Putin, Trump and Xi Against the International Criminal Court: A Primarily Political Declaration

I must admit that, as I read the joint declaration adopted today in Shenzhen by Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, the third paragraph gave me pause for thought.

The leaders of three states that are not parties to the Rome Statute felt the need to remind the International Criminal Court of the importance of state consent and respect for the immunities of state officials, warning it against abusing its jurisdiction.

Of course, the fact that these states are not parties to the Statute does not deprive them of the right to criticise the Court. And the question of the immunities of state officials before an international criminal court raises genuine legal problems, which remain the subject of considerable debate. Still, there is something rather curious about three powers that have chosen to remain outside the ICC system coming together to prescribe the limits within which the Court should operate.

In strictly legal terms, the declaration changes very little. The Court retains its jurisdiction under the conditions laid down in the Rome Statute, including over nationals of non-party states when crimes are committed on the territory of a state that has accepted its jurisdiction. This is what happened in Ukraine, which had already accepted the Court’s jurisdiction through two declarations under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute before becoming a state party on 1 January 2025. Russia’s non-participation in the Statute does not therefore, in itself, prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction over crimes committed on Ukrainian territory that fall within its competence.

The Security Council’s power to refer a situation to the Court under Article 13(b) of the Statute also remains intact. Admittedly, following this declaration, it is even harder to imagine Russia, China and the United States agreeing on a new referral. Yet this mechanism had already been effectively paralysed at the political level for years. Since the referrals of Darfur in 2005 and Libya in 2011, the Council has not adopted another. In May 2014, for example, Russia and China vetoed a draft resolution that would have referred the situation in Syria to the Court. The Shenzhen declaration therefore seems to formalise a political convergence that, at least as regards the prospect of new Security Council referrals, has few new consequences.

What interests me most, however, is something else. This declaration appears to be aimed primarily at strengthening Putin’s international legitimacy.

Since 17 March 2023, the Russian president has been subject to an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes involving the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children. The warrant has not prevented him from continuing to exercise his presidential functions or attending international meetings. It has, however, created a degree of legal and diplomatic vulnerability in his international travel, requiring him to take account of the cooperation obligations of the states he intends to visit.

The Mongolia episode is particularly instructive. In September 2024, Putin visited Mongolia, a state party to the Rome Statute, without being arrested. On 24 October 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber II found that Mongolia had failed to comply with its cooperation obligations and referred the matter to the Assembly of States Parties. The Court also addressed the question of immunities, holding that the personal immunity of heads of non-party states cannot be invoked before the Court and does not relieve states parties of their obligation to execute requests for arrest and surrender. This is an important legal position, situated within an ongoing debate, particularly concerning the relationship between Article 27 of the Rome Statute, Article 98 and the immunities recognised under general international law.

The episode illustrates just how difficult it can be to enforce an arrest warrant against the leader of a major power, even where, according to the Court, a clear legal obligation exists. It also confirms that, in such cases, the effectiveness of international criminal justice depends to a considerable extent on states’ willingness to cooperate.

For Putin, therefore, the problem has probably never been limited to the immediate risk of arrest, which he can substantially reduce by carefully choosing the countries he visits. It also concerns the political significance of an outstanding warrant that continues to identify him as a person wanted by an international criminal court. A warrant that follows him in his diplomatic relations, potentially restricts his international travel and keeps alive a judicial challenge to his conduct as head of state.

From this perspective, securing a joint declaration with the presidents of the United States and China, invoking the immunities of state officials and questioning possible abuses of the Court’s jurisdiction, represents a diplomatic achievement. It does not invalidate the arrest warrant, amend the Rome Statute or release states parties from their cooperation obligations. But it gives Putin something that may carry considerable political weight: a challenge to the Court’s conduct endorsed by the leaders of the other two major world powers.

The language used is also revealing. The three presidents do not expressly call for the withdrawal of Putin’s arrest warrant, nor do they identify any particular decision of the Court as unlawful. Instead, they invoke broad principles, such as state consent and respect for immunities, and warn the Court against possible abuses of jurisdiction. The wording is sufficiently broad to allow all three governments to express a common position without committing themselves to a precise legal interpretation.

Moreover, the reference to state consent leaves unresolved the very issue it appears to address: the Rome Statute expressly provides for the exercise of jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states in certain circumstances. As for immunities, the Court has already addressed the issue in its decision concerning Mongolia, holding that the personal immunity of heads of third states cannot be invoked in proceedings before the Court and does not prevent states parties from fulfilling their obligations to arrest and surrender individuals sought by the ICC. This interpretation remains contested, particularly as regards its application to heads of non-party states, but a political declaration cannot, in itself, alter the Court’s legal position.

Perhaps this is the most interesting aspect of the summit. International criminal justice continues to produce legal consequences that major powers cannot simply erase through a political declaration. Yet those same powers retain considerable influence over its practical effectiveness and over the public legitimacy