner invite us to ask another question: why leave a threat out when it has become an established part of other states’ security vocabulary? After these conversations, I would add one of my own. When does a shared vocabulary merely reflect existing relations of power, and when does it help reproduce or change them? The documentary evidence makes this a question worth pursuing. Answering it will require us to look beyond published strategies, towards the institutions, negotiations and decisions that give political language its consequences.

Source: Andrew W. Neal and Roy B. Gardner, Securitization through inscription: National security documents and the making of a global threat lexicon (1987–2025), Contemporary Security Policy, published online 15 November 2026.