Russia: EU prolongs economic sanctions by six months. Il Consiglio ha prorogato le sanzioni economiche riguardanti settori specifici dell’economia russa fino al 31 gennaio 2019.

This decision follows an update from President Macron and Chancellor Merkel to the European Council of 28-29 June 2018 on the state of implementation of the Minsk agreements, to which the sanctions are linked.

The Council adopted this decision today by written procedure and, in line with the rule for all such decisions, unanimously.

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Il 5 luglio 2018 il Consiglio ha prorogato le sanzioni economiche riguardanti settori specifici dell’economia russa fino al 31 gennaio 2019.

La decisione fa seguito all’aggiornamento del presidente Macron e della cancelliera Merkel al Consiglio europeo del 28 e 29 giugno 2018 in merito allo stato di attuazione degli accordi di Minsk, a cui sono collegate le sanzioni.

Il Consiglio ha adottato tale decisione in data odierna mediante procedura scritta e, come di regola per tutte le decisioni di questo tipo, all’unanimità.

Le misure riguardano i settori finanziario, dell’energia, della difesa e dei beni a duplice uso. Introdotte inizialmente per un anno il 31 luglio 2014 in risposta alle azioni della Russia che destabilizzavano la situazione in Ucraina, sono state rafforzate nel settembre 2014.

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Pubblicato in Brexit, Russia, sanctions | Lascia un commento

Rate of new trade restrictions from G20 economies doubles against previous period

The WTO’s nineteenth monitoring report on Group of 20 (G20) trade measures covering the period from mid-October 2017 to mid-May 2018, issued on 4 July, shows that new trade-restrictive measures from G20 economies have doubled compared to the previous review period. The report also shows that G20 economies continue to implement trade-facilitating measures, with the rate increasing slightly. The report’s findings should be of ‘real concern’ to the international community, according to Director-General Roberto Azevêdo.

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/monit_04jul18_e.htm

 

Pubblicato in trade wars, WTO | Lascia un commento

WTO: Members raise concerns over US Section 232 investigation on automobiles and automotive parts

Members expressed their concerns over possible measures by the United States regarding extra duties on the import of automobiles, including cars, SUVs, vans, light trucks and automotive parts, at the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) held on 3 and 4 of July. Over 40 members — including the 28 European Union members — took the floor to warn of the “serious disruption” to world markets and the multilateral trading system that may arise as a result of these potential measures, particularly in light of the large proportion of global trade accounted for by these products.

The item was discussed at the request of Japan and the Russian Federation, which were of the view that such measures could trigger a spiral of counter-measures and result in serious disruption to the rules-based multilateral trading system. They recalled that the issue of US investigations under Section 232 provisions has been raised over the past year in several WTO bodies – the CTG and the Committee on Safeguards – only to see things change for the worse. Both Japan and Russia reserved their right to protect their legitimate rights and interests as provided for under WTO rules.

The European Union echoed these concerns and said that there can be no justification for measures to restrict imports of cars, car parts and light trucks on grounds of national security, as there is no apparent economic threat to a US industry which has steadily expanded domestic production over the last 10 years. Any trade restrictive measures in the sector will have a serious negative impact not only on the EU but on the global economy overall, the EU said.

China stressed that the measures at stake mostly involve products for civilian use and that, as such, they do not pose a threat to national security. According to Beijing, these are simply protectionist measures that will significantly distort trade and global value chains and will bring serious challenges to the multilateral trading system. China said it stands ready to work with all WTO members to tackle this challenge and to take concrete action in order to safeguard the authority of the WTO and fight against unilateralism and protectionism.

Other members – Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Costa Rica, Hong Kong China, Venezuela, Singapore, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, Qatar, Thailand and India – also raised concerns with the  announced US investigation, which in their view will trigger a cycle of measures and counter-measures that will harm all members with negative effects on international trade.

On the impact of the existing US tariffs on steel and aluminium, some members pointed out that the additional tariffs in force since 23 March are already having negative effects on the supply chains, on producers and exporters, on the US downstream industry, and finally on US consumers. It was recognized that there is a serious problem of global overcapacity in the steel and aluminium sectors, but these members noted that import duties at the border will not solve it – it needs to be addressed through dialogue and negotiations in international fora such as the OECD.

In response, the United States said that the US Section 232 investigation on steel and aluminium is an issue that has been referred to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and, therefore, should not belong to the CTG agenda. The US referred other members to the statements made on this issue in the Safeguards Committee, as well as the Dispute Settlement Body, for further information on the US position on this issue.

 

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/good_03jul18_e.htm

 

WTO | 2018 News items – Members raise concerns over US Section 232 investigation on automobiles and

Pubblicato in trade, trade wars, USA, WTO | Lascia un commento

2019 European elections: National rules

An infographic of the EP

EPRS_ATA(2018)623556_EN

 

 

Pubblicato in EULaw | Lascia un commento

U.S. government has moved to block China Mobile from offering services to the U.S. telecommunications market for national security reasons.

The U.S. government has moved to block China Mobile from offering services to the U.S. telecommunications market, recommending its application be rejected because the firm posed national security risks.

It said the company was “subject to exploitation, influence and control by the Chinese government” and that its application posed “substantial and unacceptable national security and law enforcement risks in the current national security environment”.

Pubblicato in China, natsec | Lascia un commento

Rule of Law: Commission launches infringement procedure to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court. Stato di diritto: Procedimento d’infrazione della Commissione a tutela dell’indipendenza della Corte suprema polacca.

IP-18-4341_EN

IP-18-4341_IT

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4341_it.htm

Today, the European Commission has launched an infringement procedure by sending a Letter of Formal Notice to Poland regarding the Polish law on the Supreme Court.

On 3 July, 27 out of 72 Supreme Court judges face the risk of being forced to retire – more than one in every three judges – due to the fact that the new Polish law on the Supreme Court lowers the retirement age of Supreme Court judges from 70 to 65. This measure also applies to the First President of the Supreme Court, whose 6-year mandate would be prematurely terminated. According to the law, current judges are given the possibility to declare their will to have their mandate prolonged by the President of the Republic, which can be granted for a period of three years and renewed once. There are no criteria established for the President’s decision and there is no possibility for a judicial review of this decision.
The Commission is of the opinion that these measures undermine the principle of judicial independence, including the irremovability of judges, and thereby Poland fails to fulfil its obligations under Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union read in connection with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

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La Commissione ha avviato in data odierna un procedimento d’infrazione nei confronti della Polonia inviandole una lettera di costituzione in mora per la legge sulla Corte suprema.

