Neutrality Is Not Indifference: Switzerland’s Vote and the Future of Sanctions Against Russia – National Security (a multidisciplinary perspective)

Switzerland’s vote on 27 September 2026 deserves some reflection beyond the referendum result itself. With 70.16% of voters rejecting the popular initiative to “Safeguard Swiss Neutrality”, and a majority voting against it in all 26 cantons, the outcome was remarkably clear. Yet the question was not whether Switzerland should abandon neutrality. It was whether a much more restrictive definition of neutrality should be written into the Federal Constitution, significantly limiting the Confederation’s future choices. This distinction matters, particularly when we consider what the initiative would have meant for Switzerland’s sanctions against Russia.

The proposal, promoted by Pro Switzerland and supported by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), sought to establish a constitutional commitment to “perpetual and armed neutrality”, severely restrict cooperation with military alliances, and prohibit sanctions against belligerent states, except for those adopted by the United Nations and measures necessary to prevent their circumvention. Behind the declared objective of protecting Swiss independence lay a significant consequence: limiting the Federal Council’s ability to respond independently to certain violations of international law.

Neutrality does not require indifference

The first misconception concerns the meaning of neutrality itself. The law of neutrality, governed in particular by the 1907 Hague Conventions and customary international law, establishes a set of obligations for states that do not participate in an armed conflict. These include refraining from hostilities, preventing belligerents from using their territory for military purposes, and observing certain requirements of impartiality, particularly concerning military activities and the supply of war materials.

But these obligations do not entail a general duty of indifference towards violations of international law. Remaining neutral in relation to participation in a war does not necessarily mean remaining neutral about the legality of that war. A state may decide not to participate militarily in a conflict while condemning aggression, supporting respect for the United Nations Charter, and adopting economic measures compatible with its international obligations.

Of course, not every measure is automatically compatible with neutrality. Restrictions on the export or transit of military equipment, for instance, raise different legal questions from asset freezes or financial restrictions. The legal implications of individual measures must therefore be assessed separately, rather than treating neutrality as a concept that provides the same answer to every question.

Not all sanctions are legally equivalent

There is a second issue, perhaps even more important. When we speak generally of “sanctions”, we tend to group together measures that are quite different in legal terms.

Some measures constitute retorsion, meaning unfriendly but entirely lawful conduct. Suspending voluntary forms of economic cooperation or imposing certain diplomatic restrictions may fall into this category. A state may adopt such measures even if it has not been directly injured by an internationally wrongful act, provided that it continues to comply with its applicable treaty obligations and other rules of international law.

Countermeasures are different. These are measures that would otherwise breach an international obligation owed to another state but may be justified as a response to that state’s prior internationally wrongful conduct. International law allows an injured state, subject to strict conditions, to adopt countermeasures intended to induce the responsible state to cease its wrongful conduct and comply with its obligations. Countermeasures are not punishments. They are subject to limitations, particularly concerning proportionality, and must comply with the conditions established by the law of state responsibility.

More controversial is whether states that have not been directly injured may adopt countermeasures in response to breaches of obligations owed to the international community as a whole. This remains one of the unresolved questions of contemporary international law. Article 54 of the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts does not expressly recognise a general right to adopt such countermeasures, but neither does it definitively exclude the possibility of their development. The provision leaves open the question of lawful measures taken to secure cessation of the wrongful act and reparation.

State practice, including the economic responses to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, has made this debate particularly relevant. It would be excessive to argue that a universally accepted customary rule now permits any form of collective countermeasure. But it would be equally questionable to present all such measures as definitively prohibited under international law.

Most importantly, international law does not give the UN Security Council a monopoly over all economic restrictive measures. The Council can adopt binding decisions under the UN Charter, but its authority does not exclude states from adopting autonomous measures within the limits of international law. The rules governing the use of armed force cannot simply be extended by analogy to economic restrictions.

This does not mean that sanctions become lawful merely because they are intended to respond to a serious violation. Their compatibility with the adopting state’s trade, financial and treaty obligations must be assessed independently. Article XXI of the GATT, concerning security exceptions, does not provide unlimited discretion: WTO jurisprudence has recognised that at least some conditions governing the invocation of those exceptions are subject to review.

The veto problem and the responsibility of third states

The war in Ukraine exposes a structural weakness in the international legal order. The UN Security Council is entrusted with maintaining international peace and security, yet its ability to act can be paralysed by the veto of a permanent member. This is precisely what happens when that permanent member is itself responsible for the aggression.

