
This slide illustrates three possible legal characterisations of cyber operations under international law. The central point is that the technology used does not, by itself, determine the legal classification of an operation. What matters is principally its nature, scale, severity and consequences.
The first example concerns cyber espionage. Imagine that State A secretly accesses the computer systems of State B’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and copies confidential diplomatic documents without destroying data or disrupting the systems. Such an operation would generally fall below the threshold of a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the operation is lawful. It may raise questions concerning sovereignty, diplomatic law or other international obligations. We should also distinguish espionage from prohibited intervention: under the principle of non-intervention, coercion in matters within a State’s protected sphere of decision-making is an essential element. There is also disagreement among States about the precise circumstances in which a cyber intrusion violates sovereignty.
The second example concerns a cyber operation that may amount to a use of force. Imagine that State A attacks State B’s electricity network, causing a widespread blackout across several cities. Hospitals must rely on emergency generators, transport systems stop functioning, and essential services are seriously disrupted.
Here, the legal assessment becomes more difficult. Even without physical destruction or casualties, the operation could qualify as a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4), depending on its scale and effects. However, the precise threshold remains debated. Moreover, qualifying an operation as a use of force does not automatically mean that it constitutes an armed attack giving rise to a right of self-defence.
The third example concerns a cyber operation that may constitute an armed attack. Imagine that State A remotely manipulates the control systems of a major dam in State B, deliberately opening its floodgates. The resulting flooding destroys several towns, causes numerous deaths and severely damages critical infrastructure.
In this case, the consequences are comparable to those of a major conventional military attack. The operation would very likely constitute both a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) and an armed attack under Article 51.
Provided the operation is attributable to State A, State B could potentially exercise its right of self-defence. However, the existence of an armed attack does not authorise an unlimited military response. Any defensive action must satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality and comply with the other applicable rules of international law.
The legal distinction is particularly important. In its Nicaragua judgment of 1986, the International Court of Justice distinguished the most grave forms of the use of force from less grave forms. This distinction remains fundamental when assessing cyber operations. The Tallinn Manual 2.0, particularly Rules 69 and 71, provides a useful framework for examining these questions, although it is an expert study rather than a legally binding instrument and does not represent a universally accepted interpretation.
The question I would like you to consider is this: If a cyber operation causes exactly the same destruction as a missile strike, should international law treat the two operations differently simply because one involves computer code and the other explosives?
Under an effects-based approach, the answer is generally no. The means employed are relevant, but they should not alone determine the legal characterisation. What matters is what the operation actually does, and whether its consequences reach the thresholds established by international law.