Poiché la nuova legge polacca abbassa da 70 a 65 anni l’età pensionabile obbligatoria per i giudici della Corte suprema, il 3 luglio 27 dei 72 giudici – più di uno su tre – rischiano di essere collocati in pensione d’ufficio. La misura si applica anche al primo presidente della Corte suprema, che vedrebbe terminare in anticipo il suo mandato sessennale. La legge consente agli attuali giudici di chiedere una proroga del mandato attivo al presidente della Repubblica, che può concederlo per un triennio, rinnovabile una sola volta. La decisione del presidente non è subordinata ad alcun criterio e contro di essa non è ammesso ricorso per via giudiziaria.

La Commissione ritiene che queste misure ledano il principio di indipendenza della magistratura, in particolare nell’aspetto dell’inamovibilità dei giudici, e che la Polonia venga quindi meno agli obblighi assunti con l’articolo 19, paragrafo 1, del trattato sull’Unione europea (TUE) in combinato disposto con l’articolo 47 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea.

La Commissione ha già affrontato il tema della legge sulla Corte suprema nel dialogo sullo Stato di diritto tenuto con le autorità polacche, ma senza ottenere risultati soddisfacenti: nonostante le affermazioni delle autorità polacche, la Commissione non ritiene che la consultazione del Consiglio nazionale della magistratura introdotta nel processo rappresenti effettivamente una garanzia, perché i criteri alla base sono vaghi e il parere del Consiglio non è vincolante. Per effetto della riforma dell’8 dicembre 2017, inoltre, i giudici membri del Consiglio nazionale della magistratura sono ormai nominati dal parlamento polacco, in una procedura che non soddisfa i criteri europei d’indipendenza della magistratura.

Dato lo stallo del dialogo sullo Stato di diritto e l’imminenza dell’applicazione del nuovo regime di pensionamento ai giudici della Corte suprema, la Commissione ha deciso di avviare con urgenza un procedimento d’infrazione. Il governo polacco disporrà di un mese di tempo per rispondere alla lettera di costituzione in mora. La Commissione è peraltro pronta a continuare con la Polonia il dialogo sullo Stato di diritto in corso, che a suo giudizio resta la sede privilegiata per risolvere la questione della minaccia sistematica che incombe sullo Stato di diritto nel paese.

Pubblicato in EULaw, rule of law, sanctions | Lascia un commento

Celebrating the Customs Union: the world’s largest trading bloc turns 50

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4265_en.htm

The EU’s Customs Union celebrates its 50th anniversary on July 1, one of the greatest achievements of the European Union.

Borne out of the landmark post-war agreements that paved the way for European integration, the Customs Union opened for business in 1968. By abolishing customs tariffs for trade in goods within what is now the EU, the Customs Union marked the first decisive step towards the EU becoming the world’s largest trading bloc, with the 28 customs administrations of the EU acting as though they were one entity.
Over the past 50 years, the Customs Union has developed into a cornerstone of our Single Market, keeping EU borders safe and protecting our citizens from prohibited and dangerous goods such as weapons and drugs. It also facilitates an ever-growing portion of global trade: EU customs handled 16% of the world’s commerce in 2017.

IP-18-4265_EN

Pubblicato in EULaw | Lascia un commento

WTO DS554: Russia v. United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products

On 29 June 2018, the Russian Federation requested consultations with the United States concerning certain measures imposed by the United States to allegedly adjust imports of steel and aluminium into the United States.

ds554_e.htm

Pubblicato in lawfare, trade, trade wars, USA, WTO | Lascia un commento

Governance of the Energy Union: Council confirms deal reached with the European Parliament

The EU ambassadors of the member states confirmed, on behalf of the Council, the provisional agreement reached on 19-20 June between the Bulgarian Presidency and the European Parliament on the Energy Union governance regulation.

Governance of the Energy Union

ST_15090_2016_REV_1_EN

ST_15235_2017_INIT_EN

Governance of energy union

 

Pubblicato in Energy, EUsec, natsec | Lascia un commento

European Council (Art. 50) meeting (29 June 2018) – Conclusions – Riunione del Consiglio europeo (Articolo 50) (29 giugno 2018)

29-euco-art50-conclusions-it

29-euco-art50-conclusions-en

Pubblicato in Brexit | Lascia un commento

The European Council establishes the composition of the European Parliament after Brexit – Il Consiglio europeo stabilisce la composizione del Parlamento europeo a seguito della Brexit

composizione parlamento

La decisione riduce e ridistribuisce i seggi del Parlamento europeo a seguito della decisione del Regno Unito di recedere dall’Unione europea. La nuova composizione comporterà una riduzione delle dimensioni dal Parlamento europeo, che passerà da 751 a 705 membri.
Dei 73 seggi resi vacanti dalla Brexit, 27 saranno riassegnati per rispecchiare meglio il principio della proporzionalità degressiva.
I 27 seggi saranno assegnati a: Francia (+5), Spagna (+5), Italia (+3), Paesi Bassi (+3), Irlanda (+2), Svezia (+1), Austria (+1), Danimarca (+1), Finlandia (+1), Slovacchia (+1), Croazia (+1), Estonia (+1), Polonia (+1) e Romania (+1). Nessuno Stato membro perderà seggi.

Decisione del Consiglio
ST_7_2018_REV_1_IT

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The decision reduces and redistributes European Parliament seats following the decision by the United Kingdom to exit the European Union. The new composition will reduce the size of the European Parliament from 751 to 705 Members (MEP’s).

Of the 73 seats vacated by Brexit, 27 will be re-allocated to better reflect the principle of degressive proportionality.

The 27 seats will be distributed to France (+5), Spain (+5), Italy (+3), Netherlands (+3), Ireland (+2), Sweden (+1), Austria (+1), Denmark (+1), Finland (+1), Slovakia (+1), Croatia (+1), Estonia (+1), Poland (+1) and Romania (+1). No member state will lose any seats.

Pubblicato in Brexit, EULaw | Lascia un commento

EU to ban data localisation restrictions – A breve il divieto UE sulle restrizioni in materia di localizzazione dei dati

The EU is moving to boost its data economy by creating a single market for data storage and processing services, such as cloud computing. This freedom to choose a data service provider anywhere in Europe is expected to lead to more innovative data- driven services and more competitive prices for businesses, consumers and public administrations. Member states’ ambassadors endorsed the new rules today, following a provisional agreement with the European Parliament on 19 June.

” Free movement of data is crucial for unlocking the vast potential of the data economy. This legislation will ensure that data is allowed to flow freely, allowing companies and public administrations to store and process non-personal data wherever they choose in the EU. These rules will provide legal certainty and trust in the increasing use of data-driven innovations for the benefit of all citizens.

Ivaylo Moskovski, Bulgarian Minister for Transport, Information Technology and Communications

The reform will remove any restrictions imposed by member states’ public authorities on the geographical location for storing or processing non-personal data, unless such restrictions are justified on grounds of public security. Important sources of non-personal data include the rapidly expanding Internet of Things, artificial intelligence and machine learning. Current uses of aggregate and anonymised sets of non-personal data include for example big data analytics and precision farming.

