Reading Timofey Bordachev’s interview in Corriere della Sera today, I was struck by a familiar picture: the great powers make the decisions, and Europe adjusts. Bordachev develops a similar argument in a recent article for the Valdai Club. Yet I still think this picture leaves a great deal out. It tells us something about Europe’s difficulties in security and defence, but much less about how European power actually works today.
A few figures are enough to put things in perspective. According to Eurostat, the European Union’s GDP reached EUR 18.8 trillion in 2025. The EU remains one of the world’s largest markets, capable of setting rules that shape the behaviour of businesses and governments well beyond its borders. The importance of that market is particularly clear in its relationship with the United Kingdom. According to the UK House of Commons Library, in 2025 the EU accounted for 41% of UK exports of goods and services and 50% of its imports. What happens in Brussels has very tangible consequences for London.
Today’s timing is revealing. On 20 November 2026, the EU and the UK announced in Brussels that negotiations on three new agreements had been concluded, as set out in their joint statement. The first is intended to make trade in food and agricultural products easier by removing most sanitary certificates and checks, through a common area based on regulatory alignment. It is due to apply from 1 March 2028. The second would link their respective CO? emissions trading systems, with a target start date of 1 January 2028, and create the conditions for reciprocal exemptions from carbon border adjustment measures. Those exemptions would still require the necessary legal acts.
The third agreement may be the most immediately striking for anyone who has seen what Brexit meant for younger generations. The new Youth Experience Scheme would offer 100,000 places per year on each side for people aged 18 to 31, allowing stays of up to three years to work, study or travel. It would be a limited, visa-based arrangement, not a return to free movement. The stated aim is to have the scheme in place by 2028, with opportunities becoming available no later than January 2030. The UK will also participate in Erasmus+ in 2027, while the two sides have committed to concluding further negotiations on university tuition fees within six months. These are significant developments, but it would be premature to present them as rights that can already be exercised: the agreements still have to complete the relevant legal procedures. The official explanation of the youth scheme is available here.
What I find particularly telling is that a country which chose to leave the Union is now moving closer to some of its rulesin order to reduce the economic costs of separation. The joint statement also goes well beyond trade: it envisages dialogue on economic security, coordination on supply chains and critical technologies, closer cooperation on defence, cyber threats, Ukraine and the fight against migrant smuggling. This is also a way of rebuilding a wider European strategic dimension that includes the United Kingdom, without pretending Brexit never happened.
Of course, Europe’s weaknesses remain. According to the European Defence Agency, EU Member States spent EUR 418 billion on defence in 2025. But that does not amount to a single, integrated military establishment. Dependence on key US strategic capabilities and the difficulty of taking decisions together are serious problems. I see them as reasons to ask how Europe can act more effectively, rather than as proof that it no longer matters.
Perhaps this is why I find some geopolitical analyses unconvincing. They focus on who commands the greatest military force and end up portraying Europe as a territory over which others compete for influence. I would also look at who sets the terms for trade, investment, cooperation and access to an enormous market. Europe already possesses considerable power. The question is how effectively it can use it, and to what ends.

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