Leggi in italianoAnyone studying economic security today faces a fundamental question: when does economic interdependence become a weapon? Edward Fishman’s “How to Fight an Economic War” addresses this question head-on, offering a sharp analysis of how globalization has been transformed from a system of mutual gain into a field of strategic competition. The article argues that states now weaponize the very structures that once underpinned economic integration—currencies, payment systems, export controls, critical minerals, and supply chains—turning interdependence into leverage. One of its most interesting contributions is the distinction between ordinary dependency and a true economic “chokepoint”: a sector becomes strategically decisive only when it is highly concentrated, difficult to replace in the short term, and capable of imposing far greater costs on the target than on the coercing power. This gives the essay a strong analytical backbone and makes it more than a general reflection on geoeconomics. What makes the piece especially compelling is the way it connects theory to concrete contemporary cases. Fishman explains why some tools, such as broad tariffs, often fail to produce real coercive power, while others—such as U.S. financial sanctions, semiconductor export controls, or China’s dominance in rare earths—can be far more effective. The discussion of U.S.-China rivalry is particularly strong: the article shows that both powers are simultaneously building offensive economic capabilities and defensive insulation against each other’s pressure. It also raises a deeper and more original point—one that resonates strongly with the European experience of sanctions policy: every time a country weaponizes its economic advantages, it creates incentives for others to reduce their dependence, which means that power can be weakened by overuse. This is precisely the dilemma the EU has faced in calibrating its sanctions against Russia, where the tension between coercive ambition and economic self-harm remains unresolved. In that sense, the article is not only about how to apply economic pressure, but about how to preserve leverage over time.
Another strength of the article is its strategic realism. Fishman distinguishes among different goals of economic warfare—symbolic punishment, long-term attrition, and actual coercion—and argues that policymakers often fail because they do not define which objective they are pursuing. He is also persuasive in warning against ad hoc escalation and against unilateral economic nationalism that can fragment markets without improving security. The broader implication is that economic security cannot be achieved through improvised protectionism alone; it requires disciplined prioritization, domestic resilience, and coordination with allies. For that reason, the article stands out not just as a diagnosis of a fractured global order, but as a sophisticated framework for thinking about power, vulnerability, and strategy in the twenty-first-century economy.