To ensure that the rules will work in practice, member states must either repeal their data localisation requirements or notify those that are permitted to the Commission. The text clarifies that member states’ public administrations are not prevented from insourcing the provision of services involving data processing.

If a data set contains both personal and non-personal data, the general data protection regulation will apply to the personal data part of the set, while the non-personal data will be covered by the free flow of data regulation.

Member states’ competent authorities will continue to have access to data even when it is stored or processed in another country. This may be necessary for example for the purposes of regulatory or supervisory control.

The draft regulation also encourages the development of codes of conduct to make it easier for users of data processing services to switch service providers or to port their data back to their own IT systems.

Removing data localisation restrictions is considered a key factor in ensuring that the data economy can achieve its full potential and double its value to 4% of European GDP in 2020.

With this agreement, the Council and the Parliament succeeded in meeting the June 2018 deadline that EU leaders set for this priority dossier in the European Council in October 2017.

press release

L’UE mira a stimolare l’economia dei dati creando un mercato unico per i servizi di conservazione e trattamento dei dati, come il cloud computing. Tale libertà di scegliere un fornitore di servizi di dati ovunque in Europa dovrebbe tradursi in servizi basati sui dati più innovativi e in prezzi più competitivi per le imprese, i consumatori e le amministrazioni pubbliche. Oggi gli ambasciatori degli Stati membri hanno approvato le nuove norme, dopo aver raggiunto un accordo provvisorio con il Parlamento europeo il 19 giugno.

” La libera circolazione dei dati è fondamentale per liberare l’ampio potenziale dell’economia dei dati. Tale normativa garantirà la libera circolazione dei dati e consentirà alle imprese e alle amministrazioni pubbliche di archiviare e trattare i dati non personali ovunque scelgano di farlo nell’UE. Tali norme garantiranno certezza del diritto e fiducia nel crescente utilizzo di innovazioni guidate dai dati a vantaggio di tutti i cittadini.

Ivaylo Moskovski, ministro bulgaro dei trasporti, della tecnologia dell’informazione e delle comunicazioni

La riforma eliminerà le restrizioni in materia di ubicazione geografica imposte dalle autorità pubbliche degli Stati membri per quanto riguarda la conservazione o il trattamento dei dati non personali, a meno che tali restrizioni siano giustificate da motivi di sicurezza pubblica. Importanti fonti di dati non personali includono l’internet degli oggetti, l’intelligenza artificiale e l’apprendimento automatico, che sono in rapida espansione. Gli attuali utilizzi dei set aggregati e anonimizzati di dati non personali comprendono, ad esempio, l’analisi dei megadati e l’agricoltura di precisione.

Per garantire che le norme siano efficaci nella pratica, gli Stati membri devono abrogare i loro obblighi di localizzazione dei dati o comunicare alla Commissione quelli che sono autorizzati. Il testo specifica che le amministrazioni pubbliche degli Stati membri possono internalizzare la prestazione di servizi in materia di trattamento dei dati.

Se un set di dati contiene dati sia personali che non personali, ai dati personali del set si applicherà il regolamento generale sulla protezione dei dati, mentre i dati non personali rientreranno nel campo di applicazione del regolamento sulla libera circolazione dei dati.

Le autorità competenti degli Stati membri continueranno ad avere accesso ai dati anche se conservati o trattati in un altro paese. Ciò potrebbe risultare necessario, ad esempio, ai fini di un controllo regolamentare o di vigilanza.

Il progetto di regolamento incoraggia inoltre l’elaborazione di codici di condotta affinché sia più agevole per gli utenti di servizi di trattamento dati cambiare fornitore di servizi o ritrasferire i propri dati verso i propri sistemi informatici.

L’eliminazione delle restrizioni in materia di localizzazione dei dati è considerata un fattore essenziale per consentire all’economia basata sui dati di raggiungere il pieno potenziale e raddoppiare il proprio valore fino ad arrivare al 4% del PIL europeo nel 2020.

Con questo accordo il Consiglio e il Parlamento hanno rispettato il termine, ovvero giugno 2018, che i leader dell’UE avevano fissato per questo fascicolo prioritario nel Consiglio europeo di ottobre 2017.

comunicato stampa
press release

Pubblicato in cloud, data localization | Contrassegnato , | Lascia un commento

ECHR: Confiscation of land over unlawful site development: Italy in violation of Convention

Grand Chamber judgment1 in the case of G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others v. Italy (applications nos. 1828/06, 34163/07 and 19029/11) the European Court of Human Rights

The cases concern the confiscation of land as provided for by domestic legislation in the event of unlawful site development. The applicants alleged that this confiscation had an insufficient legal basis.

The Court observed that all the applicants had had their property confiscated even though none of them had received a formal conviction. In accordance with the Varvara v. Italy case-law, the Court reiterated that Article 7 precluded the imposition of a criminal sanction on an individual without personal criminal liability being established and declared beforehand.

Where the courts found that all the elements of the offence of unlawful site development were made out, while discontinuing the proceedings solely on account of statutory limitation, those findings could be regarded, in substance, as a conviction for the purposes of Article 7, which in such cases would not be breached. It followed that there had been no violation of Article 7 in respect of Mr Gironda.

The applicant companies had not been parties to any proceedings. Having regard to the principle that a person could not be punished for an act engaging the criminal liability of another, a confiscation measure that was applied, as in the present case, to individuals or legal entities which were not parties to the proceedings, was incompatible with Article 7.

The Court took the view that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of all the applicants on account of the disproportionate nature of the confiscation measures.

Lastly, Mr Gironda had been declared guilty, in substance, by the Court of Cassation, following proceedings in which the right to be presumed innocent had not been respected. There had thus been a violation of Article 6 § 2 in respect of Mr Gironda.

Grand Chamber judgment G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy – confiscation of land due to illegal site development

Pubblicato in CEDU | Lascia un commento

We consider a hard Brexit a real possibility now – not a tail risk.

http://www.eurointelligence.com/public/briefings/2018-06-28.html

Pubblicato in Brexit | Lascia un commento

Following agreement by both Houses on the text of the Bill it received Royal Assent on 26 June. The Bill is now an Act of Parliament (law).

