Whenever I hear that international law has reached the end of the road, I think of an essay Philip C. Jessup published in Foreign Affairs in January 1940: The Reality of International Law. The date matters. The Second World War had begun only a few months earlier, with Germany’s invasion of Poland, and the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact, under which states had renounced war as an instrument of national policy, had plainly failed to prevent it. It is difficult to imagine a more severe test for international law.
Jessup does not minimise that failure. Nor does he seek to explain away the gulf between legal obligations and the conduct of the great powers. Instead, he asks whether the inability to prevent a war really establishes that international law does not exist. His answer is no, and the reasoning remains remarkably relevant.
Consider how states actually conduct their relations. Governments seek legal advice, conclude treaties, argue disputes by reference to recognised rules, assert rights and challenge violations. In 1940, this was particularly apparent in questions of neutrality, navigation, naval warfare and prize courts. Beyond the most dramatic crises, a vast range of international dealings continued to be governed by law, from borders and transport to communications and public health. Much of this activity rarely makes the headlines. Yet without it, relations among states would be far more difficult to sustain.
Jessup is equally alert to the structural limitations of the international legal order. There is no central legislature; the jurisdiction of international courts is subject to significant limits; and, above all, there is no general enforcement machinery comparable to that of a domestic legal system. Writing in the language of his time, he describes the system as still “primitive”. That characterisation may sound questionable today, but the underlying problem remains: international rules operate within an institutional setting fundamentally different from that of domestic law.
What I find most striking is the conclusion Jessup reaches in the midst of war. International law had proved unable to restrain a major power determined to use force. Yet it continued to shape ordinary state practice, to be invoked in disputes and even to be relied upon by governments that had openly violated it in other circumstances. A breach of a rule, however serious, does not by itself extinguish the rule or settle the question of its effectiveness.
Reading these pages today helps us ask a familiar question more precisely. When we witness serious violations of international law, are we seeing the disappearance of legal rules, or the difficulty of securing compliance by the most powerful states? These are different problems, and they call for different responses. Jessup offers no comforting assurance that law can prevent war. He does, however, remind us how misleading it is to judge an entire legal order solely by those moments when its enforcement mechanisms fail.
Reference: Philip C. Jessup, “The Reality of International Law”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 18, no. 2, January 1940, pp. 244–253.


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