The General Assembly can intervene, condemn the violation and recommend collective measures. Its role is important, including in identifying and articulating the position of the international community. But its recommendations do not generally have the same binding force as decisions adopted by the Security Council.

This raises a question that is difficult to avoid: when the collective security system is unable to respond, must other states necessarily confine themselves to political condemnation?

The law of state responsibility provides some elements of an answer. Articles 40 and 41 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility establish particular consequences for serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms of general international law. These include a duty to cooperate through lawful means to bring such breaches to an end, as well as obligations of non-recognition and non-assistance.

This framework does not automatically establish a general obligation to impose economic sanctions, nor does it resolve the controversy surrounding countermeasures adopted by third states. It does, however, demonstrate that international responsibility for certain violations cannot be understood exclusively as a bilateral relationship between the wrongdoing state and the state directly injured. International law also recognises obligations and interests belonging to the international community as a whole.

EU sanctions and Switzerland’s choice

Since February 2022, Switzerland has adopted most of the European Union’s sanctions against Russia. It is important to remember, however, that Switzerland is not an EU member state and is under no general legal obligation to follow EU sanctions decisions automatically. The Federal Council adopts restrictive measures autonomously, under Swiss legislation, following the political and legal assessments required in each case.

The referendum was therefore not about the direct application of EU sanctions, but about preserving this decision-making capacity. According to the Federal Council, approval of the initiative would probably have required Switzerland to repeal existing sanctions against belligerent states, including those targeting Russia.

This helps explain why the proposal was viewed favourably in Moscow. There is no need to assume that the initiative originated in Russia to recognise that constitutionally entrenching a more restrictive form of neutrality, with sanctions largely dependent on Security Council decisions, would have constrained Switzerland’s ability to respond to Russian aggression.

Preserving that ability does not mean that all sanctions are legally beyond challenge, or that they should be adopted automatically. It simply means that their appropriateness and legality can continue to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, without a prior constitutional prohibition.

The problem of consistency

There is one final issue that I consider far from marginal: the selective application of sanctions. We cannot ignore the fact that the international community responds very differently to comparable violations of international law. Some states face exceptionally far-reaching restrictions, while others encounter considerably more limited consequences, even when they are responsible for serious internationally wrongful acts.

This inconsistency inevitably weakens the credibility of governments that claim to be defending a rules-based international order. The problem also concerns Switzerland, whose international identity has long been associated with neutrality, mediation and the provision of good offices.

Yet the political and legal questions must remain distinct. The fact that a state imposes sanctions selectively does not automatically render the measures it adopts unlawful. Selectivity may raise specific legal problems where it conflicts with non-discrimination obligations or other applicable rules. But there is no general principle under which an otherwise lawful measure becomes unlawful simply because comparable action has not been taken in other situations.

The problem of double standards is real and deserves criticism. But it cannot become an argument that, because it is impossible to respond to every violation, it would be preferable not to respond to any. Consistency remains an essential objective of foreign policy, not a condition that automatically determines the legality of individual decisions.

Neutrality, autonomy and the defence of international law

I think the most interesting aspect of the Swiss vote lies precisely here. Swiss voters did not abandon neutrality, nor did they choose to align themselves automatically with EU foreign policy. They preferred to retain an understanding of neutrality that leaves federal institutions room for judgement, rather than turning a longstanding tradition of independence into a constitutional restriction on their freedom to act.

This does not remove the difficulties. Cooperation with military alliances raises different issues from the adoption of financial restrictions. Economic assistance to a state that has been attacked is not legally equivalent to supplying weapons. The effectiveness of sanctions, their consequences for civilian populations and the risk of escalation also deserve independent assessment. None of these questions can be resolved simply by invoking the legitimacy of the objectives pursued.

But that is precisely why I do not think a general prohibition would have been the right answer.

Neutrality can be an important instrument of independence and security. It can also enable a state to perform diplomatic functions that others would find difficult to undertake. It should not, however, become an inability to distinguish, including in the field of non-military responses, between a state violating the prohibition on the use of force and a state exercising its right of self-defence.

Recognising this distinction does not authorise every possible measure against an aggressor. International law continues to establish conditions and limits that must be respected.

That, in my view, is the essential conclusion: neutrality is not indifference, but neither does it provide a general justification for any economic response. It is a legal position that must coexist with a state’s other international obligations and with the need to preserve a meaningful degree of political autonomy.

On 27 September, Swiss voters chose to preserve that room for manoeuvre. I consider this an important decision, not only for Switzerland, but also for the wider debate about the future of sanctions and international law’s capacity to respond to its own violations.