Following agreement by both Houses on the text of the Bill it received Royal Assent on 26 June. The Bill is now an Act of Parliament (law).

https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/europeanunionwithdrawal.html

Information about the Withdrawal Bill

https://www.parliament.uk/brexit

European Union Withdrawal Bill Act

Pubblicato in Brexit | Lascia un commento

US Supreme Court: Travel Ban and National Security

TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. v. HAWAII ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–965. Argued April 25, 2018—Decided June 26, 2018

https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-965.html

In September 2017, the President issued Proclamation No. 9645, seek- ing to improve vetting procedures for foreign nationals traveling to the United States by identifying ongoing deficiencies in the infor- mation needed to assess whether nationals of particular countries present a security threat. The Proclamation placed entry restrictions on the nationals of eight foreign states whose systems for managing and sharing information about their nationals the President deemed inadequate. Foreign states were selected for inclusion based on a re- view undertaken pursuant to one of the President’s earlier Executive Orders. As part of that review, the Department of Homeland Securi- ty (DHS), in consultation with the State Department and intelligence agencies, developed an information and risk assessment “baseline.” DHS then collected and evaluated data for all foreign governments, identifying those having deficient information-sharing practices and presenting national security concerns, as well as other countries “at risk” of failing to meet the baseline. After a 50-day period during which the State Department made diplomatic efforts to encourage foreign governments to improve their practices, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security concluded that eight countries—Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—remained deficient. She recommended entry restrictions for certain nationals from all of those countries but Iraq, which had a close cooperative re- lationship with the U. S. She also recommended including Somalia, which met the information-sharing component of the baseline stand- ards but had other special risk factors, such as a significant terrorist presence. After consulting with multiple Cabinet members, the Pres- ident adopted the recommendations and issued the Proclamation.

Invoking his authority under 8 U. S. C. §§1182(f) and 1185(a), he de- termined that certain restrictions were necessary to “prevent the en- try of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Gov- ernment lacks sufficient information” and “elicit improved identity- management and information-sharing protocols and practices from foreign governments.” The Proclamation imposes a range of entry re- strictions that vary based on the “distinct circumstances” in each of the eight countries. It exempts lawful permanent residents and pro- vides case-by-case waivers under certain circumstances. It also di- rects DHS to assess on a continuing basis whether the restrictions should be modified or continued, and to report to the President every 180 days. At the completion of the first such review period, the Pres- ident determined that Chad had sufficiently improved its practices, and he accordingly lifted restrictions on its nationals.
Plaintiffs—the State of Hawaii, three individuals with foreign rela- tives affected by the entry suspension, and the Muslim Association of Hawaii—argue that the Proclamation violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction barring enforce- ment of the restrictions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Proclamation contravened two provisions of the INA: §1182(f), which authorizes the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens” whenever he “finds” that their entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,” and §1152(a)(1)(A), which provides that “no person shall . . . be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” The court did not reach the Establishment Clause claim.

Held:
1. This Court assumes without deciding that plaintiffs’ statutory
claims are reviewable, notwithstanding consular nonreviewability or any other statutory nonreviewability issue. See Sale v. Haitian Cen- ters Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155. Pp. 8–9.
2. The President has lawfully exercised the broad discretion grant- ed to him under §1182(f) to suspend the entry of aliens into the Unit- ed States. Pp. 9–24.
(a) By its terms, §1182(f) exudes deference to the President in every clause. It entrusts to the President the decisions whether and when to suspend entry, whose entry to suspend, for how long, and on what conditions. It thus vests the President with “ample power” to impose entry restrictions in addition to those elsewhere enumerated in the INA. Sale, 509 U. S., at 187. The Proclamation falls well with- in this comprehensive delegation. The sole prerequisite set forth in §1182(f) is that the President “find[ ]” that the entry of the covered aliens “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” The President has undoubtedly fulfilled that requirement here. He first ordered DHS and other agencies to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of every single country’s compliance with the information and risk assessment baseline. He then issued a Proclamation with extensive findings about the deficiencies and their impact. Based on that review, he found that restricting entry of aliens who could not be vetted with adequate information was in the national interest.
Even assuming that some form of inquiry into the persuasiveness of the President’s findings is appropriate, but see Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 600, plaintiffs’ attacks on the sufficiency of the findings cannot be sustained. The 12-page Proclamation is more detailed than any prior order issued under §1182(f). And such a searching in- quiry is inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the deference traditionally accorded the President in this sphere. See, e.g., Sale, 509 U. S., at 187–188.
The Proclamation comports with the remaining textual limits in §1182(f). While the word “suspend” often connotes a temporary de- ferral, the President is not required to prescribe in advance a fixed end date for the entry restriction. Like its predecessors, the Procla- mation makes clear that its “conditional restrictions” will remain in force only so long as necessary to “address” the identified “inadequa- cies and risks” within the covered nations. Finally, the Proclamation properly identifies a “class of aliens” whose entry is suspended, and the word “class” comfortably encompasses a group of people linked by nationality. Pp. 10–15.
(b) Plaintiffs have not identified any conflict between the Proc- lamation and the immigration scheme reflected in the INA that would implicitly bar the President from addressing deficiencies in the Nation’s vetting system. The existing grounds of inadmissibility and the narrow Visa Waiver Program do not address the failure of certain high-risk countries to provide a minimum baseline of reliable infor- mation. Further, neither the legislative history of §1182(f) nor his- torical practice justifies departing from the clear text of the statute. Pp. 15–20.
(c) Plaintiffs’ argument that the President’s entry suspension vio- lates §1152(a)(1)(A) ignores the basic distinction between admissibil- ity determinations and visa issuance that runs throughout the INA. Section 1182 defines the universe of aliens who are admissible into the United States (and therefore eligible to receive a visa). Once §1182 sets the boundaries of admissibility, §1152(a)(1)(A) prohibits discrimination in the allocation of immigrant visas based on national- ity and other traits. Had Congress intended in §1152(a)(1)(A) to con- strain the President’s power to determine who may enter the country,
it could have chosen language directed to that end. Common sense and historical practice confirm that §1152(a)(1)(A) does not limit the President’s delegated authority under §1182(f). Presidents have re- peatedly exercised their authority to suspend entry on the basis of nationality. And on plaintiffs’ reading, the President would not be permitted to suspend entry from particular foreign states in response to an epidemic, or even if the United States were on the brink of war. Pp. 20–24.
3. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the Proclamation violates the Establish- ment Clause. Pp. 24–38.
(a) The individual plaintiffs have Article III standing to chal- lenge the exclusion of their relatives under the Establishment Clause. A person’s interest in being united with his relatives is suffi- ciently concrete and particularized to form the basis of an Article III injury in fact. Cf., e.g., Kerry v. Din, 576 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 24–26.
(b) Plaintiffs allege that the primary purpose of the Proclamation was religious animus and that the President’s stated concerns about vetting protocols and national security were but pretexts for discrim- inating against Muslims. At the heart of their case is a series of statements by the President and his advisers both during the cam- paign and since the President assumed office. The issue, however, is not whether to denounce the President’s statements, but the signifi- cance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neu- tral on its face, addressing a matter within the core of executive re- sponsibility. In doing so, the Court must consider not only the statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the Presidency itself. Pp. 26–29.
(c) The admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a “funda- mental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792. Although foreign nationals seeking admission have no constitutional right to entry, this Court has engaged in a cir- cumscribed judicial inquiry when the denial of a visa allegedly bur- dens the constitutional rights of a U. S. citizen. That review is lim- ited to whether the Executive gives a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for its action, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 769, but the Court need not define the precise contours of that narrow in- quiry in this case. For today’s purposes, the Court assumes that it may look behind the face of the Proclamation to the extent of apply- ing rational basis review, i.e., whether the entry policy is plausibly related to the Government’s stated objective to protect the country and improve vetting processes. Plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence may be considered, but the policy will be upheld so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of unconsti- tutional grounds. Pp. 30–32.
(d) On the few occasions where the Court has struck down a policy as illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny, a common thread has been that the laws at issue were “divorced from any factual context from which [the Court] could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 635. The Proclama- tion does not fit that pattern. It is expressly premised on legitimate purposes and says nothing about religion. The entry restrictions on Muslim-majority nations are limited to countries that were previous- ly designated by Congress or prior administrations as posing national security risks. Moreover, the Proclamation reflects the results of a worldwide review process undertaken by multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies. Plaintiffs challenge the entry suspension based on their perception of its effectiveness and wisdom, but the Court cannot substitute its own assessment for the Executive’s predictive judgments on such matters. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Pro- ject, 561 U. S. 1, 33–34.
Three additional features of the entry policy support the Govern- ment’s claim of a legitimate national security interest. First, since the President introduced entry restrictions in January 2017, three Muslim-majority countries—Iraq, Sudan, and Chad—have been re- moved from the list. Second, for those countries still subject to entry restrictions, the Proclamation includes numerous exceptions for vari- ous categories of foreign nationals. Finally, the Proclamation creates a waiver program open to all covered foreign nationals seeking entry as immigrants or nonimmigrants. Under these circumstances, the Government has set forth a sufficient national security justification to survive rational basis review. Pp. 33–38.
878 F. 3d 662, reversed and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., and THOMAS, J., filed concurring opinions. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.

