When the Security Council Sees Only Part of a War

The United Nations Security Council was created to address a problem that international law cannot solve through legal rules alone: how to prevent States from using armed force to settle their disputes, and how to respond when they do. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force in international relations. Article 51 preserves the right of individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack, while Chapter VII entrusts the Council with the power to adopt collective measures, including, where necessary, military action. It is an ambitious system. Its weakness is equally familiar: the body responsible for enforcing these rules is political, and its permanent members retain the power of veto.

This does not mean that international law disappears whenever the Council is divided. The prohibition of force continues to bind States whether the Council acts or not. Nor is the Council a court required to deliver a comprehensive judgment on every aspect of a war before taking steps to protect civilians or prevent escalation. Yet the way the Council defines a crisis matters. By identifying some acts as threats to peace and leaving others outside its resolutions, it can influence not only diplomatic narratives but also the legal and political conditions in which further military action is contemplated.

The conflict involving Iran in 2026 offers a particularly revealing example. On 28 February, the United States and Israel launched military strikes against Iran, followed by Iranian attacks across the region. That same day, the UN Secretary-General condemned both the US-Israeli strikes and Iran’s subsequent attacks on other States, and recalled the Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. The Security Council’s response, however, developed along a more selective path.

On 11 March, the Council adopted Resolution 2817 (2026) by thirteen votes in favour, with Russia and China abstaining. It strongly condemned Iranian attacks against Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, demanded their cessation, and condemned interference with international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The resolution also affirmed the right of self-defence in response to Iranian armed attacks. What it did not do was address the legal basis of the initial US and Israeli use of force against Iran.

That omission deserves attention, but for a precise reason. Condemning Iranian attacks is not, in itself, legally inconsistent with recognising that Iran may have suffered an unlawful armed attack. A State exercising self-defence remains bound by necessity and proportionality under the law governing the use of force and by international humanitarian law in the conduct of hostilities. Attacks on third States cannot be justified merely because those States host foreign military bases. The more difficult question is whether, and under what conditions, their involvement in military operations affects the legality of a defensive response. By concentrating on one set of military actions, the Council avoided confronting that wider question.

A second and perhaps more delicate issue emerged on 7 April, when the Council considered draft resolution S/2026/273 on the Strait of Hormuz. Its operative language strongly encouraged interested States to coordinate defensive efforts to secure navigation, including escorting merchant vessels and deterring attempts to obstruct passage. This was not an express authorisation to use all necessary measures. The distinction is important: protecting ships, invoking self-defence and receiving authorisation to use military force under Chapter VII are not interchangeable legal grounds. Nevertheless, the wording raised concerns that an apparently defensive mandate might be interpreted broadly enough to facilitate armed operations against Iran. Russia and China vetoed the draft; eleven members supported it and two abstained.

Those concerns should not obscure the legitimate interests at stake. Civilian vessels and their crews require protection, and international straits cannot simply be treated as instruments of unrestricted military pressure. The legal difficulty lies in determining what kind of action the Council is endorsing, by whom, against whom and on what basis. A reference to defensive measures cannot by itself settle the conditions under which force may lawfully be used.

What troubles me most in this episode is not the fact that the Council condemned Iran. It is the risk that a collective security institution may respond to successive stages of a conflict as though they were disconnected events. The Council’s decisions do not need to reproduce a court judgment, but they should not obscure the relationship between an initial resort to force, the right of self-defence and the limits governing subsequent military responses. Otherwise, the danger is not only institutional paralysis. It is that collective security begins to look like a selective language for describing the conduct of some States, rather than a framework of rules applicable to all.

Sources

Further reading

For readers interested in exploring these issues in greater depth, several recent contributions offer useful and sometimes contrasting perspectives on the legality of the 2026 hostilities involving Iran, the selective responses of the UN Security Council, and the international legal framework governing the Strait of Hormuz.

Particularly relevant are:

These contributions are worth reading together precisely because they address different aspects of the same conflict and do not necessarily agree on their legal implications. They also invite a broader question: how should international lawyers assess the legal significance of Security Council resolutions when those decisions address certain uses of force while leaving others largely outside their analysis?