Pubblicato in natsec | Contrassegnato | Lascia un commento

Sanctions after Brexit

This event explores the impact of Brexit on economic sanctions from different perspectives – law, policy, and industry. The first panel will discuss the new legal framework in the UK, the second will look at policy implications and sanctions relationships between the UK and the rest of the world (including the EU, UN and USA), and the third panel will examine the impact on industry and trade, including compliance and licensing. Please come with questions – the evening will be largely conversational and (we hope!) lively Q&A with our enormously experienced panelists, continued at a drinks reception afterwards.

https://brexit.law/2018/05/14/sanctions-after-brexit/
Sanctions after Brexit

Time: 4.30 PM – 7 PM then a drinks reception

Date: Thursday, 21st June 2018

Venue: The Lancaster Room
The Savoy (The River Entrance via Savoy Place off Victoria Embankment)
London
WC2R 0BP

LAW
Chair: Maya Lester QC, Brick Court Chambers
Giles Thomson, Deputy Director, Sanctions and Illicit Finance, HM Treasury
Miriam Gonzalez, Partner and Co-Chair of the International Trade and Government Regulation Practice, Dechert LLP
Nicky Smith, Deputy Director, Foreign & Commonwealth Office Legal Directorate
Chloe Cina, Lawyer and Sanctions Expert, former UK Head of Sanctions at HSBC
David Mortlock, Partner, Chair of Global Trade & Investment Group, Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
David Heaton, Brick Court Chambers

POLICY
Chair: David Anderson QC, Brick Court Chambers
Sir John Sawers, former Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)
Harold Hongju Koh, Former Legal Adviser of the US Department of State
Kimberly Prost, Canadian Judge on the International Criminal Court, former Ombudsperson for the UN Security Council Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee
Qudsi Rasheed, Deputy Director Sanctions, Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, Head of the Paris office and Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations
Dr Erica Moret, Senior Researcher at the Global Governance Centre at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
David Meale, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions, US Department of State

INDUSTRY
Chair: Maya Lester QC, Brick Court Chambers
Susan Lake, Head of Compliance Reinsurance EMEA, Swiss Re
Andy Wragg, Global Chief Compliance Officer, AXA Corporate Solutions
Che Sidanius, Global Head of Regulation & Industry Affairs, Thomson Reuters
William Dodsworth, Head of Financial Crime Policy, Barclays
Tom Keatinge, Director, RUSI’s Centre for Financial Crime & Security Studies
Peter Dale-Skinner, Head of Compliance, Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation

Pubblicato in Brexit, sanctions | Lascia un commento

IMPLEMENTING REGULATION on certain commercial policy measures concerning certain products originating in the United States of America – Regolamento di esecuzione relativo ad alcune misure di politica commerciale riguardanti determinati prodotti originari degli Stati Uniti d’America

CELEX32018R0886ENTXT

CELEX32018R0886ITTXT

Pubblicato in ecosec, trade, trade wars, WTO | Lascia un commento

Technical note on coordination of external security. Detail on the UK’s position on coordination on external security.

Technical note on coordination of external security
Detail on the UK’s position on coordination on external security.

Technical_Note_Coordination_on_External_Security – 21 June 2018

Sanctions are a key foreign policy tool,and much of our future cooperation on sanctions will flow from UK-EU consultation on foreign policy. The UK and EU will operate their own autonomous legal regimes for the imposition of sanctions. The UK regime is now set out in the UK’s Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, which became UK law on 23 May. This will include autonomy of decision making – the EU and the UK will choose independently when and how to use sanctions as a foreign policy tool. However, the nature of sanctions means that close UK-EU coordination would be of mutual benefit.

Building on the detail in the publications of 9 May and 24 May:

i. A significant proportion of existing EU sanctions derive from UK information and analysis. As such, maintaining dialogue in relation to these sanctions after the UK has left the EU will be of mutual importance to the UK and the EU. Coordination on these existing EU sanctions could include the sharing of information and analysis on current issues and seeking a common approach where that might be possible.

ii. For new EU sanctions imposed after the UK has left the EU, given that sanctions are a complex and technical tool, subject to litigation and often designed at pace, mechanisms to enable UK-EU coordination on a range of technical details could be of mutual benefit. Using our diplomatic and technical expertise on sanctions, including in Brussels, the UK can offer support if there is mutual interest in doing so. This might include a scenario where the UK and the EU decide that common sanctions should be imposed, in which case a coordination process to discuss the details of those sanctions could assist in ensuring as much consistency and efficacy as possible, e.g. having measures come into force at the same time will prevent the risk of asset flight, or looking to ensure that exemptions are analogous.

iii. In respect of reviews of sanctions listings the UK may be in a strong position to contribute to these reviews, particularly where those listings were originally proposed by the UK, including by providing relevant evidence and information.

Framework for the UK-EU Security Partnership
This presentation explains the UK Government’s vision for the future UK-EU Security Partnership. 9 May 2018

Technical note on consultation and cooperation on external security. Detail on the UK’s position on consultation and cooperation on external security – 24 May 2018

Technical note on the exchange and protection of classified information. Detail on the UK’s position on the exchange and protection of classified information – 25 May 2018

Pubblicato in Brexit, classifiedinfo, natsec, sanctions, Terrorismo | Lascia un commento

JOINT STATEMENT FROM THE EU NEGOTIATORS AND THE UK GOV ON PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS

JOINT STATEMENT FROM THE NEGOTIATORS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT ON PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 50 TEU ON THE UNITED KINGDOM’S ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION

Pubblicato in Brexit | Lascia un commento

EU adopts rebalancing measures in reaction to US steel and aluminium tariffs – L’UE adotta misure di riequilibrio in reazione ai dazi statunitensi sull’acciaio e sull’alluminio

IP-18-4220_IT

IP-18-4220_EN

IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 12.5 OF THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS OF PROPOSED SUSPENSION OF CONCESSIONS AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS

tradoc_156909

Pubblicato in ecosec, sanctions, trade, trade wars | Lascia un commento

Illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol: EU extends sanctions by one year. Annessione illegale della Crimea e di Sebastopoli: l’UE proroga le sanzioni di un anno.

Il 18 giugno 2018 il Consiglio ha prorogato fino al 23 giugno 2019 le misure restrittive in risposta all’annessione illegale della Crimea e di Sebastopoli da parte della Russia.

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/press/press-releases/2018/06/18/illegal-annexation-of-crimea-and-sevastopol-eu-extends-sanctions-by-one-year/

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/18/illegal-annexation-of-crimea-and-sevastopol-eu-extends-sanctions-by-one-year/

Pubblicato in Russia, sanctions | Lascia un commento

Banca d’Italia: Attuazione della politica monetaria ed Emergency Liquidity Assistance

Attuazione della politica monetaria ed Emergency Liquidity Assistance

La Banca d’Italia concorre a formulare la politica monetaria nell’area dell’euro attraverso la partecipazione del Governatore al Consiglio direttivo della Banca centrale europea (BCE). In qualità di membro del Consiglio direttivo, il Governatore della Banca d’Italia agisce in piena autonomia e indipendenza, contribuendo alle decisioni di politica monetaria anche sulla base dell’attività preparatoria condotta dai comitati e dai gruppi di lavoro dell’Eurosistema cui partecipano rappresentanti dell’Istituto. In virtù dei principi di decentramento operativo e sussidiarietà stabiliti a livello europeo, la Banca d’Italia partecipa all’attuazione della politica monetaria.

Pubblicato in ecosec | Lascia un commento

Fight against human trafficking in Libya: EU sanctions six human traffickers and smugglers in line with UN decision – Lotta contro la tratta degli esseri umani in Libia: l’UE sanziona sei trafficanti di esseri umani e passatori in linea con la decisione dell’ONU

Il 14 giugno il Consiglio ha recepito nel diritto dell’UE le sanzioni adottate il 7 giugno dalle Nazioni Unite che impongono il divieto di viaggio e il congelamento dei beni a sei trafficanti di esseri umani e passatori operativi in Libia, quattro cittadini libici e due eritrei . Le persone soggette alle sanzioni ricoprono un ruolo chiave nelle attività connesse alla tratta di esseri umani e al traffico di migranti in Libia e nei dintorni.

È la prima volta che le Nazioni Unite impongono sanzioni a trafficanti di esseri umani. La decisione del Comitato del Consiglio di sicurezza dell’ONU è il risultato degli sforzi coordinati di vari Stati membri dell’UE.

On 14 June, the Council transposed into EU law sanctions adopted by the United Nations on 7 June, imposing a travel ban and an asset freeze on six human traffickers and smugglers operating in Libya, four of Libyan nationality and two of Eritrean nationality. The individuals targeted by the sanctions are key figures in human trafficking and migrant smuggling activities in and around Libya.

It is the first time that the UN imposes sanctions against human traffickers. The decision by the UN Security Council committee was the result of coordinated efforts of several EU members states.

https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13371.doc.htm

Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration

Trovare soluzioni alle pressioni migratorie

Security Council Committee concerning Libya Adds Six Individuals to Its Sanctions List  | Meetings C

Pubblicato in migrazioni - migrations, sanctions | Contrassegnato , | Lascia un commento

La Corte di giustizia conferma il mantenimento del congelamento di capitali di Rami Makhlouf, cugino di Bachar al-Assad, per il periodo 2016-2017. The Court of Justice confirms that the fund-freezing measures imposed on Rami Makhlouf, cousin of Bashar al-Assad, must be maintained for the period 2016-2017.

Sentenza nella causa C-458/17 Rami Makhlouf / Consiglio
14 giugno 2018

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Pubblicato in sanctions | Lascia un commento

Bilancio UE: all’Europa che protegge 4,8 miliardi di € in finanziamenti per la sicurezza

IP-18-4125_IT

Per il prossimo bilancio a lungo termine dell’UE per il periodo 2021-2027 la Commissione propone un consistente aumento degli attuali finanziamenti destinati alla sicurezza: da 3,5 a 4,8 miliardi di €.

IP-18-4121_IT

Pubblicato in EUsec, natsec | Lascia un commento

WTO DS552: Norway v. United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products

On 13 June 2018, Norway requested consultations with the United States concerning certain measures imposed by the United States to allegedly adjust imports of steel and aluminium into the United States.

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds552_e.htm

Pubblicato in lawfare, trade, trade wars, USA, WTO | Lascia un commento

EMN: Annual Report on Migration and Asylum 2017

Annual Report on Migration and Asylum 2017

The effectiveness of return in EU Member States

The changing influx of asylum seekers in 2014- 2016: Member State responses Common Template of EMN Focussed Study 2017

Safe Country of Origin

Italy country factsheet_2016_en

Pubblicato in migrazioni - migrations, protezione internazionale | Lascia un commento

Ad-Hoc Query on Average cost and average length of reception for asylum seekers

Ad-Hoc Query on Average cost and average length of reception for asylum seekers

Pubblicato in migrazioni - migrations, protezione internazionale | Lascia un commento

The Charlevoix G7 Summit (almost) Joint Communique

The Charlevoix G7 Summit Communique

“4. We acknowledge that free, fair, and mutually beneficial trade and investment, while creating reciprocal benefits, are key engines for growth and job creation. We recommit to the conclusions on trade of the Hamburg G20 Summit, in particular, we underline the crucial role of a rules-based international trading system and continue to fight protectionism. We note the importance of bilateral, regional and plurilateral agreements being open, transparent, inclusive and WTO-consistent, and commit to working to ensure they complement the multilateral trade agreements. We commit to modernize the WTO to make it more fair as soon as possible. We strive to reduce tariff barriers, non-tariff barriers and subsidies.”

Pubblicato in trade, trade wars, WTO | Lascia un commento

1970 Libya Sanctions Committee adds leaders of a transational trafficking network or involved in brutal treatment of migrants to its sanctions list .

http://www.whatsinblue.org/2018/06/libya-reauthorisation-of-maritime-interdiction-and-addition-of-names-to-sanctions-list.php

1970 Libya Sanctions Committee adds individuals to its sanctions list

The six names were proposed by the Netherlands, supported by France, the UK, the US, and non-Council member Germany, for human rights abuses against migrants. They are the first new individuals to be designated for sanctions (travel ban and asset freeze) by the Libya Sanctions Committee, established by resolution 1970 (2011), since June 2011. In June 2015, two names were proposed for listing in the context of undermining the successful completion of Libya’s political transition. The names were put forward by France, Spain, the UK and the US, but silence was broken by China and Russia, effectively blocking the listing.

The sanctions against the individuals went into effect on 7 June under the listing criterion related to human rights abuses, pursuant to paragraph 22(a) of resolution 1970 (2011), paragraph 4(a) of resolution 2174 (2014) and paragraph 11(a) of resolution 2213 (2015). Four of the individuals (including two Libyan nationals and two Eritrean nationals) are leaders of a transnational trafficking network. One of these Libyan nationals also commands a militia involved in brutal treatment of migrants. A fifth is a Libya national who serves as the Commander of the Shuhada al-Nasr brigade and head of the Petrol Refinery Guard of Zawiya’s refinery, a central hub of migrant smuggling operations. A sixth, also a Libyan national, is the Commander of the regional Coast Guard in Zawiya.

The proposed listings were first put under silence procedure at the beginning of May.
At that time, the listings were explicitly supported by Libya and all Council members except Russia. Before the end of the silence procedure, Russia put a “technical hold” on the listings and asked for more information as well as the convening of a formal Committee meeting. It seems that Russia’s concerns were related to its generally cautious attitude towards the imposition of sanctions and their effectiveness. In addition, Russia inquired about potential national criminal proceedings against the targeted individuals and the role of nationals from countries of origin and destination in trafficking activities.

The Committee meeting requested by Russia took place on 25 May, with a representative from the Libyan delegation in New York present for part of the meeting to answer questions. The main argument from the member states that proposed the listings was that criminal networks profiting from migrant abuse threaten the peace, stability and security of Libya. The general belief was that Russia would not block the listings, considering that Libya and the African members of the Council supported them. Russia lifted their hold on 7 June.”

The 1970 Committee is mandated to consider designating individuals or entities on the basis of the criteria contained in paragraph 22 of resolution 1970 (2011), paragraph 23 of resolution 1973 (2011), paragraph 11 of resolution 2146 (2014), paragraph 4 of resolution 2174 (2014) paragraph 11 of resolution 2213 (2015) and paragraph 11 of resolution 2362 (2017).

https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1970

https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/en/libya.xsl

Resolution 2362 (2017)
Resolution 2213 (2015)
Resolution 2174 (2014)
Resolution 2146 (2014)
Resolution 1973 (2011)
Resolution 1970 (2011)

LYi.024 Name: 1: MUS’AB 2: ABU-QARIN 3: na 4: na
Title: na Designation: Leader of a transnational trafficking network DOB: 19 Jan. 1983 POB: Sabratha, Libya Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: a) ABU-AL QASSIM OMAR Musab Boukrin b) The Doctor c) Al-Grein Nationality: Libya Passport no: a) 782633, issued on 31 May 2005 b) 540794, issued on 12 Jan. 2008 National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 7 Jun. 2018 Other information: Listed pursuant to paragraphs
15 and 17 of resolution 1970 (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze) INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/

LYi.022 Name: 1: Fitiwi 2: Abdelrazak 3: na 4: na
Name (original script): ### ###### (Tigrinya)
Title: na Designation: Leader of a transnational trafficking network DOB: Approximately (30-35 years old) POB: Massaua, Eritrea Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: Fitwi Esmail Abdelrazak Nationality: Eritrea Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 7 Jun. 2018 Other information: Listed pursuant to paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution 1970 (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze)

LYi.021 Name: 1: Ermias 2: Ghermay 3: na 4: na
Name (original script): ##### #### (Tigrinya)
Title: na Designation: Leader of a transnational trafficking network DOB: Approximately (35-45 years old) POB: (possibly Asmara, Eritrea) Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: a) Ermies Ghermay b) Ermias Ghirmay Nationality: Eritrea Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: (Known address: Tripoli, Tarig
sure no. 51, likely moved to Sabratha in 2015.) Listed on: 7 Jun. 2018 Other information: Listed pursuant to paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution 1970 (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze)

LYi.025 Name: 1: Mohammed 2: Kachlaf 3: na 4: na
Title: na Designation: Commander of the Shuhada al-Nasr brigade, Head of the Petrol Refinery Guard of Zawiya’s refinery DOB: na POB: Zawiya, Libya Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: a) Kashlaf b) Koshlaf c) Keslaf d) al-Qasab Nationality: Libya Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: Zawiya, Libya Listed on: 7 Jun. 2018 Other information: Listed pursuant to paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution 1970 (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze)

LYi.023 Name: 1: Ahmad 2: Oumar 3: al-Dabbashi 4: na
Title: na Designation: Commander of the Anas al-Dabbashi militia, Leader of a transnational trafficking network DOB: Approximately (30 years old ) POB: (possibly Sabratha, Talil neighbourhood) Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: a) Al-Dabachi b) Al Ammu c) The Uncle d) Al-Ahwal Nationality: Libya Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: a) Garabulli, Libya b) Zawiya, Libya Listed on: 7 Jun. 2018 Other information: Listed pursuant to paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution 1970 (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze) INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/

LYi.026 Name: 1: Abd 2: Al-Rahman 3: al-Milad 4: na
Title: na Designation: Commander of the Coast Guard in Zawiya DOB: Approximately (29 years old) POB: Tripoli, Libya Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: a) Rahman Salim Milad b) al-Bija Nationality:
Libya Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: Zawiya, Libya Listed on: 7 Jun. 2018 Other information: Listed pursuant to paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution 1970 (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze) INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/

Pubblicato in Lybia, sanctions | Lascia un commento

Golden power: Next Ingegneria dei Sistemi s.p.a. / Defence Tech Holding s.r.l.

Il Consiglio dei ministri ha deliberato:

di esercitare, a tutela degli interessi essenziali della difesa e della sicurezza nazionale, i poteri speciali, con l’imposizione di condizioni e prescrizioni, in relazione all’operazione di acquisizione delle azioni costituenti l’intero capitale sociale della Next Ingegneria dei Sistemi s.p.a. da parte della società Defence Tech Holding s.r.l.;
di esercitare i poteri speciali con riferimento alla modifica della governance della società Reti Telematiche Italiane s.p.a derivante dall’assemblea degli azionisti del 27 aprile 2018, mediante l’imposizione di prescrizioni e condizioni volte a salvaguardare le attività strategiche della società nel settore delle comunicazioni.

Pubblicato in Golden Power | Lascia un commento

Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018

This is the first Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

UNODC, Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018

Pubblicato in migrazioni - migrations | Lascia un commento

The term ‘spouse’ within the meaning of the provisions of EU law on freedom of residence for EU citizens and their family members includes spouses of the same sex. La nozione di «coniuge», ai sensi delle disposizioni del diritto dell’Unione sulla libertà di soggiorno dei cittadini dell’Unione e dei loro familiari, comprende i coniugi dello stesso sesso

Judgment in Case C-673/16 – 5 June 2018

Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigr?ri andOthers

The term ‘spouse’ within the meaning of the provisions of EU law on freedom of residence for EU citizens and their family members includes spouses of the same sex

Although the Member States have the freedom whether or not to authorise marriage between persons of the same sex, they may not obstruct the freedom of residence of an EU citizen by refusing to grant his same-sex spouse, a national of a country that is not an EU Member State, a derived right of residence in their territory

———–

Sentenza nella causa C-673/16 – 5 giugno 2018

Relu Adrian Coman e a./Inspectoratul General pentru Imigr?ri e a.

La nozione di «coniuge», ai sensi delle disposizioni del diritto dell’Unione sulla libertà di soggiorno dei cittadini dell’Unione e dei loro familiari, comprende i coniugidello stesso sesso

Anche se gli Stati membri sono liberi di autorizzare o meno il matrimonio omosessuale, essi non possono ostacolare la libertà di soggiorno di un cittadino dell’Unione rifiutando di concedere al suoconiuge dello stesso sesso, cittadino di un Paese non UE, un diritto di soggiorno derivato sul loro territorio

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Pubblicato in EULaw | Lascia un commento

WTO DS551: Mexico v. United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products

On 5 June 2018, Mexico requested consultations with the United States concerning certain measures imposed by the United States to allegedly adjust imports of steel and aluminium into the United States.

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds551_e.htm

 

Pubblicato in lawfare, trade, trade wars, USA, WTO | Lascia un commento

JCPOA: a joint letter from Europe to USA

To: Steven MNUCHIN, Secretary of the Treasury, The United States of America
and Mike POMPEO, Department of State, The United States of America

Dear colleagues,
We strongly regret the decision taken by the United States to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA). We believe that the JCPoA, which was unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council, is critical for protecting our collective security interests.
Even though the United States has decided to withdraw from the JCPoA, we are still convinced that the JCPoA is the best means through which we can prevent a nuclear- armed Iran. There appears to be no credible alternatives at this time. As such, an Iranian withdrawal from the JCPoA would further unsettle a region where additional conflicts would be disastrous. We share most of the concerns expressed by the US regarding the status of Iran’s nuclear programme after 2025, Iran’s ballistic missiles programme, and its destabilising actions in the region. We believe that preserving the content of the JCPoA is the best basis on which to engage Iran and address these concerns.
As allies, we expect that the United States will refrain from taking action to harm Europe’s security interests. The E3 and the EU are committed to undertaking strong efforts to continue sanctions relief to Iran in order to uphold our commitments to the JCPoA for as long as Iran remains in compliance with its requirements. As you know, the International Atomic Energy Agency has recently confirmed for the 11th time that this remains the case. We therefore ask for your assurances that the US will not take actions that might undermine the ability to do this in line with UNSCR 2231. In their current state, US secondary sanctions could prevent the European Union from continuing meaningful sanctions relief to Iran.
Building on our discussions at several occasions, as close allies we expect that the extraterritorial effects of US secondary sanctions will not be enforced on EU entities and individuals, and the United States will thus respect our political decision and the good faith of economic operators within EU legal territory.
In support of this, we specifically request you to:
– grant exemptions from US sanctions for EU companies that initiated or concluded their contracts after JCPoA Implementation Day (16 January 2016).
– give public confirmation of areas of business that are exempt from US secondary sanctions, such as pharmaceuticals, healthcare; and grant exemptions to allow for economic relationships in key sectors, in particular in the fields of energy, automotive, civil aviation and infrastructure.
– grant exemptions to maintain banking channels and financing channels with Iran. This notably includes maintaining links with the Central Bank of Iran as well as with the other Iranian banks that are not sanctioned by the European Union and the preservation of financial messaging services (SWIFT) to these banks.
– grant extended and adapted winding-down periods according to the necessary time to properly wind down affected projects for companies that may eventually choose to withdraw from Iran.
– prolong General License H (foreign subsidiaries of US companies to be able to continue business).
– reaffirm the exemption for Embassy bank accounts.
Please note that these first requests are preliminary and do not aim to cover those that OFAC will directly receive from European companies. Our authorities stand ready to support them in this process.
We are sure that, building on our steadfast cooperation, we will manage to find swift and efficient remedies to these urgent concerns. Therefore, the E3 and the EU would welcome a constructive approach on the issues set above. Following this, we are ready to continue working together with you on matters of shared concern.
Sincerely yours,

Bruno Le Maire, Olaf Scholz, Philip Hammond, Heiko Maas, Jean-Yves Le Drian, Peter Altmaier, Boris Johnson, Federica Mogherini

Joint E3 letter on JCPoA

Pubblicato in natsec, sanctions | Lascia un commento

Migration flows in Europe

http://migration.iom.int/europe/

Flows_Compilation_Report_April_2018

Pubblicato in migrazioni - migrations, protezione internazionale | Lascia un commento

WTO DS548: EU v. United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products

On 1 June 2018, the European Union requested consultations with the United States concerning certain measures imposed by the United States to allegedly adjust imports of steel and aluminium into the United States.

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds548_e.htm

 

Pubblicato in lawfare, trade, trade wars, USA, WTO | Lascia un commento

WTO DS549: EU vs. China — Certain Measures on the Transfer of Technology

On 1 June 2018, the European Union requested consultations with China concerning certain measures imposed by China pertaining to the transfer of foreign technology into China.

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds549_e.htm

Pubblicato in China, lawfare, trade, trade wars, WTO | Lascia un commento

WTO DS550: Canada v. United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products

On 1 June 2018, Canada requested consultations with the United States concerning certain measures imposed by the United States to allegedly adjust imports of steel and aluminium into the United States.

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds550_e.htm

 

Pubblicato in lawfare, trade, trade wars, WTO | Lascia un commento